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Colin McKenzie*

INTEGRATING THE LAW OF THE RIO CHAMA
THROUGH INSTITUTIONAL ONTOLOGIES OF
THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE BASIN
Terror is lawfulness, if law is the law of the movement of some suprahuman force,
Nature or History. * * * If the essence of government is defined as lawfulness, and if
it is understood that laws are the stabilizing forces in the public affairs of men (as
indeed it always has been since Plato invoked Zeus, the god of the boundaries, in his
Laws), then the problem of movement of the body politic and the actions of its citizens
arises. Lawfulness sets limitations to actions, but does not inspire them; the
greatness, but also the perplexity of laws in free societies is that they only tell what
one should not, but never what one should do. The necessary movement of a body
politic can never be found in its essence if only because this essence—again since
Plato—has always been defined with a view to its permanence. Duration seemed one
of the surest yardsticks for the goodness of government
—Hannah Arendt^*
You want me to land on Earth? Why? — Because you’re hanging in midair, headed
for a crash? — How is it down there? — Pretty tense. — A war zone? — Close: a
Critical Zone, a few kilometers thick where everything happens. — Is it habitable?
— Depends on your chosen science. — Will I survive down there? — Depends on
your politics.
—Bruno Latour & Peter Wiebel&*

* Colin is an attorney and independent researcher; in a former life, a groundwater hydrologist. Until
recently he was inaugural fellow at the Natural Resources Use and Management Clinic at the University
of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. The research underlying this article began under the
direction of Adrian Oglesby, Director of the Utton Transboundary Resources Center at the University of
New Mexico School of Law. Parts of the article were subsequently drafted during the author’s fellowship
at the University of Arizona. There, Professors Priya Sundareshan, John Lacy, George Ruyle, Justin Pidot,
and James Hopkins, as well as Dean Marc Miller, provided invaluable support and encouragement,
feedback and critique, and a collegial institutional home. Further, the author would be remiss in not
acknowledging the tireless efforts of this Journal’s staff and editors. Finally, the author would like to
extend his heartfelt appreciation to Steve Harris, Mark Stone, and Mike Harvey for hosting the author on
two remarkable float trips down the Rio Chama and for sharing their unparalleled expertise on the Rio
Chama and the broader Rio Grande system; they are three remarkable scientists and river advocates.
^
HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 465, 466–67 (1976 ed. with added prefaces).
&
LATOUR & WIEBEL, infra note 1, at Cover.
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EDITORS’ NOTE: This work and appendices cited in the following article were
initially developed to support the Rio Chama Flow Project through the Utton
Transboundary Resources Center with funding from the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation. Specifically, this article is adapted from and expands on a report
prepared for Reclamation by the Utton Center, The Law of the Rio Chama (Sept. 25,
2019), on the legal aspects of the Rio Chama Reservoir Operations Pilot Project.
Relevant report findings are used with permission of the Utton Center and its initial
contributors. Additionally, Reclamation’s contemporaneous efforts are reported
in Rio Grande Basin SECURE Water Act Section 9503 Report to Congress (2021),
pursuant to the SECURE Water Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–11, 123 Stat. 1329.
That report can be found at: https://www.usbr.gov/climate/secure/docs/2021secure/
basinreports/RioGrandeBasin.pdf. All documents submitted to Congress can be
found at: https://www.usbr.gov.climate/secure, which also contains an interactive
web
tool,
the
2021
SECURE
Report
Web
Portal,
available
at: https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/7461ca68b2da4620863ff27d65b8cf14.
To access the appendix information, as cited in this article, please contact the author
at: cpmckenz@gmail.com.
ABSTRACT
The Law of the River is paradigmatically the legal and policy
framework for river basin governance in the largely arid Western
United Sates. In parsing this notoriously arcane body of law,
complexity theory and jurisprudence, or the philosophy of law, are
useful tools. This work develops and applies a conceptual model
of the Middle Rio Grande basin as a social–ecological system in
an attempt to improve understanding, transparency, and a sense
of meaning of the so-called Law of the River. This project
confronts the legal ecology of the “Great River” and its principle
middle valley tributary, northern New Mexico’s Rio Chama,
through the lens of what it takes to operationalize instream
ecological flows. The overarching “legal mapping” analysis
draws on various strands of theory and practice coalescing
around the diversity of institutions—or “institutional
ontologies”—which, employing techniques of material culture, or
new materialism, are constitutive of and indeed construct the Law
of the River.
On the question of instream flows, the legal analysis is mainly
descriptive, prescriptive, and ethical by nature. It also draws on a
significant body of interdisciplinary scholarship and applied
research into the coupled legal–operational framework for New
Mexico’s Rio Grande reservoirs. Especially relevant are the
efforts of the Rio Chama Flow Project, a multistakeholder
initiative studying and advocating for multi-objective instream
flows on the Wild and Scenic-designated reach of the Rio Chama
between El Vado and Abiquiu reservoirs. This otherwise largely
untouched stream segment is, paradoxically, a highly engineered
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system and a core part of the transbasin water transfer under
Reclamation’s San Juan–Chama Project. Owing to these marked
contrasts, the Rio Chama is, therefore, ripe for scientific and
institutional analysis, which is where this article joins the relay,
with its unpacking of the mechanisms for instream flow innovation
there. But the Rio Chama Flow Project’s original legal
hypothesis—that these instream, ecological flows can be further
optimized throughout novel applications of hitherto underutilized
“flexibility” in existing legal authorities, requires refining.
As this article asserts, we must urgently and fundamentally
reorient ourselves with respect to the Law of River considering: 1)
the manifold contingencies and historic processes which it rests
upon; 2) the planetary forces and mission-critical exigencies of
global climate, as reflected in local social–hydrologic conditions;
together with 3) the core attendant issues of justice—including
indigenous rights and settler colonialism—all in a fundamentally
transboundary, entangled assemblage. To put it more prosaically,
a complex, adaptive system. Because the Law of the River is such
an apparent lingua franca or boundary object, the ontology of this
legal framework is an idoneous starting point, methodologically
and substantively, since canonical water law and policy belie that
constitutive diversity of this not merely abstract but situated,
material, and embodied, body of law.
INTRODUCTION
The Rio Grande is constitutive of a “Critical Zone” undergirding life in
many forms.1 The river flows from Colorado, through New Mexico, then to Texas,
and empties into the Gulf of Mexico. It tracks the entirety of the boundary between
Texas and Mexico.2 Like the river itself, the Middle Rio Grande Basin is a complex,
adaptive system, especially considering the management and governance of its
waters—the Critical Zone’s lifeblood. The rules governing such waters, both legally
and institutionally, are codified in the so-called Law of the River.3 Such “rules”

1. BRUNO LATOUR AND PETER WIEBEL EDS., CRITICAL ZONES: THE SCIENCE & POLITICS OF
LANDING ON EARTH (2020).
2. Mexico’s full name is Estados Unidos Mexicanos, i.e., the United Mexican States.
3. See generally Adell Amos, Developing the Law of the River, 62 KANS. L. REV. 1092 (2014);
James Robison, The Law of the Colorado River: A Contemporary Perspective on its Transformation
(2013) (unpublished dissertation, Harvard Law School) (on file with author).
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contain multiform infrastructural,4 institutional,5 cultural6 and other such elements.7
An entangled assemblage,8 the resultant institutional ontologies require integral
heuristics and analytics to properly convey their constitutive diversity, critical to
justice and to the continued survival and dignity of human life and that of our morethan-human relations.
While the Law of the River can be quite abstract, grounded notions of
climate justice and related matters9 help to foreground, and thus highlight the Middle
Rio Grande system’s precarity.10 As of this writing, the basin is projected to
experience the worst spring runoff conditions in nearly 70 years, with much of New
Mexico facing “exceptional drought conditions.”11 This precarity highlights threats
to human life, culture, and survival and the urgency, stakes, and scope of the policy
responses needed. Still, “you can’t manage what you don’t measure,” as the maxim
goes. And so, an adequate mapping of these manifold agents, structures, and
behaviors—emergent properties themselves—must not only be done, but
disseminated and deliberated, urgently, and transparently.12 This exercise, while
daunting and slow-moving, would be a step toward addressing the critical,
intertwined threats to life and dignity posed by global change and adjacent resourceconsuming political economies, such as settler colonialism. These economic systems
and attendant human and environmental effects are deeply rooted, historically and
racially. They are also, importantly, present realities in the Western United States
4. Cf. ANDREA BALLESTERO, A FUTURE HISTORY OF WATER (2019).
5. Cf. KATHARINA PISTOR AND OLIVIER DE SCHUTTER EDS., GOVERNING ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL
RESOURCES (2015); ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY (2005).
6. Cf. HERMAN GRAY AND MACARENA GÓMEZ–BARRIS EDS., TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF THE
TRACE (2010).
7. Cf. Robison, supra note 3; William K. Jaeger et al., Finding Water Scarcity Amid Abundance
Using Human–Natural Systems Models, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCIENCE (2017);
BALLESTERO, supra note 4.
8. See, e.g., IAN HODDER, ENTANGLED: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
HUMANS AND THINGS (2012); MANUEL DELANDA, ASSEMBLAGE THEORY (2016) (drawing on the
concepts of “entanglement” and “assemblage [theory]” as developed by such scholars as anthropologist
Ian Hodder and philosopher Manuel DeLanda).
9. See, e.g., Darren Modzelwski, Pueblo Water Rights, in INDIGENOUS JUSTICE: NEW TOOLS,
APPROACHES, AND SPACES 53, 53–68 (Jennifer Hendry et al., eds., 2018); Richard Hughes, Pueblo Indian
Water Right: Charting the Unknown, 57 NAT. RES. J. 219 (2017).
10. See, e.g., LAURA PASKUS, AT THE PRECIPICE: NEW MEXICO’S CHANGING CLIMATE (2020);
ELIZABETH KOLBERT, THE SIXTH EXTINCTION: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY; WILLIAM DEBUYS, A GREAT
ARIDNESS: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN SOUTHWEST (2011).
11. See Theresa Davis, NM Water Managers Warn Communities to Prepare for Low Rio Grande,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Jan. 31, 2021, 10:36 pm), https://www.abqjournal.com/2354734/nm-water-managerswarn-communities-to-prepare-for-low-rio-grande.html (MRGCD chief engineer and CEO forecasting
worst “water shortages and storage restrictions . . . since the 1950s”); Hannah Grover, Amid Drought,
Interstate Stream Commissions Seeks Federal Support, NM Political Rpt. (May 2, 2021),
https://nmpoliticalreport.com/2021/05/02/amid-drought-interstate-stream-commission-seeks-federalsupport/.
12. Cf. Robison, supra note 3; see, e.g., Burke W. Griggs, The Political Cultures of Irrigation and
the Proxy Battles of Interstate Water Litigation, 57 NAT. RES. J. 1, 12 (2017); James Ragsdale, Jr., Anasazi
Jurisprudence, 22 AMER. INDIAN L. REV. 392; VINE DELORIA, JR., METAPHYSICS OF MODERN
EXISTENCE (2012; paperback ed.); BALLESTERO, supra note 4; ERIC P. PERRAMOND, UNSETTLED
WATERS: RIGHTS, LAW, AND IDENTITY IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2018).
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(“U.S.”) and, in particular, New Mexico. Unpacking and integrating these realities
provides a crucial perspective for formulating ethical policy responses to the
manifold challenges facing river basin governance in the arid West.
The legal and policy framework for river basin governance is the so-called
Law of the River. Complexity theory and jurisprudence are both useful, if seldom
used, tools for parsing this notoriously complex, arcane body of law. Towards such
a challenging meaning-making exercise, this article develops and applies a
conceptual model to make sense of the Middle Rio Grande Basin as a notional
social–ecological system in terms of a legal ecology of the Rio Grande and the Rio
Chama, its principal tributary north of Mexico. Such a legal mapping analytic draws
on various strands of theory and praxis coalescing around ontology. The model
comprises descriptive and prescriptive elements which, however provisionally
integrated, point to and roughly sketch some contours of critical emergent ethical
dimensions of water law, policy, and management—and of natural resource use and
management more generally. This empirical–theoretical method also draws on new
materialism—a transdisciplinary field which proffers “an ontological
reconceptualization of the material world”13 and related approaches, such as legal
geography,14 to think about the problematics imminent in paradigmatic political
economy, which no doubt extend into the natural resources’ domain.15
This article draws on earlier research into legal and operational aspects of
reservoir operations in the system, work which has often been carried out under the
auspices of the Rio Chama Flow Project, in collaboration with its various
stakeholders, and researchers. The Flow Project obtains funding from the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”), the de facto water master of the rivers
Chama and Grande. Flows on the Rio Chama are driven by Reclamation’s transbasin
San Juan–Chama Project. This transdisciplinary, multistakeholder initiative has been
promoting, and operationalizing, ecological, flows on a federally designated “Wild
and Scenic”16 segment of the Rio Chama between El Vado and Abiquiu reservoirs
in northern New Mexico. These two reservoirs are operated and managed by
Reclamation, and the Army Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”). Unsurprisingly, this
13. Melinda H. Benson, New Materialism: an Ontology for the Anthropocene, 59 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 251, 253 (2019) [hereinafter M.H. Benson (2019)] (offering, by way of explanation, new materialism’s
alternative guises: “post-humanism, agential realism, and new or vital materialism,” i.e., those field fields
representing a “move away from the centrality of the human and toward a more complex and relational
perspective” on life, e.g., politics for take but one example).
14. See, e.g., Melinda Morgan, Rules of Engagement: The Spatiality of Judicial Review, in THE
EXPANDING SPACES OF LAW: A TIMELY LEGAL GEOGRAPHY (2014).
15. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Settler Colonialism and Reclamation: Where American Indian Law and
Natural Resources Law Meet, 24 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVT’L. L. REV. 261, 264–83, 285 (2013)
(arguing that “in response to the thorny questions . . . how tribes should be able both to quantify and use
their water today, answers should be consistent with the goal of unraveling our settler-colonial past”)
(internal citation omitted); cf. Melinda Morgan, Mining Sacred Space: Law Enactment of Competing
Ontologies in the American West, 44 ENVT’L & PLANNING A 44: 1443 (2012); see Eduardo Galeano,
OPEN VEINS OF LATIN AMERICA: FIVE CENTURIES OF THE PILLAGE OF A CONTINENT (Engl. trans. 1997)
(giving the classic account of this phenomenon in the Americas but do note that, for what it is worth, the
author later disavowed the work; see Larry Rohter, Author Changes His Mind on 70s Manifesto, N.Y.
Times (May 23, 2014), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/books/eduardo-galeanodisavows-his-book-the-open-veins.html).
16. Krakoff, supra note 15.
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otherwise largely untouched Wild and Scenic segment of the Rio Chama is
nonetheless a highly engineered system. This apparent paradox results from a
large—approximately 100,000 acre-feet per year—transbasin water transfer, from
the Colorado River Basin to the Rio Grande Basin. This transfer, by means of the
San Juan–Chama Project, primarily serves the City of Albuquerque and the state’s
largest irrigation district, the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District (“MRGCD”).
The Rio Chama Flow Project’s original legal hypothesis, that ecological
flows on the river and elsewhere in the Middle Rio Grande Basin can be optimized
by underutilized flexibility in existing legal authority, requires refining. History’s
manifold contingencies, projected climate change-related decrease surface water
flows, and core issues of justice—including indigenous rights—are but a sampling
of the many reasons why. Whether ecological flows can be improved by way of
underutilized flexibility in existing legal authority, and the consequent question of
how to effectuate such innovations, requires investigation of what the Law of the
River is, exactly. This descriptive task frames the approach taken to water
governance in the Middle Rio Grande, particularly complex adaptive system with
attendant ontological registers. The jurisprudential, legal, analytical, and ethical
issues in such an approach suggest a learning agenda that would pose policy
questions whose effective resolution is necessary to maintain the just and dignified
habitability of the Critical Zone. These far-from-straight-ahead legal issues implicate
paradigm shifts, squarely confronting matters of institutional economics, and
complex adaptive systems, for example, harkening to the Bloomington school of
political economy17 and the Santa Fe school of complexity theory,18 respectively.
Complexity and law, in turn, intersect by way of computational legal
analysis,19 which though quantitative in terms of its use of legal texts as data,
nonetheless provides a useful conceptual framework—legal analytics, as one of its
leading scholars, Kevin Ashley, calls it.20 As it turns out, legal analytics has been
employed as a front-line water management tool going back nearly two decades.
Indeed, the flagship Upper Rio Grande Water Operations Model (“URGWOM”),
used by all major water managers in the Middle Rio Grande, models water allocation
and use through 200 discrete extant law and policy rules.21 The law and policy rules
and concomitant ontologies required to cope with such complex systems in the face
of threats to human survival, to take but one example, are far from academic. The
relevance of this application of legal analytic has grown, if anything.22 As this article
will show, the assemblage they comprise represents myriad entanglements, from

17. Cf. OSTROM, supra note 5.
18. WORLDS HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE EVOLVING IDEA OF COMPLEXITY AT THE SANTA FE
INSTITUTE 1984–2019 (David Krakauer ed.) (2019) (overviewing the Santa Fe Institute’s work in this
field, spanning the nearly four decades).
19. See, e.g., LAW AS DATA: COMPUTATION, TEXT AND THE FUTURE OF LEGAL ANALYSIS (Michael
A. Livermore and Daniel N. Rockmore, eds., 2019); Eric Williamson, In New Book, Michael Livermore
Delves int Data’s Possibilities, Univ. of Virginia News & Media (June 3, 2019) (containing embedded
link to a short interview and a podcast episode featuring Prof. Livermore on this topic).
20. See KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS (2017).
21. Craig Boroughs, Upper Rio Grande Water Operations Model (URGWOM): RiverWare Ruleset
Documentation, Version 5.0.2 (Sept. 12, 2013) [hereinafter URGWOM Ruleset].
22. Id.
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political ecological to geomorphology. Popular, even expert, discourse often falsely
distinguishes between the legal and the physical, and between the social–ecological
and the phenomenological, etc.
Notwithstanding the urgency of operationalizing legally defensible
instream flows and, to this end, refining the Flow Project’s legal flexibility, the
hypothesis is admirably simple and elegant. This adaptive management-flavored
hypothesis appears quite appropriate, if at first blush unremarkable, given the
setting’s thoroughgoing transboundary architecture.23 Within this networked,
polycentric system of governance, where “colors” of water and attendant legal
authorities are multiple and manifest in various social–ecological configurations,
their disposition implicates multiple valences and plural fields, which implicate
fundamental ontological issues in law and society.24 This then implicates our
fundamental orientation to the material world—and each other.25 Throughout the
West, legal arguments like those implied by a narrow view of the Law of the River
or of the legal flexibility hypothesis both belie the constitutive diversity of what the
law of the river is, exactly.26 This article attempts to first describe such complexity
and then engage a meaning-making investigation27 whose coupled empirical and
analytical dimensions28 attempt to address the crucial threats of climate change and
concomitant water insecurity vis-à-vis life, dignity, and justice in the Middle Rio
Grande Basin.
In the so-called Anthropocene,29 “past performance” is certainly “no
longer” any “guarantee of future returns,” as the investment maxim goes.30 As
various scholars and scientists have argued that the Law of the River is ripe for
transformational analyses.31 Their work has, in turn, identified a slew of critically
applied research questions.32 Underscoring this “Anthropocentric” moment, one pair
23. Water flows in the Middle Rio Grande in a truly liminal setting: ecologically and culturally, but
also through more than a half dozen sovereigns.
24. M.H. Benson (2019), supra note 13.
25. Id.
26. Salt River Water Users’ Ass’n v. Kovacovich, 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411 P.2d. 201 (1966).
27. See, e.g., Nicholas Blomley, The Boundaries of Property: Complexity, Relationality, and
Spatiality, 50 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 224, 224 (2016).
28. See generally DAVID GROENFELDT, WATER AND ETHICS: A VALUES APPROACH TO SOLVING THE
WATER CRISIS (2013).
29. See generally, Kolbert, supra note 10 (As our planet faces what may appears to be the sixth-ever
mass extinction event, it could be said that such a centering of the human at this critical juncture does
more harm than good, as various scholars have argued); see, e.g., KATHRYN YUSOFF, A BILLION BLACK
ANTHROPOCENES OR NONE 4 (2019) (this purported geologic epoch, offers a “view from nowhere,” which
points to, on its face, our “becoming post-racial through Anthropocentric speciation,” but really is a “foil
of the humanist trickster—one that places an injunction on the recognition of historic modes of
geopolitical mattering while maintaining unequal relations of power through continued environmental
exposures.”) (quoting Toni Morrison’s caution against such “metaphoric shortcuts” who language can
“evoke and enforce hidden signs of racial superiority, cultural hegemony, and dismissive ‘othering’ of
people and language”).
30. Cf. e.g., BALLESTERO, supra note 4 (regarding “so-called” Anthropocene); see also, e.g., Jaeger,
supra note 7.
31. Amos, supra note 3.
32. See Jaeger, supra note 7; see also Amos, supra note 3, at 1092–93; Robison, supra note 3, at
391–404.
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of water law scholars have called for the “[e]nd of [s]ustainability” as the
paradigmatic political response to the exigencies of global change.33 This mode
eschews traditional environmental governance for a resilience-based adaptive
management that draws from complexity theory and emphasizes, for example, a
“narrative of connection” and “living a new story.”34 Such a perspective is nothing
new.35 However, it accords with a growing chorus of voices in rejecting the view of
humans as separate from nature, which is embedded in doctrinal environmental
law.36 To wit, many indigenous scholars offer convincing rejections of this sort of
Cartesian dualism, through narratives that have been present from time immemorial,
and continue to resonate.37 These integrated perspectives provide a powerful lens
into the entangled aspects of water, environmental, and natural resources law and
policy.38
As developed herein, practical–empirical analysis offers insight to water
managers and others, although modest contributions to the Law of the River
jurisprudence may incidentally result. From the empirical standpoint, this work
assembles a first-of-its kind Law of the Rio Chama. This framework was developed
to support Reclamation’s and other stakeholders’ efforts of optimizing the Middle
Rio Grande Basin water and reservoir operations for resilience and environmental
flows. As a result of the first phase of the Rio Chama Flow Project’s legal analysis,
which this article articulates and extends, Reclamation has exhibited interest in
further refining and documenting this system’s legal complexity.
This article employs Ruhl and Katz’s (2019) “legal mapping” methodology
to better represent the complexity of this river, and thus improve Rio Chama water
management towards the goal of operationalizing non-zero sum ecological flows.39
Here, legal mapping will question the systemic complexity of the Law of the River
in terms of the system’s structure and behavior and with an eye towards—as Ruhl
and Katz highlight—the important tasks of measuring and, prospectively, monitoring
and stress-testing the system within such complexity regime.40 The tasks, in the
mapping model, incorporate elements of design—for example, routines, protocols,
and technical tools. They also implicate management, such as measurement of
system and behavior—for example, network analytics and feedback, respectively.
Critical, too, is the task gaging system risk whereby, in the “legal mapping” domain
one can think in terms of “stress tests,” data feeds and “dashboards,” and post33. MELINDA HARM BENSON & ROBIN CRAIG, THE END OF SUSTAINABILITY: RESILIENCE AND THE
FUTURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN THE ANTHROPOCENE (2017).
34. See generally id.
35. See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THIS LAND IS OUR LAND: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW COMMONWEALTH
(2019).
36. Id; see also JEDEDIAH PURDY, AFTER NATURE: A POLITICS FOR THE ANTHROPOCENE (2017).
37. See generally NICK ESTES, OUR HISTORY IN THE FUTURE (2019); ROZANNE DUNBAR– ORTIZ,
AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2015); Ragsdale, Jr., supra note 12.
38. See generally Modzelwski, supra note 9; cf. MARTIN SHELDRAKE, ENTANGLED LIFE: HOW
FUNGI MAKE OUR WORLDS, CHANGE OUR MINDS, AND SHAPE OUR FUTURES (2020); YUSOFF, supra note
29; JUSSI PAPRIKA, A GEOLOGY OF MEDIA (2015); ANNA TSING, THE MUSHROOM AT THE END OF THE
WORLD: ON THE POSSIBILITY OF LIFE IN CAPITALIST RUINS (2014).
39. J.B. Ruhl & Daniel Katz, Mapping Law’s Complexity with “Legal Maps,” in COMPLEXITY
THEORY AND LAW: MAPPING AN EMERGENT JURISPRUDENCE, ch. 2 (2019).
40. Id. at 37–42.

Summer 2021

WATER LAW, COMPLEXITY, AND JURISPRUDENCE

261

mortem analysis. In this connection, Reclamation and partners have pursued a more
sophisticated modelling of complexity and system behavior, through updates to
URGWOM.41 This physical–computational mode is used to manage surface water
from Colorado to Texas. The model contains a hierarchy of rules which reflect the
taxonomy of legal authorities, from the Rio Grande Compact to the myriad
operational—and arguably discretionary—decisions implemented by Reclamation,
the Corps, and other water managers, such as the MRGCD. The legal mechanisms—
indeed, legal authority—underlying this rule-based, complex (adaptive) system as
captured, for example, in URGWOM, would appear amenable to rigorous analysis.
Conceivably, the same type of algorithm-assisted decision-making water managers
employ by URGWOM could be applied to deconstruct this model towards an
improved understanding of the system. One possible framework for such a project is
Kevin D. Ashley’s “legal analytics,” described in, Artificial Intelligence and Legal
Analytics: New Tools for Law Practice in the Digital Age.42
More practically, this article also reports empirical results generated from
the overarching exercise, developing a legal analysis appropriately attuned to the
exigencies of the Rio Chama Flow Project’s ecological flow optimization efforts.
Philosophy aside, this article asserts that such empirical work is part and parcel of
conceptual model development for a complexity theory-based legal analytics
applicable to a real-world Law of the River.
Following that initial reportage, the article proposes a Law of the Riverbased conceptual model to capture the system’s interdependent legal complexities.
This conceptual model would comprise code-based legal reasoning which represents
the relevant legal concepts (rules) in ontological terms (i.e., what is). To wit,
Reclamation’s rule based URGWOM is an idoneous starting point. To extend this
framework, the article also considers a case study in reservoir-based water
management, a pulse flow event on the Rio Chama in 2016. In doing so, it describes
and analyzes a flow operation which required the assent of the Rio Grande Compact
Commission through an official Resolution of the tri-state authority, called a
Resolution Hydrograph. In the same spirit, the article also comes to revisit one
canonical interpretation of legal authority underlying a prominent tool for water
management flexibility along the Rio Chama, the Heron Waiver, which permits
contractors of San Juan–Chama Project water to take delivery of their Project annual
water allotments within a certain period.
This work is also intended to be used as an adaptive management tool,
helping to parse a complex system, and thus facilitate efficacious responses to water
insecurity, which simultaneously indexes other critical issues of human wellbeing.43
41. Cf. URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21; see generally CRAIG BOROUGHS, USER MANUAL FOR
WATER OPERATIONS AND FORECAST A MODULES OF URGWOM FOR PREPARING ANNUAL OPERATING
PLANS, WATER OPS MODEL ᴠ-4.1.2 [hereinafter URGWOM Model v–4.1.2 User Manual] (2010).
42. ASHLEY, supra note 20.
43. See generally Kathleen Moore, Optimizing Reservoir Operations to Adapt to 21st Century
Expectations of Climate and Social Change in the Willamette River Basin, Oregon, Ph.D. Diss. (Oregon
St. Univ., June 2015); Mary Tchamkina, Evaluating the Need for Adaptation for U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers Wilmington District Reservoirs, Masters Thesis (Duke Univ., April 2016); see also RIO
CHAMA FLOW PROJECT, DRAFT PROPOSAL (Nov. 13, 2015) [hereinafter RCFP PROPOSAL] (intended
outcomes) (noting goal of legal analysis to “prevent . . . institutional and operational constraints to
modifying flows and storage” from becoming “fixed and inflexible”); Melinda Harm Benson, Ryan

262

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 61

Towards such resilience, it contributes to a growing portfolio of applied research
showing that institutional and operational constraints on modifying flows and storage
need not be treated as fixed and inflexible.44 Next, it represents a curation of
innovative water management responses in the Middle Rio Grande, historic and
contemporary, and thus memorializes and transparently documents actual examples
of reservoir operations flexibility, notably in the reservoir operations context.
Historical bases for many operational constraints are characterized to show how the
relevant assumptions may not be invalid.45 In the end, the investigation underlying
this article reveals that discretion is regularly exercised by water managers and
recognizes this flexibility paradigm occurs both within and goes beyond existing
legal authority. Similarly, it presents a refinement of the legal flexibility hypothesis
for in-stream flows. Finally, it presents some options to extend the discretion–
flexibility paradigm.
Moving from theoretical inquiries to practical modes, this work responds to
stakeholder interest in refining water management decision-support tools for the Rio
Grande Basin. Foremost among these tools is URGWOM, which is used by many
government agencies, federal, state, and local, and which clearly captures the
canonical elements of the Law of the River in stunning detail. Building on and
conceptually going beyond URGWOM’s rule-based system and dynamic modeling
framework and similar approaches,46 this article thus contributes to a more nuanced
understanding of the information processing, feedback, and feedforward
mechanisms which produce a structure of interconnected and interdependent agents
throughout the system. These components are all the hallmarks of a complex,
adaptive system.
Such legal–philosophical exploration of the political economy of water in
the arid West, through the more integral dimensions of culture, livelihood, wellbeing,
survival, and justice is as timely and relevant as ever. For example, while the Rio
Grande and Rio Chama are not subject to active litigation like the San Pedro in
Arizona, the Lower Rio Grande is, although stayed pending the resolution of the
Texas v. New Mexico original action before the U.S. Supreme Court. In that case, as
in the active water rights adjudication in Arizona’s San Pedro Basin, it could well be
Morrison, and Mark Stone, A Classification Framework for Running Adaptive Management Rapids, 18
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, No. 3, Art. 30, at [PDF] pp. 3–8, esp. tbls. 2, 3 (2013)) [hereinafter M.H. Benson
(2013)] (presenting a conceptual model for adaptive management and river restoration in the context of
the Rio Chama).
44. See, e.g., Victor Flatt & Jeremy Tarr, Adaptation, Legal Resiliency, and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers: Managing Water Supply in a Climate-Altered World, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1499 (2011) (analyzing
legal authority for Corps’ reservoir operations with eye to (a) “preserving flexibility by exercising
discretionary authority in inherent in common Corps’ decisions” and “recognizing the flexibility paradigm
and making it operational”).
45. Melinda Harm Benson, et al., Water Governance Challenges in New Mexico’s Middle Rio
Grande Valley: A Resilience Assessment, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 195, 205–18 (2014) [hereinafter M.H. Benson
(2014)] (suggesting avenues for “more flexible and adaptive strategies for water storage and delivery,”
highlighting institutional constraints (including operations restrictions at Heron and El Vado but noting
that “changes are possible,” giving the example of ca. 2007–10 Cochiti Deviation(s) and historical basis
of many constraints, including “many . . . assumptions . . . [which] are now known to be invalid”).
46. See, e.g., Ryan Morrison, Managing Complex Water Resource Systems for Ecological Integrity:
Evaluating Tradeoffs and Uncertainty (2014) (civil engineering Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of New Mexico)
(on file with author and the University of New Mexico).
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said the “human abstractions of the natural world” at issue—namely, the distinction
between groundwater and surface water—resultantly lend themselves to infinite
debate, as if “to suit one’s purposes.”47 While such philosophical musings are
surprising, though not dispositive, when uttered by a government attorney in a legal
brief, the abstraction was precisely the mark for Deloria’s critical analysis48 in his
creative, emergent Metaphysics.49 These “absurd result[s]” of Western water law,
that endless recursion, with which Deloria engaged are thus becoming increasingly
recognized.50
Part I inquires into and describes the premises underlying the article’s
overarching argument. That core assertion is that ecological precarity and myriad
interdependencies of the Middle Rio Grande basin merit—demand, really—an
adequate mapping of its variegated components, infrastructure, institutions, culture,
and history, among other elements. That background narrative foregrounds the
prescriptive issues which Part II pursues and highlights in terms of the Law of the
Rio Grande and Rio Chama. This descriptive project builds on preliminary results,
both scientific and legal, of the interdisciplinary Rio Chama Flow Project’s longtime
in-stream, ecological flow science and advocacy work. Building on this legal–
operational, adaptive management framework, then, Part III presents contemporary
views of the Law of the River, by contrasting it with more orthodox interpretations,
and thus evaluating what these respective frames of reference fundamentally
constitute, hereby hinting at why the entrenched, reductive, and paradigmatic view
is misguided. Traces of important world-making possibilities of alternative
interpretations are foreshadowed here as technical water management tools,
including powerful physical–mathematical models that are compared with a suite of
largely cooperative, negotiated agreements, and water exchanges and transfers.
Part IV, the core of the article, applies the complexity jurisprudence
framework thus developed to present more realistic, if not truly integral Law of the
River, proceeding in three main steps. First, it explores the legal analysis of a 1983
Department of the Interior Solicitor’s legal opinion rejected, then abruptly blessed, a
flexibility-generating interpretation of Congressional authorization of the transbasin
San Juan–Chama Project diversion. This legal authority for so-called “carryover
waivers” for storage San Juan–Chama Project water past year-end may be longeststanding source of reservoir operations and thus water management flexibility on the
47. In Re: The General Adjudication of All Water Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and
Source, Contested Case No. W1–103, In re San Pedro Subflow Technical Report, U.S. Response Brief 3–
4, 4, filed Nov. 13, 2019 (arguing against, in longstanding case which has not yet finally resolved the
distinction, if any, between surface water and groundwater in an groundwater-fed desert stream system,
against premise that “classifications of water exists in nature,” highlighting the “logical fallacy of
reification” of such a proposition and noting that man-made abstractions as “the map” or “the terrain” are
“mere approximation, the accuracy of which one may questions, revisit, and debate ad infinitum, to suit
one’s purposes”).
48. DELORIA, supra note 12, at 179 (interpreting the prior appropriation case which providing
Arizona’s rule regarding “salvaged” water, Salt River Water Users’ Ass’n v. Kovacovich, 3 Ariz. App. 28,
411 P.2d. 201 (1966)) (observing, trenchantly, that if “our legal system reflects our view of reality, [] we
believe we exist [] apart from the physical world”).
49. See, e.g., DELORIA, supra note 12.
50. U.S. Response Brief 4, W1-103, In re San Pedro Subflow Technical Report (Nov. 13, 2019)
(“absurd result,” i.e., parochial debate and thus recursion “ad infinitum”).
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Rio Chama. This case suggests opportunities for creative legal analysis, even as it
long preceded technical water resources modeling, which aid current efforts. One
venue suggested for such integrated legal analytics if is the case of storage pursuant
to the Prior and Paramount water rights of the Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos, also
discussed. Second, it deconstructs the coupled legal–practical underpinnings of the
“Resolution Hydrograph” of 2016—an experimental instream ecological “pulse
flow” event on the Chama blessed by the eponymous authorizing issued by Rio
Grande Compact Commission. Finally, Part IV reflects on this foray into innovative
empirical aspects of MRG water governance, offering some potential flexibility
mechanisms, highlighting too the political–ecological elements of the conceptual
model presented—often overlooked by canonical representation of the Law of the
River.
I. BACKGROUND
The geology, history, geography, and ecology of the Rio Grande Basin
yields an appropriate—and unique—setting for studying reservoir operations, their
legal framework, and the potential adaptive capacity of each in the face of global
changes. Diversity produces resilience51 and the Rio Grande Basin has a rich history
that is characterized by geographic and cultural diversity.52 Geographically, the
headwaters of the Rio Grande lie above the tree line in the southern reaches of the
Rocky Mountains. From there, the river gains as it flows through the parched
Colorado Plateau of northern New Mexico and feeds the Pueblo civilizations, as well
as newer Anglo developments in the Middle Rio Grande from roughly Albuquerque
to Socorro. Prior to forming the international boundary between Mexico and the
U.S., the river provides for extensive irrigated agriculture in the northern reaches of
the Chihuahuan Desert; from source to sea, the river flows 1,896 miles.53
51. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, Interview, LIVING ON EARTH (Dec. 16, 2016),
http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=16-P13-00051&segmentID=6
Cf.16,
2016),
http://www.loe.org/shows/segments.html?programID=16-P13-00051&segmentID=6 (in other words,
diversity—of ecology, landscapes, cultures, politics, for example—demands and thus produces
resilience); cf. M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 198 (noting the contrast, in explaining how under
resilience theory, regime shift causes transformation—both ecologically and politically).
52. See generally FRED M. PHILLIPS, G. EMLEN HALL, AND MARY E. BLACK, REINING IN THE RIO
GRANDE: PEOPLE, LAND, AND WATER (2015) [hereinafter PHILLIPS]; PAUL HORGAN, GREAT RIVER: THE
RIO GRANDE IN NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY (1991); IRA G. CLARK, WATER IN NEW MEXICO: A HISTORY
OF ITS MANAGEMENT AND USE (1st ed., 2nd printing, 2002); see also STEVE HARRIS, LONG RIVER, SHORT
WATER: THE RIO GRANDE WATER DEVELOPMENT STORY, in N.M. BUREAU OF GEOLOGY AND MINERAL
RESOURCES, Decision-Makers Guide: Water Resources of the Middle Rio Grande: San Acacia to Elephant
Butte 7–14 (L. Greer Price, Peggy S. Johnson, and Douglas Bland, eds., 2007); G. Emlen Hall, The Middle
Rio Grande—Short on Water, Long on Legal Uncertainties, in N.M. BUREAU OF GEOLOGY AND MINERAL
RESOURCES, Decision-Makers Guide: Water Resources of the Middle Rio Grande: San Acacia to Elephant
Butte at 54–57 (L. Greer Price, Peggy S. Johnson, and Douglas Bland eds., 2007) [hereinafter Hall
(2007)]; M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 199–200 (providing an overview of historical
background); U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, WEST-WIDE CLIMATE RISK ASSESSMENT: UPPER RIO
GRANDE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Dec. 2013), at app. A, A-1–A-3 [hereinafter CLIMATE RISK ASSESSMENT]
(summarizing basin history).
PARKS
AND
WILDLIFE,
RIO
GRANDE
BASIN,
available
at
53. TEXAS
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=25&ved=2ahUKEwi3qIWkper
kAhVQoZ4KHdLQDY8QFjAYegQIARAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Ftpwd.texas.gov%2Fbusiness%2Fgr
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Primer on Rio Grande History, Geography

While this work focuses on the Rio Grande’s principal tributary, the Rio
Chama, it necessarily involves a treatment of the Rio Grande from Española, in
northern New Mexico at its confluence with the Rio Chama, through the middle Rio
Grande valley, from Cochiti Reservoir to Elephant Butte. The Rio Grande follows
the eponymous, roughly thirty-million-year-old, three-mile-deep Rift Valley from
Colorado to Chihuahua, Mexico. Three sub-basins mark the Upper and Middle Rio
Grande reaches, from north to south: The San Luis (in southern Colorado), the
Española, and the Albuquerque basins, the latter of which exhibits a thickness of up
to 1,500 feet. Precambrian rock forms the basement of the Middle Rio Grande, the
surface exposure of which can be seen, for example, in the Sandia Mountains
overlooking Albuquerque. For comparison, the modern Rio Grande Valley dates
from approximately one million years ago, while the Albuquerque volcanoes erupted
about 150,000 years ago. The area was first settled 12,000 years ago, with permanent
settlement occurring roughly 1,500 years ago.54
Along the Rio Grande’s path through varied landscapes, ecosystems, and
cultures, the river operates as a liminal system. The river’s ecological diversity
mirrors the cultural diversity along its banks. New Mexico is home to twenty-three
Native American tribes, including nineteen Pueblos, nearly all of which are situated
alongside the Rio Grande. These tribes have inhabited their lands from time
immemorial, through cycles of drought, colonization, and agricultural, sociocultural, and economic development.55 With the river’s annual spring flooding, the
historic floodplain comprised a similarly rich riparian ecosystem, characterized by
cottonwood, migratory birds, waterfowl, and a variety of fish.56 The Rio Grande is
known as a “feast or famine” river because natural temporal variation in the river’s
flow has historically complemented its biological and geographical diversity.57 A
changing climate amplifies these variations, as drought and flood magnitudes
increase and snowmelt runoff occurs earlier in the year.58 This new exigency, along
ants%2Fwildlife%2Fcwcs%2Fmedia%2Fdocs%2Frivers%2Friogrande1.doc&usg=AOvVaw3YXe9Rd8
w7RUi8ta6Wh4bv.
54. Adrian Oglesby, The Colors of Water: Compact, Irrigations, M&A, Ecological, and Recreation
(2010) (notes for talk given on Rio Chama rafting trip); see also PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at 11–23.
55. See generally ROXANNE DUNBAR–ORTIZ, ROOTS OF RESISTANCE: A HISTORY OF LAND TENURE
IN NEW MEXICO (2007); ASHISH KOTHARI, PLURIVERSE: A POST-DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY (2019).
56. See PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at 37–38; cf., HORGAN, supra note 52, at 3–7; see generally U.S.
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, FINAL BIOLOGICAL AND CONFERENCE OPINION FOR BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, AND NON-FEDERAL WATER MANAGEMENT AND
MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES ON THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE, NEW MEXICO 27, 40, 41 (Dec. 2, 2016)
[hereinafter 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION].
57. Kara Gillon, An Environmental Pool for the Rio Grande, 47 NAT. RES. J. 615, 617, n. 10 (2007)
[hereinafter Gillon (2007)]; See also HORGAN, supra note 52, at 3–7 (describing the rich landscape in
which the Rio Grande flows and the low volume of water that is typical of the Rio Grande); see also
PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at Plate 28 (showing the ebb and flow of drought in the southwest); cf. DEBUYS,
supra note 10, at 11 (“The physical landscape of New Mexico is as rich as its culture[.]”).
58. See, e.g., CLIMATE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 52, at s-iii–iv; see PASKUS, supra note 10; see
DEBUYS, supra note 10, at 8–9; see generally David S. Gutzler, Climate and Drought in New Mexico, in
Water Policy in New Mexico: Addressing the challenge of an Uncertain Future (David S. Brookshire,
Hoshin V. Gupta, & Olen Paul Matthews, eds., 2012).
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with the effects of human-induced alteration of the river’s ecosystem and
hydrograph, demands a new form of ecological resilience.
Humans have modified the natural hydrologic regime of the Rio Grande
throughout historical and colonial times, but modern efforts altered the river on a
vast scale. The river has a high sediment load and historically had a dynamic, braided
river channel. Historically, its main water course could reach a half-mile width, and
regular flooding would inundate the floodplain and reorient the channel’s margins
and sand bars.59 By far the largest effect on the river’s hydrograph in the Middle Rio
Grande was occasioned within the past hundred years. In the nineteenth century,
large-scale water storage and flood control projects were constructed from the Heron,
El Vado, and Abiquiu reservoirs on the Rio Chama, to Cochiti and Elephant Butte
on the main-stem Rio Grande.60 The big dams of this area drastically affect a river’s
flow regime. In general, peak flows were dampened and stored by dams and released
over time. This process also traps large quantities of sediment in each reservoir,
which in turn causes river aggradation upstream and degradation downstream.
Today, the Middle Rio Grande reach has largely been channelized through flood
control structures like levees, resulting in a more homogenous, deeper, and swifter
river with less—if any—hydraulic connection to its historic floodplain.61
Human settlement along the river is nonetheless a foundational aspect of
current governance structure on the Rio Grande, which comprises elements both
rooted and superimposed. The Middle Rio Grande basin is, in fact, home to one of
the oldest, most developed hydraulic societies in the world. Native American Pueblo
water use and governance dates back at least a thousand years. Historian Roxanne
Dunbar-Ortiz notes that indigenous peoples in the Western Hemisphere had
economies and institutions which supported populations on the same level as those
of Europe at the time.62 To wit, New Mexico was one of the most successful, and its
complex irrigation systems date from pre-colonial times.63 Because the past is often
prologue, this vast history likely contain clues for “new” ecological resilience.
During the most recent 500-year period, the waters of the Rio Grande Basin
have been governed by many sovereigns: multiple Native American pueblos; the
Spanish crown; Mexico; the territory and then state of New Mexico; and the United
States.64 Spanish influence on water management in these areas dates to the
59. See, e.g., Teresa Rice, The Middle Rio Grande Basin, New Mexico (Ch.6), NAT. RES. L. CTR.,
VOL 2, 6-1-6-7 (1996) (narrating water supply development, geographic setting, as well as customary
water management regimes).
60. Bruce Thompson, Water Resources in New Mexico 28–33, in Water Policy in New Mexico:
Addressing the challenge of an Uncertain Future (David S. Brookshire, Hoshin V. Gupta, & Olen Paul
Matthews, eds., 2012); See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at 103–26.
61. See, e.g., 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 56, at 15–36, 42, 66; Cf. PHILLIPS, supra note
52, at 67–80, 144.
62. Audiotape: Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Lecture, An Indigenous Economic Model, held by
Alternative Radio (Feb. 2, 2017) (transcript on file with author).
63. Id.
64. See Modzelwski, supra note 9, at 53–65; see generally PERRAMOND, supra note 12; see generally
DUNBAR–ORTIZ, supra note 55, at 3–17 (explaining the history of land sovereignty in New Mexico); see
generally Malcolm Ebright & Rick Hendricks, Pueblo Sovereignty: Indian Land and Water in New
Mexico and Texas 3–27 (2019) (explaining the history of the various tribes and pueblos that inhabited the
area and transfers of power).
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beginnings of European colonialism in the mid-1500s, including Spanish royal
“granting” tracts of land, concomitant agricultural development, and the communityoriented governance of surface water irrigation known as acequias.65 In 1848, these
Pueblo and Hispanic lands formally passed from Mexico to the U.S. through the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.66 Complex, competing claims among these groups—
and other, more newly arrived groups such as Anglo settlers—persisted, and would
multiply and continue to the present.67
After initial settlement by the ancestors of the modern-day Indian Pueblos,
and the first wave of colonization by Hispanic citizens of Spain and Mexico,
widespread human intervention in and development of the Rio Grande began in the
mid-nineteenth century in the San Luis Valley of southern Colorado.68 At this time,
agriculture expanded significantly, facilitated by the construction of large-scale
irrigation works and levees. The resultant increase in sediment load, along with river
dewatering, channelization and narrowing, contributed to a newly aggrading river.
In fact, increasingly frequent flooding and elevated water tables meant the river’s
nature, extent, and flow were becoming divorced from its historic, natural rhythms.69
The U.S. federal presence on the Rio Grande dates to the end of the
nineteenth century, as the federal government became involved as a water developer,
owing to the repeated failure of private irrigation enterprises.70 Initially, the federal
government imposed an embargo on non-federal development on the Upper Rio
Grande from 1895 to 1925, as it investigated and then built the roughly 1 million
acre-foot impoundment of water at Elephant Butte Dam and Reservoir.71 In the mid1920s, the MRGCD was founded to drain the swamplands that had developed along
the newly aggrading Rio Grande.72 While the MRGCD would come to be the core
water supplier in the Middle Rio Grande—having consolidated dozens of individual
acequias, including those from what came to be known as the Six Middle Rio Grande
65. See, e.g., DUNBAR–ORTIZ, supra note 55, at 8, 31–45 (land grants), 10–11, 18–24 (irrigation and
acequias), 58–60, 100–18 (irrigation, agriculture and land capitalization); PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at 10–
11, 12, 11–23, 39–48, 61, 65 (explaining social institutions of water governance, Spanish influence, and
acequias), 65–66 (“a plague of cattle”).
66. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, Mex.-U.S.,
Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo]; CLARK, supra note 52, at 24, 33, 35;
see generally Hughes, supra note 9.
67. See also Hughes, supra note 9, at , 222 n. 7 (2017) (providing an overview of the nature of Pueblo
land holdings in New Mexico, including by Spanish “grant”), 253–54 (noting impact of Spanish and
Mexican law on Pueblo water rights); see generally PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at 24–33 (explaining the
varies settlements along the Rio Grande and different irrigation techniques used); see generally MALCOLM
EBRIGHT, ET AL., FOUR SQUARE LEAGUES: PUEBLO INDIAN LAND IN NEW MEXICO (UNM Press, 2014).
68. Griggs, supra note 12; Andrew Gulliford, Aldo Leopold, Estella Bergere, Mia Casita and
Sheepherding in New Mexico and Colorado, 57 NAT. RES. J. 395, 397, 403 (2017),
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol57/iss2/6.
69. Oglesby, supra note 54; see also Gulliford, supra note 68, at 401–403; PHILLIPS, supra note 52,
at 70–72.
70. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LITTLEFIELD, CONFLICT ON THE RIO GRANDE: WATER AND THE LAW, 3–15,
16–165 (Univ. of Okla. Press, 2008); See generally CLARK, supra note 46, at 55–82.
71. See, e.g., LITTLEFIELD, supra note 70, at 52–55, 147–65, 170–18, 186.
72. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., Senate Memorial 21 Task Force Studying the Electoral
Process of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District: Findings and Recommendation,
http://mrgcd.com/uploads/FileLinks/d001dbb5f28d48999cbeef85e264ce76/SM21_Final_Report.pdf
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Pueblos—it was so unsuccessful at its original drainage project that it required a
bailout by the federal government.73 As Reclamation bolstered its water development
and supply presence in the West, it cemented its presence in the Middle Rio Grande.74
The bailed-out MRGCD, and its existing acequia infrastructure, became the
cornerstone of Reclamation’s Middle Rio Grande Project.75
B. Past Flex Points
This article describes several past water management actions that have
illustrated the ability of water managers to find flexibility within their existing
operating environment.76 Historically these flex points have been identified in
response to floods, droughts, infrastructure failure, and concerns for the
environment.77
The degradation for the Rio Grande watershed, incited by the rapid
development of land and water in the San Luis Valley during the late 1800s, served
as the catalyst for major changes in the existing water management regime.78 Within
forty years the development of the Rio Grande in Colorado resulted in sever water
shortages and increased flood risks in New Mexico, Texas and Mexico.79 Only a
couple decades later an international convention was negotiated to share water
between the U.S. and Mexico.80 Contemporaneously the U.S government created the
Reclamation Service, imposed the prior appropriation doctrine on New Mexico
water law, and began development of the Rio Grande Project.81
The aggradation of mainstem river beds in the Middle Rio Grande Valley,
also caused in no small part by the development in the San Luis Valley, resulted in
water-logged lands and increased flood threats.82 By the 1920’s, New Mexico’s
urban leaders were busy creating the MRGCD to drain the lands, build levees, and
create irrigation water storage on the Rio Chama.83 The real possibility of expanded
irrigation in the Middle Rio Grande in an already water-short basin motivated the
negotiation of the Rio Grande Compact. The inadequacy of the MRGCD to control
floods and groundwater levels resulted in federal intervention through the creation
of the federal Middle Rio Grande Project in 1948.84 The need to provide Albuquerque

73. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at 112–22.
74. See, e.g., PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at 103–115; see also Flood Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. 80771, 62 Stat. 1175, 1179 (1948); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, JOINT BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT: BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, AND NON-FEDERAL WATER MANAGEMENT AND
MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES ON THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE, NEW MEXICO, at I-5 to I-7 (August 2015)
[hereinafter 2015 JOINT BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT].
75. See PHILLIPS, note 52, at 102–122, 130–32.
76. See infra Section III.B(2).
77. See infra Section I.A.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. See App. A(1) (citing Paddock, supra note 178) (forthcoming 2021) (on file with author).
81. Infra Section II.B(1); see generally infra Section III.A; cf. App. A(2) passim.
82. See, e.g., infra Section III.A.
83. See id.
84. Id; App. A(2)(ii)(a) (detailing Middle Rio Grande Project and its development).
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with additional flood control resulted in the authorization and construction of Cochiti
Reservoir and the creation of the Reservoir Regulation Plan in 1960.85
The imposition of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and the attendant
requirements for protecting the Rio Grande silvery minnow created several less
dramatic but critically important moments of management flexibility in the Middle
Rio Grande.86 These responses have been predominantly a matter of soft law rather
than instituting a dramatic change to federal or state law.
In the early 2000’s, there was a flurry of management changes related to the
Rio Grande silvery minnow that were motivated by ESA litigation.87 New
management agreements and collaborations were employed. Reclamation created
the Supplemental Water Program to source water supplies for the minnow.88 The
Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program, a new organization
of multiple stakeholders, was established to protect the silvery minnow while
allowing existing and future water use to continue.89
The 2001 Conservation Water Agreement was a remarkable new tool
negotiated by parties to the silvery minnow litigation as a way to utilize New
Mexico’s Rio Grande Compact credits in new and creative ways for the benefit of
the minnow.90 It required the consent, which was granted, of the Rio Grande
Compact Commission to deviate from normal operations. This served as the basis
for the 2003, 2008, and 2016 Emergency Drought Water Agreement (“EDWA”).91
All of these agreements allow for flexible water management within the constraints
of ESA Biological Opinions, New Mexico water law, and the Rio Grande Compact.
II. SETTING: THE CRITICAL ZONE
The Rio Chama Flow Project’s overarching effort is really a trust-building
exercise amongst stakeholders.92 Building this trust requires at a minimum that
environmental flow operations be perceived to have no negative impacts to water
users at large, from acequia parciantes on the Rio Chama to the MRGCD and the
Six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos. In short, this requires demonstrating that such flows
benefit multiple sectors, harm no actors, and offer robust, quantifiable ecological
results. To get there, in-stream flow operations must be evidence-based and legally
defensible, as well as framed in terms of adaptive management, which is widely
recognized as a best practice in management of natural resources. Such a proof-ofconcept, successfully demonstrated on the Rio Chama, could lead to a fresh take of
85. See App. A(2)(ii)(a) at 85–87 nn. 521–23, 529–38.
86. Cf. infra Section III.B(2); App. B, at tbls. 1, 2, 5, 6, & 7.
87. App. B, at tbls. 1, 2.
88. See infra Section III.B(2).
89. Cf. Gillon (2007), supra note 57; App. B, at tbls. 1, 2, & 8 passim.
90. App. B, at tbls. 1 & 2.
91. Cf. infra notes 435–48 and accompanying text; App. B, at tbls. 1 & 2.
92. Cf. Charles Heckscher, TRUST IN A COMPLEX WORLD: ENRICHING COMMUNITY (2016), at chs.
1, 3, 4, 6–7 (exploring, inter alia, emergent futures as the “rich” community characterized by “interactive
sensitivity,” notwithstanding the “contest for legitimacy” as the benefits of collaboration intersect the
present paradigmatic decline of the community in modern era), chapter level abstracts available at
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/trust-in-a-complex-world-9780198708551?cc=us&lang=en&#
(click on link in right hand column, “Also Available In: Oxford Scholarship Online”).
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the myriad “hard law” constraints which govern not just the Rio Chama but also the
Rio Grande proper, such as Congressionally mandated flood control limits to
reservoir operations, and in the case of the mainstem Rio, ESA requirements. Indeed,
people bring lawsuits after all and, perhaps like the midwifery model, a fresh view
that includes collaborative and evidenced-based but still traditional methods, could
be brought to decrease litigation risk and increase the positive outcomes. Here, to
rebirth an ecosystem.93
In support of this ongoing effort to midwife in-stream flows in the Middle
Rio Grande, the following section develops the core of a Critical Zone- and
complexity theory-informed Law of the River for the Rio Chama–Middle Rio
Grande system.94 What emerges from this initial legal mapping exercise95 is a sketch
of the ambiguities inherent in this physically embodied, body of law. This mapping
can be thought of simply as characterizing the hypothesized underutilized existing
legal authority in support of optimized ecological flows on the Rio Chama. While
these foundational elements of water governance on the Rio Chama and mainstem
Rio Grande are far from novel, in other ways, the empirical results presented and
summarized here are new contributions. Together they represent a decision–support
tool, a map of the law and society matrix of any Law of the River—especially
important in such a fundamentally transboundary system as the Middle Rio Grande.
A. Water and Governance of the Middle Rio Grande
Following the work of Benson, et. al. (2013),96 and many others,97 this
article analyzes the legal constraints and opportunities for flexibility in reservoir
operations on the Rio Chama. In doing so, it does not focus on individual conflicts
but instead attempts to treat the system as a whole. To that end, both real and
perceived limitations are mapped and evaluated. These limitations include prevailing
federal reservoir authorizing legislation and state water law, along with regulation,
management, policy, and operations. This work further intends to facilitate
transparency, clarify decision-making and accurately inform water users, managers,
and citizens.98 The law of the Rio Chama is a collection of treaties, interstate
compacts, statutes, court decisions, regulations, and contracts generated over more
than 100 years of conflict regarding the allocation of the Rio Grande and its
tributaries. While there is not necessarily a definitive version of the Law of the River

93. See, e.g., Rob Fishman, Working Paper Presented Univ. of Arizona College of Law,
Collaborative Governance Under the Endangered Species Act: An Empirical Analysis of Protective
Regulations 63–65 or 101–103 (Mar. 29, 2021) (abstract containing Fishman’s empirical results on file
with author).
94. SECURE Water Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–11, 123 Stat. 1329 (codified as 42 U.S.C. 109B)
(as a requirement of the SECURE Water Act, this Law of the River for the Rio Chama, which underlies
the legal analysis in this article, will be made available through the Bureau of Reclamation).
95. Cf. Ruhl & Katz, supra note 39.
96. M.H. Benson (2013), supra note 43.
97. See LITTLEFIELD, supra note 70, at 1879–1939 (The source of international and interstate conflict
going back at least 120 years, the Rio Grande basin is well characterized).
98. See generally ALIDA CANTOR ET. AL., DATA FOR WATER DECISION MAKING: INFORMING THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF CALIFORNIA’S OPEN AND TRANSPARENT WATER DATA ACT THROUGH RESEARCH
AND ENGAGEMENT, AB 1755 STAKEHOLDER WORKING GROUP SYNTHESIS REPORT (2018).
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for the Rio Grande or the Rio Chama, this compilation may be the first Law of the
Rio Chama compiled in database form, complete with explanatory annotations and
relevant gray literature that assists in understanding the law.99
Material institutions bearing on reservoir operations are foundational for
this article’s analytical framework. Here, material is meant in a tripartite literal,
metaphorical, and legal sense. Once developed, the analytic will be applied to the
Law of the River, generally, to the Law of the Rios Chama and Grande, and most
specifically, the nexus of ecological flows and reservoir operations in the Middle Rio
Grande Basin. This overview is presented at the outset and builds largely on the
pioneering work of perhaps a dozen leading Middle Rio Grande water-wonks,
managers, and scholars in science, law, and policy praxis from geomorphology,
engineering, and water operations to complexity theory and adaptive management.100
This article adopts the core premise that the Middle Rio Grande is a
complex, socio–ecological system that must adapt. The issue is that achieving water
supply resilience to climate change implicates ways of being and knowing, in other
words, ontology and epistemology.101 This specified resilience must address “climate
stress, over [the] appropriated basin.” The former is a path dependency, and the latter
is the salient future trajectory.102 Furthermore, it must address decreased functional
diversity owing to, inter alia, massive infrastructure for water storage and flood
control. All of this points to adaptive governance innovation needs in the realm of
reservoir operations flexibility and water management innovations, including storage
and allocation mechanisms.103 The related ontological and epistemological issues
deal with what we value and protect.104
1.

The Great River and Thumbnail Complexity Sketch

Simple hydrographs showing flow over time indicate the current reality.105
That is that over the course of the twentieth century the federal government led a
massive water development scheme in the arid West, thus creating a highly managed
99. See, e.g., App. B, at tbls. 3, 4, 6, & 7 (database on file with author).
100. See e.g., HARRIS, supra note 52; Mark Stone, CF Byrne, RR Morrison, Evaluating the impacts
of hydrologic and geomorphic alterations on floodplain connectivity, Ecohydrology, 2017 (investigating
floodplain inundation and interface dynamics on two New Mexico Rivers, including the Rio Grande);
Morgan, supra note 14; Oglesby, supra note 54; Mike Harvey, RIO CHAMA FLOW [OPTIMIZATION]
PROJECT, 2016 Pulse Flow: “Resolution Hydrograph” (Oct. 12, 2016); Oglesby, supra note 54.
101. Melinda Harm Benson et al., Governing the Rio Grande: Challenges and Opportunities for New
Mexico’s Water Supply, in PRACTICAL PANARCHY FOR ADAPTIVE WATER GOVERNANCE, Barbara Cosens
and Lance Gunderson eds. (2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72472-0_7 [hereinafter M.H.
Benson (2018)].
102. See, e.g., Id.
103. Id.
104. Cf. Ragsdale, Jr., supra note 12 (What we value and protect can be explored by way of culture
and (diverse) narratives as well as metaphor—i.e., infrastructure, conversation, relationship, and (making)
kin.); PURDY, supra note 36 (regarding the overwhelming literal weight of infrastructure, globally); Jane
Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 917 (2010) (proposing “conversation”
metaphor as alternative to the paradigmatic property law metaphor, “machine”); ESTES, supra note 37
(relations and “making kin,” in the context of activism of “water protectors” at Standing Rock in 2016).
105. See, e.g., App. B, at tbls. 3, 4, 6, & 7 (showing water operations on Rio Chama A stocks and
flows of water over time, i.e., storage, releases, and flows of water between Heron Dam and Reservoir
and the river’s confluence with the mainstem Rio Grande at the Ottowi Gage).
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hydrological system controlled by a vast built infrastructure.106 The combined effects
notably include earlier peaks of snowmelt-driven runoff in the spring and
disconnection of the rivers’ historic floodplain—a liminal zone rich in biodiversity—
from increasingly channelized and sediment-starved water courses. This resulted in
significantly degraded riverine and riparian ecosystem health, including impacts on
an endangered Rio Grande silvery minnow, acting as a proxy for overall river health.
Most importantly, what reasonably might be considered a rapidly approaching
ecological threshold in the Middle Rio Grande watershed certainly looks like it has
already arrived.107
Water law and legal geography scholar, Melinda Harm Benson, and
colleagues recently offered an exceptional articulation of aspired-to and necessary
“specific resilience” of the Middle Rio Grande, treating the basin as a complex,
adaptive social–ecological system that must adapt successfully to the system shocks
and regime shifts already underway. The authors describe the system structure,
including its social and ecological elements as well as key exogenous drivers in this
water governance space.108 Based on this empirical work, they propose a theory of
change for Middle Rio Grande water governance that would consider the system’s
current trajectory and resistance to perturbations from non-linear, complex processes
such as climate change and attendant reverberations in water security in terms of
both quality and quantity.109
Accordingly, water policy and governance issues are part and parcel of the
system’s adaptive capacity. In other words, this is the system’s amenability to change
as water managers consider alternative scenarios and operational innovations under
pressure to make water available to people and ecosystems.110 These considerations
all relate to the adaptive capacity required for a system approaching its ecological
threshold, i.e., a regime change–transformation.111 Climate change indeed
“[c]hanges [e]verything.”112 Not least of such changes are the assumptions
underlying global political economy. In turn, the character and relationality of the
emergent interdependencies are governed by the elements that comprise the system’s
social and ecological structure.113 Apart from climate, other key structural
components include regimes of water supply and allocation, i.e., governance
structures, as well as social elements which, after lifeways extant from time
immemorial, would subsequently include two waves of colonization, at least three
sovereign nations, and landscape modifications on various scales.114

106. See generally Marc Reisner, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER (1993) (landmark journalistic investigation, surface water domain); CHARLES BOWDEN, KILLING
THE HIDDEN WATERS (1985) (investigating concomitant groundwater issues from anthropologically
oriented journalistic perspective focusing on 20th century revolution in groundwater pumping and
attendant effects and implication).
107. Id; accord PASKUS, supra note 10.
108. M.H. Benson (2018), supra note 101.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Naomi Klein, THIS CHANGES EVERYTHING: CAPITALISM VS. THE CLIMATE (2014).
113. M.H. Benson (2018), supra note 101.
114. Id.
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Key drivers in the Middle Rio Grande water governance space, as described
by Benson and others, include the orthodox elements of this complex adaptive
system.115 These include: 1) a multistate water allocation contract, the Rio Grande
Compact, which divides the river between New Mexico and its neighboring states
and traditionally represents, hierarchically, the core and highest discrete legal
authority for water management in the state; 2) federal water management
infrastructure; 3) an overlay of environmental law, like the ESA; 4) a large irrigation
district, the MRGCD; 5) six sovereign, native nations, whose water is incidentally
delivered by the MRGCD; and 6) environmental advocacy groups.116 Far from
comprehensive, this enumeration nonetheless provides building blocks or “enabling
constrains” for generating adaptive innovations, including addressing historic
inequities and injustices.117
Water supply resilience to climate change requires effective and adaptive
management of natural resources in response to climate’s manifold threats.118 In this
way, Benson et al. are among those water-wonks and other diverse voices holding
space for the conversation surrounding the now well-established premise: resilience
theory helps recognize the need for adaptive capacity.119 Here, the river—Rio
Grande, Rio Chama or otherwise—is the system’s lifeblood, a leading indicator of
major, interrelated regime change drivers such as climate and fire.120
2.

Adaptive Management in the Middle Rio Grande

Global climate change-type drought is driving water management
innovation in New Mexico. In the winter of 2017–2018, for example, snowpack in
the Rio Grande Basin was at a historic low, and the Rio Grande at Albuquerque dried
in parts as early as April.121 As of September 20, 2018, Elephant Butte storage was

115. Id.
116. Robison, supra note 7 at 19–89, 169–207, 231–243, 245–58, 268–314, 315–354, and 356–397
(describing environmental law “overlay” on the Law of the River) (theorizing changing property law;
articulating a “transformation” in such jurisprudence through the Law of the River [LoTR] lens, in terms
of “[s]ystematic [n]ature of [a]mbiguities” inherent in, inter alia, the LoTR’s “environmental law overlay”
and their contemporaneous materiality,” along with concomitant lessons and reflections on the LoTR’s
“adaptability” in the face of the multiple registers of challenges associated with climate change and
characteristic “interstitially,” as well as associated “administrability” issues facing the Colorado River
Compact and, more generally, water governance in the Colorado River Basin); cf. infra Section II–
IV; App. § A, passim (“Law and Policy for Reservoir Operations”).
117. See, e.g., M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 218–221 (regarding institutional constraints);
Krakoff, supra note 15 (regarding historic and extant issues of justice and rights in context of Reclamation
water projects vis-a-vis settler colonialism and natural resources law); see generally OSTROM, supra note
5.
118. M.H. Benson (2018), supra note 101 (for example, fire-risk to upland forests in the Rio Grande’s
headwaters—having certain watershed degradation as well as concomitant water supply and governance
effects and implications—has mobilized roughly $240 million in Nature Conservancy administered
funding for restoration efforts.).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Laura Paskus, It’s Only April and a Stretch of the Rio Grande Has Already Dried, N.M.
POLITICAL REP’T (Apr. 8, 2018), http://nmpoliticalreport.com/822352/its-only-april-and-a-stretch-of-therio-grande-has-already-dried-en/;
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roughly three percent of total capacity, approximately 60,000 acre-feet.122 Spurred
by these ongoing exceptional conditions, a historic partnership comprised of the
Audubon Society, Pueblos, and municipalities collaborated the following summer to
release nearly 1,000 acre-feet of water to keep a stretch of the Middle Rio Grande
from drying.123 Later in the summer irrigation season, the collaboration leased
roughly 20,000 acre-feet of water from the Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water
Utility (“ABCWUA”) to maintain Rio Grande flows at a cost of about $2 million.124
Guiding and constraining such innovative responses to the exigent hydrologic
circumstances is the Law of the River, the legal and policy infrastructure which
governs water operations.
At its core, the Rio Grande Basin is a complex, interconnected system.
Three reservoirs of system-wide import, Heron, El Vado, and Abiquiu, are located
on the Rio Chama. Of note, flows on the stretch of the Rio Chama between El Vado
and Abiquiu are particularly amenable to an analysis of reservoir operations because
the river operates, at this reach, as a relatively simplified system. The analysis of and
constraints to operationalizing experimental flows—in large part a function of legal
authority and management flexibility bearing on relevant reservoir operations—is
greatly simplified there, for two primary reasons. First, and primarily, there are no
endangered species that would otherwise trigger the application of the ESA and, thus,
heightened scrutiny and political sensitivity, across the board. Second, there is a near
paucity of consumptive uses on the stretch of river, so a water-rights impairment
analysis, theoretically but also practically, is significantly streamlined, if not
altogether avoided.
This federally designated “Wild and Scenic” reach of the Rio Chama has
been the object of study for the Rio Chama Flow Project, an interdisciplinary
collaborative conservation program engaged in an adaptive management-based
investigation of the synergies of environmental flows, recreational opportunities, and
economic development surrounding the Rio Chama.125 Taking these efforts as a
starting point, this article focuses on this unique stretch of the Rio Chama. Should
the Rio Chama Flow Project’s evidence-based multi-stakeholder exercise bear fruit,
it may offer a scalable model for optimizing water management on the main-stem
Rio Grande, which has yet to be adjudicated and is subject to the considerable
Henry Fountain, In a Warming West, The Rio Grande is Drying Up, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/05/24/climate/dry-rio-grande.html.
122. Laura Paskus, As New Mexico Reservoirs Hit Bottom, Worries Grow Over the Future, WATER
DEEPLY (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.newsdeeply.com/water/articles/2018/09/25/as-new-mexicoreservoirs-hit-bottom-worries-grow-over-the-future.
123. See Press Release, In Historic Partnership Audubon and New Mexico Municipalities Release
Water to Recharge Vital Habitat Along the Rio Grande, AUDUBON NEW MEXICO, (July 17, 2018),
http://nm.audubon.org/press-release/historic-partnership-audubon-and-new-mexico-municipalitiesrelease-water-recharge [hereinafter Audubon Soc’y, Historic Partnership]; see also Press Release,
Audubon Announces Historic Water Release to the Middle Rio Grande, AUDUBON NEW MEXICO (Sept.
7, 2016), http://nm.audubon.org/press-release/audubon-announces-historic-water-release-middle-riogrande.
124. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, WATER MANAGERS PARTNER TO PRESERVE MIDDLE RIO
GRANDE FLOWS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.usbr.gov/newsroom/newsrelease/detail.cfm?
RecordID=63104.
125. See id.
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constraints of the ESA. The interdependence of the Rio Chama and Rio Grande goes
further than this analytical matter.
Indeed, neither the Rio Chama nor any legal analysis of reservoir operations
exist in a vacuum. In compiling the Law of the River for the Rio Chama, this work
thus draws from the interconnected elements of the Law of the River for the Rio
Grande and the original Law of the River, that of the Colorado River. The case study
of the Rio Chama offers insights into the operations of a “novel [eco]system” as well
as man’s attempts to optimize it, a common occurrence on rivers across the West.126
Indeed, the tributary Rio Chama mirrors many features of the mainstem Rio Grande.
For example, in its short course, the Rio Chama is dammed three times. This
infrastructure provides water and flood control for the Albuquerque metro area,
including the MRGCD, one of the largest suppliers of irrigation water in New
Mexico. The Rio Chama also conveys water imported across the Continental Divide
from the Colorado River Basin, as part of Reclamation’s San Juan-Chama Project.
This Project’s water is destined primarily for ABCWUA and MRGCD. The Rio
Chama regularly flows at greater-than-historical levels by a large margin. This
occurrence is both unique in the arid West and orthodox—in that transbasin water
transfer projects are common. In this sense, the San Juan-Chama Project’s annual
average project “firm-yield” of nearly 100,000 acre-feet is conveyed by the Rio
Chama from Reclamation’s Heron Reservoir, through MRGCD’s El Vado
Reservoir, and then through the Middle Rio Grande Project’s Abiquiu Reservoir,
before finally being released for use in the Middle Rio Grande valley near
Albuquerque.
Taking a step back to reorient, it is worth recalling that the Rio Chama is a
principal tributary and thus part of the Middle Rio Grande Basin, which is itself a
complex127 socio–ecological128 system where geography, hydrology, law,
economics, policy, and management decisions control the flow and allocation of
water. In fact, a physical–mathematical modeling of the Middle Rio Grande system
requires no less than 180 discrete law-driven rules.129 The legal, policy, and
management framework of the Rio Grande Basin’s New Mexico reservoirs—three
of the five are located on the Rio Chama—was laid out in a special issue of this
Journal.130 Not surprisingly, uncertainty abounds in this complex system, as in any

126. Mike Harvey, supra note 100 (PowerPoint presentation, given at Rio Chama Flow Project
Advisory Council Meeting) (on file with author) (characterizing the Rio Chama as a “novel system” that
has been triply dammed, but receives an influx of “new” San Juan-Chama Project water diverted from the
Colorado River Basin).
127. See, e.g., Hall (2007), supra note 52, at 54, 54–62 (providing an overview of the “many basic
facts about legal claims to the Middle Rio Grande [that] we [don’t] know”); see generally Jaeger, supra
note 7, at 2, fig. 1 (diagram components and linkages for model of Willamette River
hydrological/economic/legal system, which contains multiple reservoirs and water uses).
128. See, e.g., M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45 (analyzing key interactions as thresholds of social
and ecological elements of the Middle Rio Grande, including their associated “drivers and disturbances”).
129. URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 4–5 (noting policy for operating water storage and diversion
facilities along the Rio Grande and Rio Chama represented in URGWOM in 46 different policy groups
and 180 specifically coded rules).
130. Klein, supra note 112.
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system of water rights or uses.131 Within this complex system, reservoir operations132
may be ripe for more flexible, optimized configurations.133 In the face of continued
water-short conditions, such configurations should offer both resiliency and adaptive
capacity.
Despite the importation of water from the Colorado River Basin, the Middle
Rio Grande remains perennially water short and water management collaboration
has progressed haltingly. The sum of various individual legal uncertainties, such as
the nature and extent of Pueblo and MRGCD water rights, has superimposed a “legal
scarcity” on top of natural water scarcity.134 Despite a narrative of collaboration
gaining traction,135 in the years following commencement of the silvery minnow
litigation and issuance of the 2003 Biological Opinion, major stakeholders could not
even agree on which scenarios of reservoir operations to model.136 In contrast to the
lack of consensus regarding the desirability, feasibility, and legal underpinnings of
alternative reservoir operations in the Middle and Upper Rio Grande, there is
scientific consensus on the need to manage this surface water system for keystone
ecological processes.137 Aquatic biology and riparian ecology, as it turns out, cannot
be separated from the human ecology of the river.
Water resources management, as well as concomitant efforts in agriculture,
conservation, and climate adaptation, can at one level be viewed a neutrally governed
by our inherited geography. Under this view, the Rio Grande silvery minnow that
has spawned prodigious litigation efforts, but also collaborative efforts, is a blessing,
not a curse.138 It is a prescient indicator of the system’s vulnerability, namely
insufficient adaptive capacity to buffer such shocks to the species as decreased
surface water supplies and droughts which have become increasingly sever, and
frequent. The minnow’s existence is a function of its unique, arid geography. It has
been a disruptive force incentivizing needed climate adaptation, water management
131. See, e.g., William deBuys, Navigating the River of our Future: The Rio Poco-Grande, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 265, 277 (2001), https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol41/iss2/2/ (“uncertainty abounds”
in “any cluster or water rights and uses”).
132. See generally Susan Kelly and Diego Urbina, New Mexico Major Reservoirs: An Overview,
UTTON CTR., WATER MATTERS!, at 20-1–20-18 (2011) [hereinafter Kelly & Urbina].
133. See, e.g., Amos, supra note 3, at 1132 (“Once these flexibilities are represented, they will
facilitate the investigation of the resiliency and adaptive capacity inherent within the current legal system
and identify where changes to law and policy might be most effective.”); DEBUYS, supra note 10, at 277
(“ . . . there is flex in the system”).
134. Hall, supra note 72, at 57 (“The sum of all of these uncertainties—the nature and extent of pueblo
and MRGCD rights, the source of rights for increasing municipal demand, the unintended consequences
of changes to policies—is even greater uncertainty”); DEBUYS, supra note 10, at 277 (“Every system
leaks. Most systems operate as much on assumptions as hard data, and only rarely are those assumptions
entirely correct.”).
135. See generally JOHN FLECK, WATER IS FOR FIGHTING OVER: AND OTHER MYTHS ABOUT WATER
IN THE WEST (2016).
136. Susan Kelly, Modeling Reservoir Storage Scenarios by Consensus, 47 NAT. RES. J. 651, 663–71
(2007) [hereinafter Kelly (2007b)].
137. DEBUYS, supra note 10, at 268, 270–71, 274 (describing “keystone processes” and their
ecological significance and arguing that environmental river management should manage for keystone
processes by, inter alia, providing flows which mimic the natural hydrograph); see also Morrison, supra
note 46.
138. Id. at 280.
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resilience, and cooperation.139 The premise of this work is that optimized reservoir
operations, like protecting the minnow, need not be a zero-sum game.
According to author and conservationist William deBuys, the biggest
challenge in effectively managing the waters of the Rio Grande is political
ecology.140 Notwithstanding the tremendous technical work done on the Rio Grande,
there will likely never be full agreement regarding operational models of this
system.141 These models, such as the URGWOM, used by agencies such as
Reclamation and the Corps, represent powerful and sophisticated planning,
predictive, and accounting capabilities. They are based on current knowledge,
scientific and otherwise. One major underpinning of such a model is the legal
infrastructure that dictates many operational rules. But while many legal mandates,
such as provisions of the Rio Grande Compact or the various dams’ and reservoirs’
authorizing legislation, translate neatly into operational requirements and water
accounting schemes, assumptions may be built into the model’s representation of
other legal authorities. Further, water management and reservoir operations take
place within a decision-making continuum ranging from professional judgment to
multi-stakeholder negotiation and collaboration.142 Within this discretionary space,
where water managers and regulators may differ in the particulars, taking different
approaches may not violate the Law of the Rio Chama.
Following a similar effort in the Pacific Northwest, this article and
corresponding interdisciplinary efforts of the Rio Chama Flow Project attempt a
refined integration of law and policy into collaborative efforts143 of stakeholders to
optimize flows on the Rio Chama.144 Accordingly, it is intended as a fresh look at
the well-trodden components of the Law of the River—such as the legislative
underpinnings of water storage and release at Abiquiu, El Vado, and Heron
Reservoirs.145 It is also intended to be an innovative mapping exercise, incorporating
those “soft law” components of the Law of the River, like policy, management, and
operations, which have largely escaped detailed analysis.146 The most salient
139. See infra Section II.A(1), III.A, and III.B(2), nn. 430–44 and accompanying text, passim; App.
A(4) passim (treating ESA developments and litigation history in MRG Basin).
140. DEBUYS, supra note 10, at 277–78.
141. Id. at 279 (arguing this situation “effectively throws decision making into the political and
economic sphere”).
142. See infra Section III.A–B passim; App. B, at tbls. 1, 2, 3, & 4 (Excerpts from Engineer Advisers’
Report in Rio Grande Compact Commission Annual Reports, 2000 to present; Excerpts from
Reclamation’s Annual Reports to the Rio Grande Compact Commission, 2000 to present; Heron–El
Vado–Abiquiu Operations (Flows); San Juan–Chama at Otowi).
143. See generally Amos, supra note 3 (giving an example of similar work in Oregon); see also Jaeger,
supra note 7.
144. Ranging from, for example, acequia interests downstream of Abiquiu Reservoir to the Corps of
Engineers whose flood control management decisions could affect the integrity of acequia diversion
structures.
145. See generally Flatt & Tarr, supra note 44 (taking a “fresh look” at legal authority for Corps’ dam
management).
146. Cf. Robison, supra note 3; Jaeger supra note 7; BALLESTERO, supra note 4; Griggs, supra note
12; Ragsdale, Jr., supra note 12; infra Section III.A–B passim; App. B, at tbls. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8
passim (Excerpts from Engineer Advisers’ Report in Rio Grande Compact Commission Annual Reports,
2000 to present; Excerpts from Reclamation’s Annual Reports to the Rio Grande Compact Commission,
2000 to present; Heron–El Vado–Abiquiu Operations (Flows); San Juan–Chama at Otowi; Bureau of
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conclusions will be incorporated into the Rio Chama Flow Project’s modeling
efforts, led by Professor Mark Stone at the University of New Mexico. Such
modeling efforts go beyond those of the Upper Rio Grande Water Operations
Review, which, for example, has yet to consider water ownership in its modeling
reservoir operations flexibility on the Rio Chama.147
3.

Rio Chama Flow Project: Legal Complexity and Analytical
Methodology

Broadly speaking, the Rio Chama Flow Project seeks to achieve
environmental and recreational improvement on the roughly 35-mile-long stretch of
the Rio Chama between El Vado and Abiquiu reservoirs. To do so, the Project set
out to identify feasible changes in the operations of the Heron and El Vado reservoirs
that do not affect downstream water users. Between Heron and Abiquiu, the Rio
Chama conveys roughly 400,000 acre-feet of water per year,148 including 96,000
acre-feet of imported San Juan-Chama Project water,149 with negligible consumptive
usage. This setting provides a unique opportunity to develop optimized hydrographs
in the form of “multi-objective flow optimizations schedules” depending on water
availability, which is the most critical among many constraints. Ultimately, the Rio
Chama Flow Project intends to foster a collaborative determination of water
operations based on multi-disciplinary science and sustainable policy. Building on
baseline studies (e.g., hydrology, geomorphology, system dynamics modeling), the
Rio Chama Flow Project currently shoulders modeling efforts to incorporate an
enhanced understanding of the operational, legal, and institutional constraints on
optimization of reservoir operations.150
In support of these modeling efforts, the Flow Project’s research regarding
the legal flexibility hypothesis commenced with a literature review. The broad initial
orientation was to interstate compact law, including an overview of the Rio Grande
Compact’s provisions accounting for debits and credits, as well as the relinquishment
of accrued credits in certain situations that prevents storage in reservoirs such as El
Vado, despite standing restrictions.151 The review next canvassed the literature on
Reclamation, Art. VII-Relinquishment Credits; Middle Rio Grande Project; San Juan–Chama at Azotea,
Heron, and Abiquiu; ESA Middle Rio Grande Project).
147. See URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21.
148. See, e.g., N.M. OFFICE OF THE STATE ENG’R, RIO CHAMA REGIONAL WATER PLAN, at 68, 72–72
(Tbl. 5-4b and Figs. 5-9a, -b., respectively) (2016), (“Description of the Planning Region” and “Legal
Issues Unique to the Region and Local Conflicts Needing resolution,” respectively)
http://www.ose.state.nm.us/Planning/RWP/Regions/14_RioChama/2016/Reg%2014_Rio%20Chama%2
0Regional%20Water%20Plan%202016_July%202016_with%20appendices.pdf.
149. See App. A(1)(ii)(b) (“In general terms, the San Juan–Chama [Diversion] Project is the vehicle
for New Mexico utilization of a large share of its allotment as an Upper Basin state within the Colorado
River Basin. In this scheme, New Mexico is statutorily permitted to divert an average, ‘firm yield’ of
96,200 acre-feet from the San Juan River basin by tunnel through the continental divide and into the Rio
Grande Basin.”).
150. RCFP Proposal, supra note 43, at 1 (intended outcomes), 4 (noting goal of legal analysis to
“prevent . . . institutional and operational constraints to modifying flows and storage” from becoming
“fixed and inflexible”).
151. Memorandum from Colin McKenzie on Interstate Compact Law to Adrian Oglesby, UTTON CTR.
(June 29, 2015); Memorandum from Colin McKenzie on Relinquishment Credit Water Allocation to
Adrian Oglesby, UTTON CTR. (Sept. 1, 2015)..
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reservoir operations, using this Journal’s 2007 symposium on New Mexico
Reservoirs as a starting point.152 That symposium resulted in articles covering a range
of reservoir operations issues, including: the legal framework; legislative and
litigation history; conservation storage at Abiquiu; modeling reservoir storage;
silvery minnow litigation; carryover storage and Indian pueblo water rights; and
Prior and Paramount water.153
As the literature review progressed, it oriented progressively to primary
authorities like Congressional authorizations of the reservoirs and interpretive tools
like legislative histories,154 a database of the resulting Law of the River took shape.155
The primary provisions of the Law of the River captured by this database encompass
legal regimes that correspond to multiple sovereigns: the U.S. and Mexico; Colorado,
New Mexico, and Texas; and at least six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos.156 Thus, this
Law of the River captures elements of international law and U.S. federal law, as well
as contracts—federal, state and private—between these various government and
other private entities.157 Substantively, the Law of the River encompasses, inter alia,
water law, environmental law, and federal Indian law.158
In addition to these primary authorities, sundry regulations, agreements, and
other provisions drive the storage and release of water from reservoirs on the Rio
Chama and Rio Grande. This physical water storage and delivery infrastructure is
primarily managed by Reclamation and the Corps, along with the MRGCD.159 These
water management agencies, therefore, figure prominently in the operational aspects
of the Law of the River. Accordingly, the Law of the River database, as with the
analysis proper, can be conceptually divided into two parts: 1) “hard law,” i.e.,
152. See Symposium, Symposium on New Mexico’s Rio Grande Rivers, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J., NO.
3 (2007), https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol47/iss3/.
153. Id.
154. See Amos, supra note 3, at 1137–38 (noting that an approach to investigating reservoir operations
flexibility would [1] “build a description of the statutory and regulatory authorities that govern the
operation of the federal reservoirs managed on the Willamette River and the non-reservoir statutory and
regulatory frameworks that impact the reservoir operations”; [2] “catalog and describe the relevant federal
court decisions that impact the exercise of discretionary legal authority on the part of the relevant federal
agencies on the Willamette River”; and [3] involve “interviews to better understand the process used by
the relevant agencies to determine how and when to exercise available discretionary authority.”) (A broad
view of these legal authorities would include, inter alia: project authorizing statutes, programmatic
statutes, applicable federal environmental law, and regulatory authority such as Corps’ water control
manuals and water control plans; Reclamation water supply Contracts, as well as state water law); see
also Reed Benson, Reviewing Reservoir Operations: Can Federal Water Projects Adapt to Change?, 42
COLUMBIA J. ENVT’L L. 353, 368–84 (2017) (providing an overview of legal factors affecting dam
operations in the West) [hereinafter R. Benson (2017)].
155. See UTTON CTR., Law of the River Database: Sources (last updated Sept. 7, 2018) (on file with
Utton Center); UTTON CTR., Law of the River: Annotated Bibliography (Sept. 10, 2018) (selected grey
literature) (on file with Utton Center) (In its current form, this database is housed in: one hierarchical
database containing sources; an annotated outline and compilation of primary provisions of the Law of
the River; and an annotated bibliography that serves as a “guide” to the Law of the River).
156. See infra Section II.A(1)–(3) and III.A.
157. See infra Section II.A; see App. A(1)–(4) (Reference Sections pertaining to 1906 Treaty; Federal
Water Projects; Water Supply, Storage, Appropriation, and Conservation: OSE Permits, Reclamation
Contracts, and Conservancy Law—State and Federal Water Law Nexus; and Endangered Species Act).
158. See App. A(1)–(4).
159. See, e.g., infra Section III.B(1)
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treaties, statutes, and case law;160 and 2) “soft law,” i.e., regulation, policy,
management, and operations.161 A summary of these soft law provisions is presented
in Tables 1–8 (found in the Appendices). It contains excerpts of key water
management decisions from 2000 to present—which was a dry period that may
roughly correspond with the new climatological normal—and legal conditions in the
Rio Grande Basin, comprising extended drought and legal scarcity driven by ESA
compliance.
The legal analysis developed in this article represents both a synthesis of
the Law of the River and a response to the first order question: What authorities,
statutory and regulatory, govern reservoir operations in the form of storage and
release of water? The compiled database mentioned above forms a conceptual
understanding of the system, comprising mainly hard law along with policy and
operations. Thus situated, the project team contextualized key regulatory, water
management, and reservoir operations decisions—such as Rio Grande Compact
Commission Resolutions, which have authorized deviations from the
congressionally mandated Reservoir Regulation Plan for the Middle Rio Grande
Project reservoir.162 This sort of operational and historical contextualization also
extended to the technical realm. For example, it helped to identify precisely which
priority Reclamation treats as its key policy rules in their modeling efforts. These
policy rules are grounded in legal authority, but their application takes place in a
discretionary technical space. Thus, a key component of the analysis process
included transparency regarding this sort of law in action, through a process of
unpacking and memorializing.
Unpacking the different layers of reservoir operations and related law,
policy, and management decisions, the project team identified key threshold
interactions163 that define the behavior of complex socio–ecological systems such as
the Rio Chama. Having identified these “boundary conditions,”164 the investigation
160. Colin McKenzie, Law of the River: Outline and Compilation, UTTON CTR. (July 4, 2018) (“hard
law”).
161. See e.g., Law of the River: Policy and Operations, UTTON CTR. (May 23, 2018) (“soft law”
comprising tabular presentation of experts from (1) Engineer Advisors’ Reports from the Rio Grande
Compact Commission’s Annual Report, 2000–16, and (2) Bureau of Reclamation’s Annual Reports to
the Rio Grande Compact Commission; UTTON CTR., Law of the River: URGWOM Annotated Ruleset
(Sept. 2018) (on file with Utton Center) (summary presentation of operative policy rules from 2013
RiverWare ruleset documentation, including explanatory annotations and citations to relevant legal
authority) [hereinafter URGWOM Annotated Ruleset]; UTTON CTR., Law of the River: Policy and
Operations (May 23, 2018) (tabular presentation of experts from (1) Engineer Advisors’ Reports from the
Rio Grande Compact Commission’s Annual Report, 2000–16, and (2) Bureau of Reclamation’s Annual
Reports to the Rio Grande Compact Commission).
162. See M.H. Benson (2018), supra note 101; infra Section IV.A–C.
163. See M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 215–18 (characterizing “key interaction and
thresholds” in Middle Rio Grande socio-ecological system such as river channelization and changes in
the natural hydrograph, including an earlier peak runoff).
164. See Barbara Cosens, Panel Comments on Crisis, Resilience, and the Reformation of the
International Law on Sustainable Development, CANADIAN COUNCIL ON INT’L LAW CONFERENCE, (Nov.
2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2013/02/perspectives-on-crisis-resilienceand-the-reformation-of-the-international-law-on-sustainable-develo.html (noting importance of boundary
conditions—i.e., how the behavior of interconnected systems is defined by how they interact—in
analyzing complex systems, from geochemistry to geomorphology); see also Roberto Mangabeira Unger,
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next focused on key relationships and agreements, creating workarounds for
management. It became apparent that water allocation in the West is as much
determined by these workarounds as it is by the Law of the Rivers’ black letter law.165
This understanding permits the evaluation and characterization of operational
flexibility within the existing legal infrastructure.
The premise of this approach is that there is inherent flexibility within the
water management system. This type of flexibility, however, is non-linear, involves
multiple “colors” of water, tends to be transactional, and often occurs “off balance
sheet.”166 Sometimes this flexibility is the result of private negotiations and thus not
a binding precedent, while other times it is the result of “horse trading.” Regularly,
it occurs as a function of ground-level water managers diligent and daily operations
coordination, which involves multiple water users and government agencies. This
sort of flexibility has not lent itself to description and exploration, and results in
individual laws and conflicts which dominate water law.167 Nonetheless, the
flexibility embodies the most important and dynamic boundary conditions that
govern the Rio Chama as a system.
Oriented with the flexibility hypothesis, specific research questions were
generated. For example, what is the nature and extent of discretionary authorities
given to water managers in this system? What processes govern agency application
of discretionary authority to manage flow? To what extent is discretion controlled by
legal requirements as opposed to professional judgment? Finally, what is the
magnitude of variability in flows derived from existing (or past) discretionary
authority.168 This stepwise approach led to consideration of some of the key liminal
relationships, agreements, and legal parameters, which govern the importation, flow,
storage, release, and subsequent diversion of water on the Rio Chama. In turn, these
working research questions guided, as well as narrowed, the resultant legal analysis.
Water law and policy scholars have consistently argued that reservoir
operations are ripe for a fresh look, taken with the goal of identifying management
flexibility and discretionary operations. Benson (2007) contends that Reclamation’s
operation of water projects is an “[i]nherently [d]iscretionary [a]ctivity.”169 Flatt and
Tarr (2011) claim, similarly, that there is discretionary authority inherent in the
Corps’ decisions.170 Amos (2014) proposes that “there is inherent discretionary
authority in the existing structure of water law” that “has not been fully explored or
implemented” and that “may provide the adaptive capacity to address changed future
Legal Analysis as Institutional Imagination, 59 MOD. L. REV 1, 7 (noting impact of reforms in the
“institutional and ideological context of political and economic life” —e.g., social democracy in Europe;
the New Deal in America; and Keynesianism—on setting the “boundary conditions” within which society
organizes and “understands and defends their interests.”).
165. See generally FLECK, supra note 135.
166. Cf. Robison, supra note 3; Jaeger supra note 7; BALLESTERO, supra note 4; Griggs, supra note
12; Ragsdale, Jr., supra note 12 (regarding “non-linear”); see infra Section III.B(1)–(2) (regarding
“transactional” and multiple “colors” of water and “off balance sheet,” i.e., requires substantial
investigation to piece together narrative and other details).
167. Amos, supra note 3, at 1095–96.
168. See id. at 1137 (raising these questions in the context of the Willamette Basin in Oregon).
169. Reed Benson, Dams, Duties, and Discretion: Bureau of Reclamation Water Project Operations
and the Endangered Species Act, 33 COLUMBIA J. ENVT’L L. 1, 40–43 (2007).
170. Flatt & Tarr, supra note 44, at 1535–47.
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circumstances.”171 This article furthers those arguments, presenting empirical
evidence, through operational examples of this flexibility paradigm, mapping the
operational aspects and legal underpinnings of such water management and reservoir
operations innovations as: 1) drought agreements for “conservation storage” of
water; 2) voluntary water transfers and sophisticated water management; and 3)
temporary re-operation of flood-control reservoirs for spring pulse flows on the Rio
Chama and Rio Grande.172
In these case studies, one can view changes to the ostensibly ossified law of
reservoir operations as possible. They highlight where there is a historical basis for
certain assumptions, or where assumptions are either known to be—or may be—
invalid. Finally, with an eye to coupling law and modeling efforts, this work
identifies areas ripe for future investigation in terms of the physical, infrastructural,
institutional, and climatological variables at play in existing and prospective sources
of discretionary authority.
What emerges is, unsurprisingly, a complex multi-jurisdictional space, a
case study in a complex, adaptive system, and polycentric governance. Western
water law—even without the overlay of, for example, environmental law and the
sovereignty, livelihood, and economic development needs of native American tribes
and Pueblos—is a fragmented jurisdictional space.173 Combined with the new
exigency of ESA requirements amidst prolonged drought, the resulting political and
economic risk is significant. This risk has manifested recently in the protracted
litigation over the endangered Rio Grande silvery minnow and a pending U.S.
Supreme Court suit between Texas and New Mexico over interstate allocation of
river water.174 The Rio Grande Basin in New Mexico is, therefore, an important
venue for this type of research.
B. Institutional Ontologies
Situated with this brief sketch of the historical, political–economic, legal–
ecological framework of water governance in the Middle Rio Grande, it is difficult
to accept at face value what the Law of River is. What this space signifies is
contestable, to paraphrase Henri Lefebvre,175 it no doubt has meaning. A coupled
171. Amos, supra note 3, at n. 18 and accompanying text (citing J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles
for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation,
89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1388–93 (2011)); cf. Barbara Cosens, Transboundary River Governance in the
Face of Uncertainty: Resilience Theory and the Columbia River Treaty, 30 J. LAND RES. & ENVT’L. L.
229 (2010).
172. See, e.g., infra Section III.B(1)–(2); IV.A–C; App. A passim; App. B, at tbls. 1–8; see M.H.
Benson (2013), supra note 43.
173. See, e.g., Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 825 (2008); Amos, supra note 3, at n. 6.
174. See U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COMMISSIONERS OF RECLAMATION (Mar. 1, 2018)
https://www.usbr.gov/history/commiss.html (perhaps a tacit acknowledgment of this reality, New
Mexicans have in recent years often been tapped as Commissioner for the Bureau of Reclamation, the
agency’s top position) (listing all Reclamation Commissioners, including New Mexicans Eluid Martinez,
Michael Connor, and Estevan López—three of the last six, since 1995).
175. Rob Shields, Henri Lefebvre: Philosopher of Everyday Life (2002) (Henri Lefebvre was a
Marxist and Existentialist philosopher, a sociologist of urban and rural life and a theorist of the State, of
international flows of capital and of social space).
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spatial–pragmatic analysis, as developed by legal geographer David Delaney,176
of what the Rio Grande’s Critical Zone signifies leads straight to the law. Not so
abstractly, law is a function of a diversity of human experience. These
innumerable social spaces are constitutive of the Law of the River. Space and
experience are thus interwoven in the manifold processes by which the Rio Grande
is governed. There is agency in the dimensionalities of this hydro–bio–geology,
human and legal ecology, and material culture; this assemblage of institutions. The
perennial political question, how to live in a place together, is thus yoked to a similar
definitional—if philosophical—matter: what is the law? Ontology, or the study of
what there is, serves as a first approximation by which to address the threshold
question of what the Law of the Rio Chama is. In this connection, law is treated as a
diversity of institutions, namely structured human–ecological interactions. Applying
the lens of ontology to the rules emergent in this complex system is a useful step in
parsing these rules and their underlying grammar, towards an improved
understanding of the underlying experiences. An investigation into what those
Middle Rio Grande water institutions are today, what exists in such spaces, and how
they interact, is the inquiry pursued in the following sections.
1.

Institutional Diversity on the Rio Chama

History and geography have always shaped water management and
allocation decisions in the basin, and still does to the present day. Various forms of
governance have attached to different forms of advanced agriculture in the Middle
Rio Grande Basin, including the Rio Chama watershed. Today, the major legal
regimes reflect these historical water governance institutions as well as add news
ones.177 They focus on, inter alia: aboriginal rights (Pueblo water rights); community
governance (acequias); public lands reclamation, flood control, environmental law
(federal claims); and municipal and irrigation needs (imported transbasin water). At
the highest level, three institutions are woven throughout nearly all water law, policy,
and management decisions in the Middle Rio Grande Basin: 1) international treaties;
2) interstate compacts; and 3) federal regulation and agency mandates.178
Federal intervention on the Rio Grande was catalyzed by the international
and interstate nature of the river, which is legally allocated between four sovereigns
and facilitated by a fifth. These four sovereigns include three states, Colorado, New
Mexico and Texas, and a country, Mexico with the U.S. acting as facilitator. In the
1890s, a dispute arose between Mexico and the U.S. over excessive upstream
176. DAVID DELANEY, NICHOLAS BLOMLEY & RICHARD FORD, THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES
READER (2001).
177. See M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 199–205 (providing a useful overview of governance
structure and key actors); see generally Susan Kelly, et al., OVERVIEW OF WATER LAW APPLICABLE TO
THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE WATER PLANNING REGION, STATE OF N.M. INTERSTATE STREAM COMM’N &
OFFICE OF THE STATE ENG’R, MIDDLE RIO GRANDE REGIONAL WATER PLAN (2004), [hereinafter Kelly
(2004)] Supporting Document H-6 (providing an overview of New Mexico water law, pueblo water rights,
relevant Endangered Species Act considerations, the San Juan-Chama project, and interstate compacts);
see generally CLIMATE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 52 (providing comprehensive overview of Upper
Rio Grande Water Operations).
178. See generally William A. Paddock, The Rio Grande Convention of 1906: A Brief History of an
International and Interstate Apportionment of the Rio Grande, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 287 (1999) (touching
on treaties, compacts, and federal action in a discussion of water allocation).

284

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 61

American diversions of the river.179 This dispute and resultant diplomatic pressure
caused a federal embargo on the use of public lands for diversion and storage of
water in both Colorado and New Mexico that would last until 1925.180 The 1906
convention between Mexico and the U.S. resolved the conflict with a provision that
gave Mexico a legal entitlement to 60,000 acre-feet per year of Rio Grande water.181
To help in part with the resulting obligation to deliver water to Mexico and also to
facilitate effective, large scale surface water irrigation, the federal Rio Grande
Project commenced in 1907.182 In 1935, in a further bid to avoid transboundary
conflict on the river, now between Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas, the U.S.
implemented another embargo on water development to pressure a binding, interstate
agreement to share the river.183
After Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas agreed to a temporary compact in
1929, the extant Rio Grande Compact was agreed upon and then ratified by the
respective states in 1938.184 In general terms, the Compact intended to protect
contemporaneous water uses and newer, upstream uses like development facilitated
by the construction of new reservoirs were circumscribed.185 Thus, the waters of the
river were allocated between these sovereigns, while also paying lip service to
sovereign native nations’ senior Prior and Paramount rights to Rio Grande’s surface
flows.
Just as the Rio Grande Compact influences the timing and magnitude of
water storage, so do the mandates of federal agencies—primarily Reclamation, the
Corps, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“Service”).186 Reclamation and the
Corps both manage the built infrastructure along the river, including dams and
reservoirs, but their missions are different. Since the Reclamation Act of 1902,
Reclamation—and its predecessor, the Reclamation Service—has been charged with
reclaiming the arid lands of the West, that is land west of the 100th meridian.187 The
newest addition to Reclamation’s portfolio of water supply projects in New Mexico
is the San Juan-Chama Project, which diverts 96,000 acre-feet of water from the
Colorado River Basin to be used primarily by the City of Albuquerque and the
MRGCD. The Corps, in contrast, was deputized in the 1930s and ‘40s to lead flood
control efforts around the country.188 In the Middle Rio Grande Basin, the City of
Albuquerque and MRGCD irrigators have benefitted from the resulting

179. See LITTLEFIELD, supra note 70, at 16–32; see also PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at 87–88.
180. See LITTLEFIELD, supra note 70.
181. Paddock, supra note 178 at 292.
182. See LITTLEFIELD, supra note 70, at 146.
183. Susan Kelly, et. al., History of the Rio Grande Reservoirs in New Mexico: Legislation and
Litigation, 47 NAT. RES. J. 525 (2007) (containing an excellent history of interstate water litigation on the
Rio Grande, building on previous work by Al Utton) [hereinafter Kelly (2007a)].
184. See generally LITTLEFIELD, supra note 70, at 166–216.
185. Rio Grande Compact, N.M. STAT. § 72-15-23 (1938); see generally LITTLEFIELD, supra note 70,
at 194–216.
186. See generally M.H. Benson (2013), supra note 43, at Table 2 (summarizing key constituencies
and managers).
187. See generally PHILLIPS, supra note 52.
188. Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738 (enacted June 22, 1936); see also Flood Control
Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887, ch. 665 (1944).
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infrastructure of dams and levees.189 In turn, the Service is charged with the
implementation of key aspects of the ESA. In its Biological Opinions, the Service
determines whether federal agency actions, such as actions by Reclamation or the
Corps, will “jeopardize” listed endangered species. Because such a Biological
Opinion may require actions like maintaining minimum flows in a river to avoid
jeopardy to an endangered species, it operates as a key water management constraint
in a water-short environment like New Mexico.190
Two other federal institutions affect water allocation in the Middle Rio
Grande: The Middle Rio Grande Endangered Species Collaborative Program
(“Collaborative Program”) and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). The
Collaborative Program is a multi-stakeholder group that supports and coordinates
efforts to achieve compliance with the ESA.191 To this end, the federal funds it
receives and then matches in part are directed to research and other efforts to achieve
ESA compliance.192 The BIA has the obligation to ensure the Six Middle Rio Grande
Pueblos receive their water entitlements, even when Compact Article VII restrictions
would otherwise prevent water from being stored at El Vado.193 A foundational fact
is that these Pueblos are sovereign Native American nations whose water use dates
from time immemorial.194 They hold the most senior water rights in the Middle Rio
189. See PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at 138–133.
190. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 205(a)–(b), 118 Stat. 2949
(2004); see also App. (A)(4) at note 270 (WildEarth Guardians v. United States Bureau of Reclamation,
No. 1:14-cv-00666 (D.N.M. filed July 24, 2014)); App. A(4) at note 271 (Lara Katz, History of the
Minnow Litigation and Its Implications for the Future of Reservoir Operations on the Rio Grande, 47,
675 (2007)); see also App. (A)(4) at note 275 (Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-137, § 208, 117 Stat. 1827, 1849–50 (2003) (passed by Jeff Bingaman and Pete Domenici,
providing that no federal funds would be applied to the San Juan-Chama Project for the benefit of the
Silvery Minnow unless such water purchased from a willing seller pursuant to relevant Office of the State
Engineer [OSE] permitting, and deeming that compliance with the 2003 BiOp would comprise
compliance with Endangered Species Act requirements for a ten-year period)); see also App. A(4) at note
276 (Dry year flow targets under the 2003 BiOp, applicable to the Rio Grande from the outlet of Cochiti
Dam and Reservoir through San Marcial, comprise a “continuous flow” requirement in the winter and
spawning season, from November 16 through June 15, and a minimum 100 cubic feet per second (“cfs”)
during the post-spawning and summer months; see, e.g. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RIO GRANDE
PROJECT ANNUAL OPERATING PLAN: WATER OPERATIONS MODELING 26 (2016),
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/albuq/rm/RGP/pdfs/2016-AOP.pdf); see App. A(4) at note 741 (2003),
http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/NewMexico/documents/BO/20030129%20Middle%20Rio%20Grande%20Water%20Ops%20BO.pdf).
191. See, e.g., BUREAU OF RECLAMATION et al., Memorandum of Understanding, Middle Rio Grande
Endangered Species Collaborative Program (April 23, 2002); Gillon (2007), supra note 57.
192. See COLIN MCKENZIE, UTTON CTR., Federal Advisory Committee Act/Middle Rio Grande
Endangered Species Collaborative Program 1–2, at n. 2–4, 12–13 (Apr. 16, 2017) (copy on file with
Bureau of Reclamation, Albuquerque Area office).
193. MEMORANDUM, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR [DOI], ASS’T SEC’Y FOR INDIAN AFFAIRS—LAND
AND WATER RESOURCES, TO DOI SEC’Y (Dec. 1, 1981), with attached copy of “AGREEMENT FOR
PROCEDURES FOR THE STORAGE AND RELEASE OF INDIAN WATER ENTITLEMENTS OF THE SIX MIDDLE
RIO GRANDE [MRG] PUEBLOS,” signed Oct. 28–Nov. 2 by, inter alia, SIX MRG PUEBLOS’ IRRIGATION
COMMITTEE, SECRETARY OF INTERIOR’S DESIGNATED ENGINEER, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AREA
DIRECTOR, AND BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (attachment approved Dec. 28, 1981 by DOI Secretary James
Watt) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1981 P&P Agreement].
194. See, e.g., Modzelwski, supra note 9; see also Hughes, supra note 9, at, 240–41 (discussing the
inherent water rights of Pueblos).
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Grande, sufficient to irrigate 8,847 acre-feet of water per year.195 Because they are
superior to all other irrigation water rights in the region, they are referred to as Prior
and Paramount water rights.196
The institutional framework of the particular reach of the Rio Chama that
this article focuses on—from the El Vado dam downstream to the Abiquiu Reservoir
upstream—is dominated by contrasting elements. Flows are largely controlled by
three dams, an interbasin water transfer, and municipal and agricultural water
allocations, yet the waters are largely inaccessible, primitive, and contain a blueribbon fishery.197 With the Rio Chama’s hydrologic regime fundamentally altered
owing to the El Vado dam and reservoir (which dates from the 1930s), and the
importation of significant amounts of imported San Juan–Chama Project water,198 it
has seen a forty percent increase over its pre San Juan–Chama Project, solely native
Rio Grande Basin flows. Nonetheless, operations at El Vado occasionally de-water
the river. Post-El Vado, high flows have been recorded on the order of 6,000 cubic
feet per second.199 Transbasin diversion flows are coupled with the unique absence
of non-negligible diversions. This circumstance, paired with the fact that flows from
El Vado may be stored at Abiquiu, indicates a ripe possibility for reservoir operation
and experimentation.200
This reach of the Rio Chama from El Vado to Abiquiu has also been
designated as a Wild and Scenic River.201 Parts of the Rio Chama are “wild”
designated, which means its shores and watershed are essentially “primitive.”202 This
federal designation recognizes the unique natural, cultural, and recreational values
195. See, e.g., 1981 P&P Agreement, supra note 193, at 1.
196. See generally N.M. OFFICE OF THE STATE ENG’R, REGIONAL WATER PLAN: RIO CHAMA
WATERSHED, 1–10 (2006), http://www.ose.state.nm.us/Planning/RWP/Regions/14_RioChama/2006/3Legal-Issues.pdf; see also RIO CHAMA RWP (2016), supra note 148 (“Description of the Planning
Region” and “Legal Issues Unique to the Region and Local Conflicts Needing resolution,” respectively).
197. See Thompson, supra note 60.
198. See id.; see also RCFP Proposal, supra note 43, at 1 (citing Wohl et al., 2015); see also Funding
Proposal from Rio Grande Restoration to the US Bureau of Reclamation, WaterSMART Cooperative
Watershed Management Program Proposal: Rio Chama Watershed Partnership (June 5, 2014) [hereinafter
2014 RGR WaterSMART Proposal].
199. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, RIO CHAMA DISCHARGE DATA BELOW EL VADO DAM, N.M., (2021)
(showing logarithm plot of peak flows to nearly 6,000 cfs, and occasionally near-zero flows, on the order
of
1–10
cfs)
[hereinafter
USGS
Stream
Gage
Below
El
Vado
Dam];
https://nwis.waterdata.usgs.gov/nm/nwis/uv/?cb_00060=on&format=gif_default&site_no=08285500&p
eriod=&begin_date=1991-05-01&end_date=2021-03-22; cf. Harvey, supra note 100, at 2, 33 (Chama
peak flows, below El Vado).
200. See M.H. Benson (2013), supra note 43, at 3–7 (providing an overview of Rio Chama system,
including: [1] the river’s “Wild and Scenic” designation; [2] its altered hydrologic regime; [3] the San
Juan-Chama Project; and [4] recent experimental flows); Morrison, supra note 46, at §§ 2.2.1, 2.2.2 (basin
description and environmental flow study); see also M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 206–17
(detailing elements of social and ecological system(s) in Middle Rio Grande).
201. See App. A(5) (“While the Endangered Species Act does not apply to the Rio Chama since the
silvery minnow has been extirpated from that river, a remote stretch of the river between El Vado and
Abiquiu Reservoirs has been afforded environmental protections for its unique aesthetic and natural
values.”); see also App. A(5) at n. 821 (N.M. Game & Fish Dep’t, Wildlife Notes: Silvery Minnow (no
date),
http://www.wildlife.state.nm.us/download/education/conservation/wildlife-notes/aquatic/RioGrande-silvery-minnow.pdf).
202. Id. (nothing this as a legal term of art in the Wild and Scenic Rivers legislation).
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of free-flowing rivers. While dams on this and other rivers confine flow, the Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act aimed to complement existing dams with a policy of
protecting other selected rivers and reaches “in their free-flowing condition to protect
the water quality of such rivers and to fulfill other vital national conservation
purposes.”203
Even as a Wild and Scenic River, downstream diversions control flow on
the Rio Chama, since the MRGCD stores water at El Vado reservoir.204 When
MRGCD is not calling for irrigation water, flows on the Rio Chama primarily
comprise the ABCWUA’s San Juan-Chama allocation. The ABCWUA tends to
move water when the MRGCD does not. For example, it has released water during
the winter to support brown trout spawning.205 Indeed, the cold, tailwater releases
below El Vado have also generated a world-class trout fishery. At the macro level,
this institutional mix has resulted in dampening spring peaks in the hydrograph while
MRGCD stores native water at El Vado, and augmenting summer flows when
irrigation water is released.206
2.

Adaptive Capacity and Reservoir Operations

The unique institutional nature and hydrologic regime of the Rio Chama
between El Vado and Abiquiu has generated interest in experimental flows. Specific
interest in such flows, which would conceptually be released from El Vado and later
stored at Abiquiu reservoir, roughly 25 miles downstream, appears to date from
2009.207 That year, unique runoff conditions required a controlled release of 5,600
cubic feet per second from El Vado.208 This release equaled a two-year return period
flow event in the pre-El Vado Dam era, which was not terribly large. Still, it was the
biggest release from El Vado since 1985. At this time, scientists observed that such
flows could pass safely through El Vado to Abiquiu reach.209 Of more immediate
scientific—as opposed to engineering—interest, however, were the geomorphologic
203. Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (1968), codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §
1274 et seq.
204. See M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 207, tbl. 2 (summarizing El Vado water management
authorizations); cf. Luke Piermont, Muddying the Waters: The Fight Over Relinquishment Credit, VISTA:
NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVT’L L. SECTION, (Winter 2012) (providing an overview of Article VII credit
relinquishment water and related legal issues, including ownership of this water) (noting MRGCD/BOR
contract with third party for “relinquishment credit” water storage at El Vado).
205. See E-mail exchange between Rich Barrios and Karl Martin (Sept. 15, 1998) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Barrios & Martin].
206. See, e.g., CLIMATE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 52, at App. A, A-12–A-14 (noting reservoir
storage and changes to the size and duration of peak flows).
207. Rio Chama Flow Project [RCFP], The Chama Flow Report, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Winter 2012), at 2
(note, “This Project Has History,” highlighting confluence of relevant factors ca. 2008, -09); see App.
note 324 (citing WildEarth Guardians v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 314 F.Supp.3d 1178,
1203–04 (D.N.M. 2018, as amended) (The year was also when, among other related events, Congress
authorized Cochiti reservoir operation deviations on a temporary, particularized basis—for environmental
flow operations).
208. cf. Harvey, supra note 100 (citing associated PowerPoint presentation; USGS Stream Gage
Below El Vado Dam, supra note 199; Presentation Remarks of Mike Harvey given at Rio Chama Flow
Project Advisory Council Meeting (Oct. 12, 2016)).
209. Harvey, supra note 100 (towards Abiquiu, there are only Forest Service roads and a Benedictine
Monastery near the river).
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changes resulting from a pulse flow event of this magnitude, which reestablished
some pre-damn era ecological functions of the Rio Chama.210
To further investigate the possibility of (re)creating ecological flows on the
Rio Chama, scholars have set out conceptual models for categorizing and analyzing
the relevant constraints and related opportunities for more flexible reservoir
operations. In this domain, it bears highlighting that many reservoir operations of the
Rio Grande affect or apply to the Rio Chama, as well.211 Although this is not
surprising, it is relevant. While there are no endangered species and no significant
water users on the Rio Chama’s river’s Wild and Scenic reach, flows in this stretch
of river are nonetheless characteristically driven in function of the basin-wide
reservoir operations. Lessons that are gleaned from the case of the Rio Chama could
be extended, therefore, more broadly.
With a particular eye to the Wild and Scenic reach of the Rio Chama,
Benson, et. al. (2013), propose a classification system for thinking about the
“institutional and physical capacity” issues generally relevant to more flexible
operations. In doing so they apply an adaptive management framework.212 Prospects
for operationalizing instream flows—ad hoc and experimental or otherwise—are
significantly influenced by a “complex set of legal requirements, physical
constraints, and both social and ecological enhancement opportunities.”213 The
classification framework put forward thus affords a navigational aid for charting
these complex waters, in order to improve and facilitate stakeholder involvement,
prevent ossification of perceived limitations, and investigate capacity issues.214
Further, Benson, et. al., argue that certain “legal and institutional uncertainties”
should be incorporated into such a mapping framework.215 In the near decade that
has passed since this framework was first presented, the physical, institutional, and
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Jennifer Faler, Reservoir Operation Constraints and Opportunities, from the Perspective
of the Bureau of Reclamation, Presentation at “Institutional Constraints to Water Management in New
Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (May 20, 2016), at 9–10, 12–15 (comments and analysis from Reclamation’s
current area director regarding reservoir operations discussing, inter alia, opportunities and examples of
operations flexibility) (on file with Utton Center); John R. D’Antonio Jr., Challenges and Opportunities
for Federal Reservoir Management, Presentation at “Institutional Constraints to Water Management in
New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM (May 20, 2016) (presentation by former New Mexico State Engineer
providing, inter alia, overview of law and management of federal reservoirs and discussing relevant
authorities) (on file with Utton Center); Rolf Schmidt-Petersen, Managing the Surface Water of the Upper
Rio Grande, in N.M. BUREAU OF GEOLOGY AND MINERAL RESOURCES, Decision-Makers Guide: Water
Resources of the Middle Rio Grande: San Acacia to Elephant Butte, Chap. 1, at 27, 30 (L. Greer Price,
Peggy S. Johnson, and Douglas Bland eds., 2007) (detailing how water management decisions are
made); see also Brad Hudgens, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Institute for Water Resources, Corps Water
Supply Storage 101 (2016).
212. M.H. Benson (2013), supra note 43, at tbl. 2, 3.
213. Id. at 8.
214. Id.
215. M.H. Benson (2013), supra note 43, at Conclusion; cf. M.H. Benson, supra note 45, at 218–23;
M.H. Benson (2018), supra note 101, at 99–101, 103, 112–13; Hannah Gosnell et al., Transforming
(Perceived) Rigidity in Environmental Law Throughout Adaptive Governance: A Case of Endangered
Species Act Implementation, 22 ECOL’Y & SOC’Y (No. 4, online) (2017), at 42–45; 48–52, 53–54; Tbl. 1;
Figs. 1–3, https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-09887-220442; see generally COSENS ET AL., LEGAL PATHWAYS
TO ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN WATER BASINS IN NORTH AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA (Barbara Cosens
and Lance Gunderson eds. 2018), https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72472-0_10.
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capacity issues—and uncertainties—have been mapped with increasing
sophistication. The Rio Chama Flow Project is now attempting to leverage these and
subsequent legal mapping efforts into a numerical modeling tool by incorporating
legal complexity. The usefulness of its result would be in function of a more
transparent treatment (and modeling) of uncertainty, regardless of the source—
scientific or legal.
In this vein, three major high-level constraints tend to dominate water
management on both the Rio Chama and Rio Grande. First, a complex accounting of
native Rio Grande Basin flows, and non-native flows is required for New Mexico to
achieve both legal—and physical—compliance with the Rio Grande Compact.216
Such accounting is carried out by complex physical–mathematical models.
URGWOM, for example, contain rules regarding the physical assumptions and legal
requirements underlying how such accounting operates. Modification of reservoir
operations would need to be represented in the accounting model, and the effects to
components of the water balance provided to the different stakeholders. In general,
these effects are difficult to predict or conceptualize, given the complex, non-linear
nature of the whole system.217
Second, the Abiquiu reservoir—through which native and non-native flows
pass—is operated primarily for flood control purposes. Any deviation from these
normal operations requires approval from the Rio Grande Compact Commission.218
The Texas Commissioner, at a minimum, will scrutinize such operation for
implications to their allocation, as delivered to Elephant Butte.
Third, any perceived or actual shortage to their allocation through altered
reservoir operations could injure the water rights of irrigators. This is a matter of
livelihood for irrigators; and for Pueblos, a matter of livelihood and sovereignty.219
In this way, the 35-mile Wild and Scenic section of the Rio Chama clearly does not
exist in a vacuum. New Mexico’s water managers, especially federal dam operators
(e.g., the Corps) and water project managers (e.g., Reclamation) are sensitive to these
wide-ranging implications of modified reservoir operations on the Rio Chama.220
For its part, Reclamation’s general policy perspective on reservoir
operations is informed by the agency’s water management responsibilities on the Rio
216. See M.H. Benson (2013), supra note 43 at Tbls. 1–4 (laying out useful tabular summaries of these
major (and related) constraints); M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 206–07, Tbl. 1; M.H. Benson
(2018), supra note 101, at 104, Tbl. 7.1.
217. See Amos, supra note 3, at 1099, n. 16 and accompanying text (describing sophisticated, agentbased simulations tools used to model complex, socio-ecological systems for purposes of optimizing water
management), 1131–32 (describing application of agent-based modeling to evaluate water scarcity
outcome vis-a-vis the dynamics of legal flexibility, in a project that involves the “integration of
biophysical parameters and social science data by legal research regarding the interaction of state and
federal water law, on issues like instream flow and water quality”).
218. See Flood Control Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat. 480, 488; see also accompanying
text (“Congressional authorizations of the MRG Project, which joined the purposes of flood and sediment
control with re-development of agricultural lands in the Rio Grande’s Middle Valley, occurred over a
nearly 20-year period. In 1941, Congress authorized preliminary flood control studies and not until 1960
was the ‘reservoir regulation plan’ for the Project’s component reservoirs defined by statute.”); cf. M.H.
Benson, supra note 45, at nn. 166–67 and accompanying text; Gillon (2007), supra note 57, at n. 102 and
accompanying text, 635 (explaining constraints to such a deviation).
219. See generally DUNBAR–ORTIZ, supra note 55; Modzelwski, supra note 9.
220. Cf. 2014 RGR WaterSMART Proposal, supra note 198.
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Grande and Rio Chama from Colorado to Texas. Reclamation manages Heron for
imported San Juan-Chama Project water, and El Vado primarily for MRGCD
supplies, which include both water native to the Rio Chama and some San JuanChama flows.221 Storage is sometimes restricted under the Rio Grande Compact. El
Vado may be used to store water pursuant to New Mexico’s credit water
relinquishment under the Rio Grande Compact.222 Reclamation also manages the Rio
Grande Project’s Elephant Butte Reservoir, which is New Mexico’s delivery point
to Texas under the Rio Grande Compact.223 In addition to this matrix of legal
requirements and management responsibilities, Reclamation must also meet ESAmandated flow requirements on the Rio Grande, as determined by the hydrologic
objectives enumerated in the relevant Biological Opinion.224
Thus, Reclamation views reservoir operations flexibility as a tool to meet
these various obligations, including ESA requirements, while enhancing ecological
resilience, including meeting or even enhancing its water delivery capabilities during
drought.225 To that end, Reclamation has noted that reservoir storage flexibility may
be needed to address water scarcity, earlier peaks of spring snowmelt runoff, as well
as more intense floods and more prolonged drought.226 With these exigencies in
221. See M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 206–07, Tbl. 1; M.H. Benson (2018), supra note 101,
at 104, Tbl. 7.1.
222. Cf. Piermont, supra note 204.
223. See, e.g., M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 206–07, Tbl. 1; M.H. Benson (2018), supra note
101, at 104, Tbl. 7.1.
224. Cf. App. A(4) at n. 277 (U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL AND
CONFERENCE OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF ACTIONS ASSOCIATES WITH THE
PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION’S
WATER AND RIVER MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ FLOOD
CONTROL OPERATION, AND RELATED NON-FEDERAL ACTIONS ON THE MIDDLE RIO
GRANDE, NEW MEXICO (2003), http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/NewMexico/documents/BO/20030129%20Middle%20Rio%20Grande%20Water%20Ops%20BO.pdf); see also App. A(4) at n. 282 (U.S.
FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, FINAL BIOLOGICAL AND CONFERENCE OPINION FOR
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, AND NON-FEDERAL WATER
MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES ON THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE, NEW
MEXICO 102 (2016), https://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/NewMexico/BO_MRG.cfm); see U.S. FISH
AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, FINAL BIOLOGICAL AND CONFERENCE OPINION ON THE EFFECTS OF ACTIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROGRAMMATIC BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT OF BUREAU OF RECLAMATION’S
WATER AND RIVER MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS’ FLOOD CONTROL
OPERATION, AND RELATED NON-FEDERAL ACTIONS ON THE MIDDLE RIO GRANDE, NEW MEXICO at §
VII 87–99 (detailing flow targets as “reasonable and prudent alternatives”), 109 (subject to the Biological
Opinion’s enumerated “terms and conditions,” in concert with Federal and state agencies’ discretionary
“conservation recommendation”), 1176–18 (Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 BIOLOGICAL OPINION]; see
2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 56, at 18–24 (showing analogous requirements in the form of
concomitant “Conservation Measures” and implementing regulations/programs/partners, corresponding
to ESA-required “reasonable and prudent measures.”), 13 (regarding draft Hydrologic Objectives for
seasonal water needs for silvery minnow support), 19 (noting “Part One of the Silvery Minnow [Survival
and Recovery Strategy, or SRS] contains strategies and decision points for silvery minnow production
and survival known at the Hydrobiological Objectives”); see also App. A, detailing Hydrobiological
Objectives.
225. See Faler, supra note 211, at 9, 10–15; cf. 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 56, at Tbl. 1,
pp. 149–150, 157–59 at Conservation Measures Nos. 1–4, 6, 31–34, 39; see generally 2015 JOINT
BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 74.
226. Faler, supra note 211, at 9.
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mind, Reclamation’s 2015 Biological Assessment, prepared in support of the new
Rio Grande Biological Opinion, suggested ways towards water management
flexibility.227 These suggestions included alternative El Vado operations that
Reclamation indicated were “within current [reservoir] authorizations.”228 These
offsetting and conservation measures for El Vado included: 1) “modific[ation] of
operations to better meet species needs[;]” 2) “adjustment to storage timing” during
the spring peak flows; and 3) “facilitat[ing] exchanges of San Juan-Chama Project
water from downstream to upstream to improve water management flexibility.”229
Beyond the types of flexible reservoir operations that Reclamation has been
exploring for some time, such as waivers for carryover storage of San Juan–Chama
Project water contractor allotments at year end,230 Reclamation has also suggested
pursuing modification to reservoir operations that go beyond existing authorization.
For example, adjusting the timing of storage and creating conservation pools in
upstream reservoirs.231
Jennifer Faler, Reclamation’s Albuquerque Area District manager,
highlighted some of the agency’s “outside the box” thinking in 2017, probing some
boundaries of current legal authority and existing authorizations.232 Focusing on
reservoir operations, she cited four recent examples of collaboration with key water
users, managers, and regulators. First, Faler highlighted its coordination with the Rio
Grande Compact Commission to enact Commission Resolutions which permitted
storage at El Vado during Compact Article VII restriction and subsequent releases
to support peak pulse-flows on the Middle Rio Grande.233 Next, she pointed to altered
timing for the release of unused Prior and Paramount water stored for the Six Middle
Rio Grande Pueblos at El Vado, which “facilitate[d] a more natural hydrograph
without affecting [downstream] water use[s] or deliveries under the Rio Grande
Compact.”234 Faler also referenced two exchanges of San Juan-Chama Project water
from Elephant Butte to upstream storage for the ABCWUA in 2013 and for the City
of Santa Fe in 2014.235 Finally, Ms. Faler cited Reclamation’s ongoing “support [for]
Albuquerque in its quest for storage of native waters in Abiquiu Reservoir” as
another example of creative water management in the Middle Rio Grande.236
227. See 2015 JOINT BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 74; 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra
note 56, at Cover Ltr. 1–2; pp. 10, 13; App. A, passim (Reclamation Conservation Measures and related
Hydrobiological Objectives, as developed initially in 2015 JOINT BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
[Hydrological Objectives].
228. Id. at 12.
229. Id.
230. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, AND
NEW MEXICO INTERSTATE STREAM COMM’N, UPPER RIO GRANDE WATER OPERATIONS REVIEW, Vol. II,
at App. I (Water Operations), I-11 (Apr. 20, 2007) [hereinafter URG WATER OPERATIONS REVIEW]
(citing Emmett Rice, Reclamation Field Solicitor Opinion (Nov. 3, 1983)) (providing legal rationale for
carryover storage where benefit “inures” to the federal government, not any individual San Juan Chama
Project water contractor).
231. Faler, supra note 211, at 9.
232. Id. at 14.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 14.
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For its part, the Corps has a naturally narrower view of reservoir operations
flexibility, in large part due to safety and engineering considerations underlying its
primary mission of flood control.237 While the Corps often operates reservoirs within
its purview for multiple authorized purposes (such as municipal water supply, fish
and wildlife, and recreation), flood control is its primary authorized purpose in the
case of Abiquiu and Cochiti, as part of the Middle Rio Grande Project. As a threshold
matter, the Water Supply Act of 1958 requires Congressional approval for any
“major . . . operational changes” to Abiquiu or Cochiti, or for any “modification . . .
which would seriously affect the purposes for which the project was authorized.”238
Within this primary constraint to its operations, recent litigation highlights
the Corps’ current dim view on at least one aspect of reservoir operations discretion.
In WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the issue was whether the
Corps had, as a matter of law, insufficient discretion in its operations of Abiquiu to
exempt it from the requirement that it consult with the Service under the ESA.239 The
Corps expressed the view that temporary, Congressionally authorized deviations
from normal operations at the Corps-managed Cochiti Dam and Reservoir were an
“unreliable tool for the purpose of silvery minnow spawning.”240 Further, the Corps
expressed that it currently has “no authority” for further Cochiti deviation, in part
because the Corps “does not own water or have water rights” and that the Corps
“does not own the land.”241 In more general terms, the Corps similarly claimed it has
“no discretion in [its] normal [daily] operations,” which allow for the “free flow” of
native Rio Grande and San Juan-Chama Project water through its dams to
contractors.242 In the same vein, the Corps categorically indicated that it has “no
authority to acquire or release any added volume of water” and “no real property
interests required to store water.”243
237. See, e.g., D’Antonio, supra note 211, passim.
238. See App. A(2)(c) (“As broad as Reclamation’s and the Corps’ water management mandates may
be, the Water Supply Act of 1958 (“1958 Act”) limits the degree to which both agencies can unilaterally
re-purpose or re-operate water projects. The 1958 Act required that Congress approve ‘[m]odifications of
a reservoir project heretofore authorized, surveyed, planned, or constructed to include storage” if such
modifications “would seriously affect the purposes for which the project was authorized, surveyed,
planned, or constructed, or which would involve major structural or operational changes.’ It has been
argued that while this provision limits agencies’ ability to unilaterally alter project purposes, it implicitly
permits non-major changes to project operations, thus affording Reclamation and the Corps a degree of
discretion in operating their projects.”); see also App. A(2)(c) (citing Pub. L. No. 85-500, Stat. 297, § 301
(1958) (“major” changes); see generally Flatt & Tarr, supra note 44, at 1522 nn. 133–34 and
accompanying text (“The WSA of 1958 requires congressional approval for a major allocation change to
a previously authorized project that stores water. Section 301 of the Act, which requires congressional
approval of modifications to a reservoir project that ‘would seriously affect the purposes for which the
project was authorized,’ has not been the subject of much litigation.”), 1529 nn. 190–91 and
accompanying text (Act “[r]equires congressional approval of a ‘major structural or operational change’
and modifications that ‘seriously affect’ authorized purposes.”); see App. A(2)(c) 29; R. Benson (2017),
supra note 154, at 370–71 nn. 81–83.
239. WildEarth Guardians vs. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 314 F.Supp.3d 1178, 1183 (D.N.M., June
6, 2018, amended Aug. 8, 2014); see also WildEarth Guardians v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137112 (Aug. 14, 2018) [hereinafter WEG v. Corps].
240. D’Antonio, supra note 211, at 17.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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Congress stepped in to address the Corps’ concerns regarding a perceived
lack of sufficient, legal authority to deviate from its primary mission to operate
Cochiti Reservoir only for flood control. In the 2018 Water Resources and
Development Act, Congress authorized the Corps to reinitiate temporary deviations
in its operations of both the Cochiti and Jemez Reservoirs for a period of five
years.244 The Corps must consult with the Pueblos of Cochiti and Santa Ana before
restarting temporary deviations and will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of the
deviations.245 Lest the Corps be attacked for its unyielding outlook, it indicated that,
had the WildEarth Guardians litigation settled, it would have been “happy to
facilitate stakeholder discussions to address:
1) “sources of water[;]”
2) “permits to store water[;]”
3) “real property interest required to store water[;]”
4) “Rio Grande Compact Commission approval[; and]”
5) “Congressional authorization[.]”246
That said, WildEarth Guardians did not settle as the Corps prevailed in
court. Corps personnel have recently expressed the view that the agency has been
less solicitous in seeking reservoir operations flexibility due to increased scrutiny of
its water operations, presumably in terms of the threat of environmental litigation.247
The Corps also notes it has completed “comprehensive data collection” for Cochiti
Dam and Lake, which “would serve as baseline information” for a new, system-wide
study.248 Such a study would presumably form the basis for operating Corps
reservoirs on the foundation of up-to-date data. This process could have the effect of
rendering previous assumptions invalid and result in an optimized system. If, as a
result, the Corps obtained a more accurate estimate for open-water evaporation,249

244. See America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-270, § 1175, 132 Stat. 3766
(2018) [hereinafter AWIA (2018)].
245. Id. (containing current Congressional authorization of Cochiti Deviations); cf. App. at § B (citing
the Letter from Antoinette Grant, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to Estevan Lopez and Brent Rhees (Nov.
12, 2013) (regarding expiration of the Cochiti Deviation) (on file with author); see also D’Antonio, supra
note 211, at 17 (noting the Corps’ that such deviations were “unreliable tool[s]” for Silvery Minnow
spawning).
246. AWIA (2018), supra note 244.
247. Anjali Bean, Opportunities to Enhance Environmental Flows on the Rio Chama 6–7 (Aug. 2018)
(Master of Water Resources Professional Project) (on file with the University of New Mexico Digital
Repository) (contending, based on interviews with Corps personnel, that “[g]reater scrutiny of [Corps’]
operations . . . has made the agency less able to find flexibility in their operations” and noting that the
federal district court’s June 2018 decision in favor of the Corps in WildEarth Guardians owed, in large,
to the Corps’ strict adherence to black letter law of, inter alia, Middle Rio Grande Project authorizing
legislation).
248. D’Antonio, supra note 211, at 19.
249. Open water evaporation is seen as reservoir evaporation, which currently comprises a high
percent of water use in the Middle Rio Grande. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, RIO GRANDE BASIN
MASTER WATER CONTROL MANUAL, APP. A, ABIQUIU DAM AND RESERVOIR, RIO CHAMA NEW MEXICO,
WATER CONTROL MANUAL 4–5 (1995) [hereinafter Abiquiu WCM] (noting 80-inch estimate of average
annual evaporation at Abiquiu Dam).
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project operations and policy could be altered to store water more efficiently without
impairment to the Corps’ acceptable margin of risk for its flood control operations.
Achieving some measure of reservoir operations flexibility is a necessary,
but insufficient, condition for adapting to climate change induced drought, which
early-21st century Rio Grande Basin conditions have previewed.250 Still, the process
of studying reservoir operations may be as important as specific results. As a
laboratory, the Wild and Scenic reach of the Rio Chama offers an opportunity to
focus on the process of consensus and trust-building. Complicating factors such as
the ESA and impairment to water rights are not at issue as there are no endangered
fish or substantial diversions on this reach of the Rio Chama.251
In the case of Rio Chama ecological flow operations—recent and
prospective—legal defensibility and practicability considerations would benefit
from answers to three significant outstanding questions. First, there is an arguably
outstanding legal question as to authority for carryover storage at Heron Reservoir.252
Such storage allows a flexible source of water for downstream release. Second,
despite general consensus about the need for more flexible storage at Abiquiu,
stakeholders are split on feasibility.253 The MRGCD, for one, is concerned with how
such storage could affect their rights in El Vado.254 Third, as water moves
downstream to Abiquiu, where it would be stored (if temporarily), evaporative losses
increase, thus necessitating proper accounting for what amounts to a consumptive
use. Still, one can imagine these three issues having technical solutions that would
leave all water users—and the environment—whole.255 Such technical solutions,
together with the legal analysis needed to assure the operations are legally defensible,
are precisely the terrain of the Rio Chama Flow Project. These issues are
significantly less intractable than those related to the maelstrom on the mainstem Rio
Grande such as: 1) complex water rights impairment analysis; 2) high-priority—and
high-profile—ESA requirements; and 3) bottom-line Compact delivery
obligations.256
III. MAPPING: LAW OF THE RIVER, OPERATING RULES, AND
RESERVOIR OPS
Within this variegated international, interstate, intrastate and generally
multi-jurisdictional, transboundary, and inter-sovereign water governance regime,
there are varying colors of water. The Law of the River for the Rio Chama and Rio
250. See, e.g., R. Benson (2017), supra note 154, at 356–57 (“[R]eservoirs operate in dramatically
changing context. . . . [C]limate change has serious implications for dam operating plans.”).
251. Personal Communication, Mike Harvey, RCFP Technical Team, Fall 2016.
252. See infra Section IV.A.
253. See, e.g., Bean, supra note 247, at 7 (noting conceptual agreement among Reclamation, the Corps,
MRGCD, and ABCWUA regarding the benefits likely to inure to the Flow Project’s goals; highlighting
generalized support of the concept from the Corps and ABCWUA; but explaining that the MRGCD is
“not particularly interested in risking harm to their own rights”).
254. Id.
255. Cf. DEBUYS, supra note 10, at 268, 270–71, 274 (noting, inter alia, the most critical challenges
in MRG water management domains dealing “political ecology,” not technical feasibility).
256. Bean, supra note 247, at 8 (noting that “large portion of the water used [for] . . . Silvery Minnow
endangered species compliance is stored and released first [on] the Chama”).
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Grande nonetheless requires an accounting of multidimensional coloring and
shading of water, given the coupled physical–legal aspect of water allocation and use
under prior appropriation. Accounting for such legal and physical dimensions of
embodiment of water thus forms a basis of the legal framework. The Law of the
River is the framework by which surface water is managed, and therefore by which
reservoirs are operated.
A. Précis for a Law of the River: Treaties, Compact, and Indigenous Rights
Amidst protracted drought and the sometimes-zero-sum mentality of water
stakeholders, federal action—and therefore federal law—in the Rio Grande Basin is
one axis on which all water management turns.257 The three bases of federal action
in the basin are largely international treaties and an interstate compact, together with
federal water projects. Reclamation, which is generally in charge of water supply
and the Corps, responsible for flood control‚ along with an environmental law
overlay fall under the prior appropriation regime.258 All represent explicit
Congressional authorizations, approvals, or mandates. The 1906 treaty with Mexico
allocates a portion of the Rio Grande’s flow to Mexico,259 while the Rio Grande
Compact of 1938 represents Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas’s attempt to divide
these international and interstate waters among the three states.260 Next, the MRGCD
attempted, but failed, to harness the river.261 The federal government authorized its
bailout as part of the Middle Rio Grande Project, which directed the Corps to provide
flood control through a network of dams and levees on the Rio Grande and its
tributaries.262 Subsequently, Congress authorized the San Juan-Chama [Diversion]
Project, whereby Reclamation would import water from the Colorado River Basin to
supply, primarily, the City of Albuquerque and the MRGCD.263 Pursuant to
authorizing legislation, neither project could operate to interfere with New Mexico’s
delivery obligations to Texas under the Rio Grande Compact.264 Further, the ESA
obligates water delivery for endangered species.265
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See App. § A(2) passim.
Id. at § A(2)(ii).
Id. at § A(1).
See generally infra notes 282–291 and accompanying text.
See PHILLIPS, supra note 52, at 102–122, 130–32 and accompanying text; see also 2015 JOINT
BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 74, at I-5 to I-7 and accompanying text.
262. See App. A(3)(iii) (Conservancy Law); App. A(2)(ii)(a) (MRGCD re-development as part of
MRG Project).
263. App. A(2)(ii)(b) at n. 538 (For concise overviews, see Abiquiu WCM, supra note 249, at 9-2, ¶
90-1(b)) (“Bureau of Reclamation”); Craig Boroughs, Marc Sidlow, and Steven Bowser, Representing
Policy for Operations in the Upper Rio Grande Water Operations Models, Presented at 2ND JOINT FED.
INTERAGENCY CONF., June 27-July 1, 2010 at 2, 5 [hereinafter Boroughs (2010)]; see generally Gillon
(2007), supra note 57, at 617–19; 2015 JOINT BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 74, at Pt. I, I-3–I-5
(“The San Juan-Chama Project.”); Kevin G. Flanigan & Amy I. Haas, The Impact of Full Beneficial Use
of San Juan-Chama Project Water by the City of Albuquerque on New Mexico’s Rio Grande Compact
Obligations, 48 N. Res. J. 371, 374–79. (2008).
264. See generally infra notes 282–291 and accompanying text.
265. See M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 200–05 (providing an overview of interstate compacts,
San Juan-Chama Project, tribal agreements, and federal agencies); Oglesby, supra note 54 (discussing
various “colors of water”); Kevin Flanigan, Bringing Accountability to Water Planning: Does it take a
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Uncertainty regarding the nature and extent of Pueblo water rights
necessarily informs any discussion of water law and policy in the Rio Grande
Basin,266 which is further complicated by the federal-tribal relationship.267 As scholar
and water lawyer Em Hall has pointed out, although “[w]e are accustomed to say
that the 1938 Rio Grande Compact limits New Mexico’s access to [water] in the Rio
Grande generally[,] the Pueblo claims come before the compact, which exempts
them from its terms.”268 Practically speaking, the priority and magnitude of these
rights has the potential to replace nearly all non-native water users. Further,
aboriginal or reserved rights, which are governed under federal law, are not subject
to state rules on beneficial use and abandonment or forfeiture.269 To add to this
complexity, the nature and extent of Indian water rights is judicially evolving, and in
New Mexico, contains a wrinkle. Here, the water rights of Pueblos do not fall
squarely within the well-established Winters doctrine of federal reserved rights for
tribes.270 Instead, Pueblos may in part have “aboriginal rights,” which are unlike
federal reserved rights that attached to Indian reservations. These rights were
generally created in the latter half of the nineteenth century, recognized by prior
sovereigns, Spain and Mexico, and subsequently preserved by the U.S. in 1848 in
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.271
On so-called grant lands, Pueblo water rights are “immemorial, aboriginal,
or first priority” because, as the Utton Center has explained, those lands 1) “have
been occupied and the water used since before Europeans entered the territory[;]” 2)
“were recognized by prior sovereigns[;]” 3) “came into the United States protected
by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo[;]” and 4) “were never relinquished to the
federal government.”272 Quantification of Pueblo rights is, nonetheless, still an open
legal question. While the “historically irrigated acreage” standard—as opposed to
Winters’ “practicably irrigated acreage” standard—was applied in the Aamodt
adjudication, that judicial decision carries no precedential value since the case was

Crisis?, New Mexico Water Dialogue Meeting, (The N.M. Water Dialogue) (setting out legal framework
for surface water management); Kelly (2007a), supra note 176, at 612; Kelly (2007b), supra note 183, at
653; Kelly & Urbina, supra note 132; Hall (2007), supra note 52, at 54 (describing Middle Rio Grande
surface flows “subject to different legal claims”); Kara Gillon, Watershed Down?: The Ups and Downs
of Watershed Management in the Southwest, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 395, 408–11 (2002) (“The Law
of the Rio Grande”); see generally, Amos, supra note 3, at Pt. III.
266. See, e.g., Kelly 2004, supra note 177, at 36 (titled “Pueblos’ [and Tribal] Reserved Water
Rights”), 37 (titled “Reserved Rights for Other Federal Purposes”).
267. See, e.g., UTTON CENTER, American Indian Water Rights, in WATER MATTERS! 5-1–5-4, 5-6–57 (2015) (providing an overview, basis, quantification, and priority of tribal and Pueblo water rights, as
well as notes on government-to-government relations); Hall (2007), supra note 52, at 54–55; Kelly 2004,
supra note 177, at 31–36.
268. Hall (2007), supra note 52, at 54.
269. See App. A(3)(ii)(a)–(b), A(3)(iii) (providing a summation of permits and categories of rights
along the MRGCD as well as Conservancy Laws relevant to the MRGCD).
270. See Modzelwski, supra note 9.
271. See Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 66; CLARK, supra note 52, at 24, 33, 35; see
generally Hughes, supra note 9; see generally Modzelwski, supra note 9.
272. UTTON CENTER, supra note 267, at 5-2.
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subsequently settled.273 In this legal grey area, out of which arise many injustices in
terms of violation of native sovereignty, it is worth recalling the obvious: Federal
water rights in New Mexico were not developed with regard to the historical and
practical realities of native water rights. As a result, watersheds were overappropriated, including through the federal Reclamation program.274
A final, judicial definition of the nature and extent of Pueblo rights may
never occur. Instead, recent Indian water rights settlements in New Mexico, such as
Aamodt and Abeyta (Taos), may provide the next-best answer. Such litigation
highlights the magnitude of fiscal and multi-stakeholder collaboration required,
through the settlement process, to resolve this complication of Indian water rights.275
For example, the Aamodt and Abeyta settlements required federal contributions of
$174 and $124 million, respectively, and state contributions of $50 and $19 million,
respectively.276 Aamodt required an extensive process to implement the Regional
Water System attendant to the case’s settlement.277 Thus, along the path to full
implementation of the Aamodt settlement were numerous milestones. The Pueblos
of Jemez, Santa Ana, and Zia have returned to litigation in the Abouselman
adjudication and so a judicial determination of the nature and extent of Pueblo water
rights in the Middle Rio Grande remains a possibility.278
Other than the Pueblos’ water rights, tribal rights most relevant to the Rio
Chama Flow Project are the rights of the Jicarilla Apache nation, which owns
riparian lands on the Rio Chama.279 In March of 2013, the State of New Mexico and
the Jicarilla Apache Nation successfully concluded years of negotiation and
collaborative technical work in the State of New Mexico v. Aragon adjudication with
the entry of a Consent Order recognizing the Nation’s water rights on lands acquired
since the entry of the 1998 Jicarilla Apache Nation decree,280 including riparian land
it subsequently purchased along the Rio Chama.281
Notwithstanding these critical issues regarding the sovereign rights of
various native nations in the basin, the Rio Grande Compact remains the canonical—
orthodox, as it were—cornerstone of the Law of th[is] River.282 As noted above, the
Compact intended to protect contemporaneous water uses and newer, upstream uses,
273. Modzelwski, supra note 9, at 59–62; Hughes, supra note 9, 223–228 (discussing New Mexico ex
rel. State Engineer v. Aamodt, 11 N.M. 4, 800 P.2d 1061 (N.M. 1990), which is not binding since this
litigation was ultimately settled out of court).
274. See, e.g., Krakoff, supra note 15, at 262–63, 265–66, 270–76, 284–86 (2013); UTTON CENTER,
supra note 267, at 5-3 (discussing reclamation projects and tribal water claims).
275. UTTON CENTER, supra note 267, at 5-1–5-7.
276. Id. at 5-4.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 5-5 (“returned to litigation”). But see Matthew Fletcher, Tenth Circuit Denies En Banc
Petition in Pueblo Water Rights Matter, TURTLE TALK (Dec. 21, 2020), https://turtletalk.blog/tag/unitedstates-v-abousleman/ (citing Order Denying Petition, TURTLE TALK (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2020/12/order-denying-petition-for-rehearing.pdf).
279. UTTON CTR. Sources, supra note 155, at 5-2.
280. Id. at 5-5.
281. Id.
282. While the “law of the river” usually refers to the Colorado River, “laws of the rivers” exist around
the West. See COLO. RIVER COMM’N OF NEV., “LAWS OF THE RIVERS”: THE LEGAL REGIMES OF MAJOR
INTERSTATE SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES (OCT. 2006).
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like development facilitated by the construction of new reservoirs that were
circumscribed. For example, Article VII dictates that no water may be stored in
upstream, “post-1929” reservoirs when “usable project water” in storage at Elephant
Butte falls below 400,000 acre-feet.283 Accordingly, new uses upstream of Elephant
Butte must occur through either imported water from the Colorado River Basin or as
a function of water stored above the volumes Rio Grande Project users are entitled
to divert.284
Under the Rio Grande Compact, water delivery requirements are indexed
based on current flows, and New Mexico makes delivery to Texas, not at the political
boundary of the two states, but into Elephant Butte Reservoir.285 Despite these
annual, indexed delivery obligations, the Compact allows for a degree of
management flexibility. For example, Article VI of the Compact provides the
upstream states an accounting system of credits and debits with regards to annual
interstate delivery obligations.286 The accrued debits and credits, however, are
limited to 200,000 acre-feet “at any time,” with no more than 150,000 acre-feet
charged in any given year.287 These credits and debits are cancelled entirely in those
years when Elephant Butte Reservoir is full and thus “spills,”288 thereby releasing
water downstream. Further, Article VII provides that New Mexico or Colorado “may
relinquish accrued credits at any time, and Texas may accept such relinquished
water.”289 In that case, the upstream state is entitled to store the amount
relinquished.290 New Mexico would accordingly store the water in such post-1929
reservoirs as El Vado.291
To put the Compact into perspective, instruments of interstate
cooperation292 like the Compact have become the preferred method of interstate
allocation of water.293 Under the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution, interstate
283. Rio Grande Compact, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-23 (VII) (1938).
284. Cf. Id. at §§ 72-15-23(IV), (V).
285. Id. at § 72-15-23(IV).
286. Id. at § 72-15-23(VI).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at § 72-15-23(VII).
290. Id.
291. See generally Piermont, supra note 204 (noting that while the Rio Grande Compact, article VII
provisions on relinquishment credits allow New Mexico to store water in post-1929 reservoirs, New
Mexico’s Interstate Stream Comm’n [ISC] has undertaken to convert “paper” relinquishment credits to
“wet” relinquishment water by contracting with MRGCD and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation for such
storage in El Vado).
292. Matthew S. Tripolitsiotis, Bridge Over Troubled Waters: The Applications of State Law to
Compact Clause Entities, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 179 (2005) (describing common issues
addressed by interstate compacts: bridges and port facilities, economic development, and prisoner
exchange—all require collaboration) (internal citation omitted) (“Much of the law applicable to compact
entities is determined by the compact itself and contract law . . . Contract law affects compacts no
differently than other instruments of agreement that are classifiable as contract. Thus, compact law is
contract law.”).
293. See DOUGLAS KEENEY, NAT. RES. L. CTR., UNIV. OF COLO. SCH. OF L., WATER ALLOCATION
COMPACTS IN THE WEST: AN OVERVIEW 8 (Natural Res. Law Ctr., Univ. of Colo. Sch. of Law 2002),
http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=books_reports_studies; see
also Edella Schlager & T. Heikkila, Resolving Water Conflicts: A Comparative Analysis of Interstate
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compacts require Congressional consent, which has the effect of transforming an
interstate compact into federal law.294 Compact law has also historically been
coextensive with contract law,295 yet a compact’s meaning may not be defined
unilaterally by one state for parochial concerns such as intrastate water allocation.296
Correspondingly, “no court may order relief inconsistent with its express terms,”
absent a finding that the compact is unconstitutional.297 Nonetheless, intrastate
allocation issues are potentially troublesome as a function of states’ unwillingness to
relinquish control of water resources in water-short years or basins.298 The U.S.
Supreme Court adjudicates compact disputes as a matter of course—and
original jurisdiction—and may dictate remedies for their breach.299
The Rio Grande Compact is codified as state law300 and forms the backbone
of water law in New Mexico, alongside 1) the doctrine of prior appropriation;301 2)
federal law governing water resources including Reclamation law,302 Congressional

River Compacts, 37 POL’Y STUDIES J. 367, 369 (2009) (citing comments made by Jerome Muys, at The
Western States’ Experience With Interstate Water Issues Panel: Lessons From the West, Sponsored by
American Bar Association Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources, at the conference Eastern
Water Resources: Law, Policy and Technology, in Hollywood, Fla. (May 2004)).
294. U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 3.
295. See Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. 1 (1823) (deciding the first case to interpret an interstate compact
as a contract); see also Tarrant Regional Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (2013)
(“[I]nterstate compacts are construed as contracts under the principles of contract law . . . . So, as with
any contract, we begin by examining the express terms of the Compact as the best indication of the intent
of the parties.”); Petty v. Tenn.-Mo. Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275, 285 (1985) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“[A] compact is, after all, a contract”); Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 at n.4 (2011)
(“As with all contracts, we interpret the Compact according to the intent of the parties [ . . . ] We this look
primarily to the doctrine of appropriation in Wyoming and Montana, but . . . we also look to Western
water law more generally.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl. 1 (precluding states’ impairing obligation
of contracts).
296. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28 (1951); Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U.S. 117, 124
(1972).
297. Texas v. New Mexico I, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983).
298. Schlager & Heikkila, supra note 293, at 371–72.
299. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987), No. 65, Org. (internal citation omitted) (explaining
that, as function of States’ ratification of the US Constitution, “the States gave this Court complete judicial
power to adjudicate disputes among them . . . and this power includes the capacity to provide one state a
remedy for the breach of another.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 1 et seq.; Kansas v. Nebraska,
135 S. Ct. 1042, 1052 (2015) (noting more than one hundred years of the court’s recognition of its
“inherent authority, as part of the Constitution’s grant of original jurisdiction, to equitably apportion
interstates streams.”) (citing Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 145 (1902)). Federalism and separationof-power concerns have rendered the Supreme Court particularly hesitant to “read absent terms into”
compacts. See Alabama v. North Carolina, x U.S. x, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2312–2313, 176 L.Ed.2d 1070
(2010) (a low-level radioactivity case citing in pertinent part, the interstate water compact case, Texas v.
New Mexico I, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983)).
300. See, e.g., Rio Grande Compact, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-15-23 (1938) (showing New Mexico’s
codification of the Rio Grande Compact).
301. Edella Schlager, Governing Boundaries: Exclusion, Essential Resources, and Sustainability, in
GOVERNING ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL RESOURCES 79 n.7 (Olivier De Schutter & Katharina Pistor eds.,
2015) (“State officials are bound by compacts[.]”) (citing the landmark interstate water compact
case, Hinderlider v. La Plata and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 91).
302. See App. A(2)(i)(a) (programmatic statutes relevant to Bureau of Reclamation operations).
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authorizations of dams and reservoirs operated by Reclamation and the Corps;303
and, most recently, 3) the overlay of environmental law, like the ESA.304 Throughout
this complex assemblage of a legal regime, the Compact is a foundational element
that is referenced often and explicitly. The 1948 Flood Control Act,305 for example,
requires that the Middle Rio Grande Project be operated in conformity with the
Compact as water is stored, released, and delivered to the MRGCD.306
B. Mapping Flow Operations
More than a decade ago, Kara Gillon provided a framework for utilizing a
portion of the City of Albuquerque’s San Juan–Chama Project water storage space
at Abiquiu, the so-called Environmental Pool, to operationalize in-stream flows on
the Rio Grande.307 This special water storage right was the product of the City’s 2006
settlement with environmental groups stemming from the eponymous silvery
minnow litigation.308 Gillon mapped out prospective steps, sources of water, and the
collaboration needed to operationalize this storage, to be leveraged towards
ecological flows dedicated to the river’s ecosystem.309 Following a robust empirical
investigation and framework development, Gillon explains the strategy thus: 1)
subleasing storage with the ABCWUA pursuant to the Settlement Agreement—
which was considered at the time by the Corps to be a deviation from normal
reservoir operations and thus require approval of the Compact Commission;310 2)
sourcing water—as from Reclamation’s Supplemental Water Program—through
leases of San Juan–Chama Project water—or in partnership with the State’s Strategic
Water Reserve; and 3) obtaining regulatory compliance, including an assessment of

303. See App. A(2)(i)–(iii) (giving an overview of Federal water projects, including programmatic
statutes, project-specific authority, and subsequent developments).
304. See App. A(4) passim (giving an overview of the ESA’s role in the Law of the River).
305. See App. A(2)(ii)(a) passim (giving an overview of project-specific authority for the Middle Rio
Grande Project); see also App. A(2)(ii)(a) (citing the Flood Control Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-228, § 4,
55 Stat. 638 (YEAR) (authorizing “preliminary examinations and surveys for flood control” in, inter alia,
“Rio Grande and tributaries, New Mexico”)); see also App. A(2)(ii)(a) at note 493 (Flood Control Act of
1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, 74 Stat 480, 488 (1941, 1960)).
306. Id.
307. See generally Gillon (2007), supra note 57, at 629–638.
308. Id. at 629–30.
309. Gillon (2007), supra note 57, at 636–37 (detailing “Options for an Environmental Pool”).
310. Id. at 631 n.110 and accompanying text (citing the 2005 version of URGWOM Ruleset). This
would appear, by now, to be an academic point since San Juan–Chama Project and native Rio Grande
basin waters are regularly co-mingled, both physically and—perhaps more importantly, for present
purposes—in URGWOM’s accounting framework. According to Audubon’s press release regarding its
historic first utilization of this Environmental Pool at Abiquiu for the storage and subsequent release of
ecological flow, the Pueblos of Sandia, Santa Ana, Cochiti, Sandia, and Isleta each “supplied 100 acrefeet of San Juan–Chama water” to Audubon for the effort. However, these Pueblos do not have San Juan–
Chama Project water contracts with the Bureau of Reclamation. This means that the Pueblos may have
entered into an exchange of their native Rio Grande basin, Prior and Paramount water for a certain amount
of imported, San Juan–Chama water. Such a maneuver would have the benefit of getting around the Corps’
reluctance to consider storage of native water in the Environmental Pool not to be a deviation from normal
reservoir operations”).
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environmental effects pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”).311
It took nearly a decade before Gillon’s framework was operationalized. The
National Audubon Society’s would come to spearhead the efforts of this innovative
use of Abiquiu’s Environmental Pool, first in 2016 in partnership with the Middle
Rio Grande Pueblos Sandia, Isleta, Santa Ana, and Cochiti, who contributed
approximately 400 acre-feet of “wet” water, and the MRGCD, who provided
technical assistance and managed the District’s water delivery and drainage
infrastructure—its irrigation ditches, as well as operational prowess.312 That
operation was planned, as announced by Audubon, to “increase flow in the river
channel for a 35-mile stretch for nearly 24 days.”313 Amidst harsh drought conditions,
similar operations were repeated in 2018314 and, most recently, in 2020.315 In 2020,
“530 acre-feet of [] water [was released] . . . near Los Lunas,” in an operation that
was, Audubon reported, “tightly coordinated with water managers and biologists to
ensure effective and efficient use.”316 The legally dispositive fact appears to be that
in order to avoid the Corps’ determination that the operation was a “deviation” from
normal reservoir operations, which would trigger the Compact Commission’s advice
and consent, the Pueblos exchanged Prior and Paramount water for San Juan–Chama
Project water, which would not occasion the same requirement—notwithstanding
Congress has authorized that both “colors” of water be stored at Abiquiu.

311. Id. at 637–38 nn. 143–49 and accompanying text.
312. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Press Release, Audubon Announces Historic Water Release to the
Middle Rio Grande, NAT’L AUDUBON SOC’Y (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.audubon.org/news/audubonannounces-historic-water-release-middle-rio-grande (describing the historic first Rio Grande in-stream
flow operation made possible by the Environmental Pool at Abiquiu reservoir) (noting also the
contribution of nearly 400 acre-feet of water leased by a Santa Fe golf club from the Jicarilla Apache
Nation) (describing historic first Rio Grande in-stream flow operation made possible by the
Environmental Pool at Abiquiu reservoir, whereby four Pueblos, Sandia, Isleta, Santa Ana, and Cochiti,
partnered with the non-profit to supply nearly 400 acre-feet of San Juan–Chama Project water for the
operation, along with the same amount of water leased by a Santa Fe golf club from the Jicarilla Apache
Nation; cf. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Press Release, Audubon Joins New Mexico Municipalities in Water
Releases
to
Recharge
Vital
Habitat
Along
the
Rio
Grande (July
17, 2018), https://www.audubon.org/news/audubon-joins-new-mexico-municipalities-water-releasesrecharge-vital-habitat; Paul Tashijian, In Driest Year in Half Century, Audubon Release Water into Rio
Grande to Sustain Flows, Western Water News (July 27, 2020), https://www.audubon.org/news/in-driestyear-half-century-audubon-releases-water-rio-grande-sustain-flows (noting that “[f]lexible tools and
timed releases help support people and birds in central New Mexico,” and describing “‘string of pearls’
strategy” developed by the MRGCD, an “innovative water management strategy that takes advantage of
irrigation infrastructure to efficiently deliver water to key habitat locations”).
313. Id.
314. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Press Release, Audubon Joins New Mexico Municipalities in Water
Releases to Recharge Vital Habitat Along the Rio Grande, NAT’L AUDUBON SOC’Y (July
17, 2018), https://www.audubon.org/news/audubon-joins-new-mexico-municipalities-water-releasesrecharge-vital-habitat.
315. See Tashijian, supra note 312 (noting that “[f]lexible tools and timed releases help support people
and birds in central New Mexico,” and describing “‘string of pearls’ strategy” developed by the MRGCD,
an “innovative water management strategy that takes advantage of irrigation infrastructure to efficiently
deliver water to key habitat locations”).
316. Id.
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Applying the legal mapping concept, this section will continue in Gillon’s
spirit by characterizing the contours of other emergent environmental flow
mechanisms, some of which, like Abiquiu’s Environmental Pool, have grown out of
the minnow litigation, and taken some time to operationalize and refine. It will also
describe a technical tool which models the operational, legal, and accounting
framework for water management, including reservoir operations in the Middle Rio
Grande. Within both the technical–operational–transactional frame, and the
primarily regulatory–collaborative frame, it appears that “collaborative governance
[has] transformed the ESA from a statute prohibiting certain outcomes (such as harm
or jeopardy to a species), to a regulatory program implementing collaboratively craft
best practices.”317 These combined empirical results match William deBuys’
assessment that the endangered Rio Grande silvery minnow is really a blessing as
opposed to a curse.318 However, it has not come easy. Matching deBuys’ other
critical insight that the key challenge of water governance in the Middle Rio Grande
is one of political ecology, Susan Kelly reported in 2007 that, in a “collaborative
process for developing simulations that can be used to understand the probable effect
of changes of the system of Rio Grande reservoir,” stakeholders involved showed
that “even developing hypothetical model runs can be controversial.”319
Mapping analytics foregrounds how, in the Middle Rio Grande Basin, the
Law of the River emerges from the dominance of many elements. Those elements
include a large network of components with no per se central control, and ostensibly
simple rules of operation, from which complex collective behavior, sophisticated
information processing, and adaptation, as well as adaptive water management
emerge. Within this setting’s characteristic legal complexity, the analysis is also
emergent, proceeding by way of intuition, analogy, and cases. Thus descriptive,
prescriptive, and ethical approaches are merged to highlight system structure and
behavior, with an eye towards assessing system feedback and logical traps such as
determinism. In this mode, system structure is mapped in terms of hierarchies, both
formal and information of agents, system architecture, and information. System
structure can be looked at in terms of complex, emergent system “feedback,” for
example, the spread of social paradigms. With another eye to future research, both
model-driven, in the predictive realm and empirical, in the domain of measuring and
monitoring, the following section also describes the foremost technical tool, the
multi-agency URGWOM as a coupled legal–hydrologic framework for water
management, including reservoir operations in the Middle Rio Grande.
This legal mapping methodology confronts well-sorted taxonomy, within
URGWOM, of myriad, entangled legal authorities. Outside and beyond the model,
where the law is not so hermetically sealed, the practical starting point is nonetheless
a focus on reservoir operations: policy and legal rules as well as water exchanges
constituting this work’s first parsing of the Law of the River in the Middle Rio
Grande as entangled assemblage. More important than precisely understanding the
grammar of this rule-based system by speaking in terms of system/network
analytics—legal or otherwise—and empirical measuring, monitoring, and modeling,
317. Fishman, supra note 93, at 1.
318. DEBUYS, supra note 10, at 280.
319. See Kelly (2007b), supra note 136, at 653 (emphasis added).
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a better frame for answering the practical question of what does this all mean? is to
understand what the paradigmatic Law of the River, as water management language
and discourse, leaves out. As a mapping technique, this is a sort of
foreground/background inversion, extending, if not overturning, the technical
model’s “boundary conditions,” necessary as they are for the model to actually run.
This inversion points towards a more nuanced system architecture that cannot,
strictly speaking, be incorporated into URGWOM.
In this manner, law can serve as a “map of misreading,” as Boaventura de
Sousa Santos has suggested.320 Such a conceptual “[m]ode of [i]nquiry into [m]odern
[e]xistence,” to employ the shorthand of philosopher Bruno Latour in his extensively
developed methodology for investigation “[a]nthropology of the [m]oderns.”321 This
points towards the urgency of more fully incorporating context and experience. Here,
legal philosophy, jurisprudence and social policy are proxies into holistic strategies
for addressing such existential issues as access to essential resources which the Rio
Grande, as the Critical Zone now so clearly presents.322 However tangential or
conceptual, this article aspires to contribute a small step towards the ongoing project
of incorporating “[e]thical [k]now [h]ow” into a more integral legal analytics. For
when it comes to the distribution, quality, and even disposition of essential resources
like water, not only justice and quality of life but survival itself is at stake—not just
of species like the Rio Grande silvery minnow, but of humans too.323
1.

Operations Accounting and Modeling324

Most immediately, water in the Rio Grande Basin is managed to meet
specific demand on a particular suite of constraints, as the Law of the River makes

320. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW,
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION at 496–521 (3rd ed. 2019).
321. See BRUNO LATOUR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE MODES OF MODERN EXISTENCE (cover) (2013).
322. See Kelly (2007b), supra note 136, at 673.
323. Id.
324. For a synopsis of URGWOM, see Boroughs (2010), supra note 263. These authors summarize
URGWOM’s capabilities in this way:
A fundamental needed . . . is assisting managers in delivering supplies to all water
users on time, in the desired quantities, and with minimum conflict between users
with a specific focus on deliveries, exchanges, and leases of water allocated to
contractors for San Juan-Chama Project water. URGWOM is used to provide the
community of water managers and water users with a clear, consistent, and a
common set of data. With the established model for the Rio Grande system in New
Mexico including methods representing the key physical process in the basin and
established accounts, rule-based simulations can be completed with the URGWOM
ruleset set up to simulate baseline operations of the system and resulting river and
systems conditions. Rules are coded for meeting all the different demands using
available supplies for those specific water uses as tracked with separate accounts.
Coded rules allow for Annual Operations Plan to be developed with accurate
representation of different implemented water agreement and any deviations from
typical operations. . . . Changes in operations or other proposed actions can be
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clear. In this system, dams and reservoirs are sentinel way-points, through which
flows water of many colors.325 The facilities at Heron, El Vado, Abiquiu, Cochiti and
Elephant Butte thus store and release to meet a variety of demands on different
temporal scales, with water that is both native to—and imported from outside—the
Rio Grande Basin.326 To facilitate this complex legal, management, and operational
scheme, water is transferred between different accounts; reservoirs are a primary
mechanism.327 Reservoirs thus serve as banks, of a sort. Continuing the financial
metaphor, water managers, both government agencies and quasi-government
institutions serve as the brokers. Meanwhile, law and policy are the “rules of the
game.”328
URGWOM is a decision-support and systems modeling tool for the
management and accounting of water in this complex system, as well as related
planning efforts.329 URGWOM is built on RiverWare, a platform put out by the
University of Colorado-Boulder’s Center for Advanced Decision Support for Water
and Environmental Systems.330 This tool facilitates “operational decision-making,
responsive forecasting, operational policy evaluation, system optimization, water
accounting, water rights administration, and long-term resource planning.”331
RiverWare also offers probabilistic modeling capabilities,332 a useful feature for
planning in the context of climate change.
In its modeling of water storage and delivery operations, URGWOM
models focus respectively on accounting, water operations, forecasting, and
planning.333 The physical system, including both the river and reservoirs, is
represented in the accounting model, which rectifies inflows and outflows
throughout the system.334 The accounting model deals only with historic data. The
water operations model, in turn, adds a forecasting capability to the accounting
model. Accordingly, the operations model uses accounting data as a foundation to
predict future storage and release of water. In due order, this model applies policy
analyzed with URGWOM to evaluate the impact on the water supply, river flows,
and water deliveries.
325. See App. B, at tbls. 2(a)–(c), 3, 4.
326. Cf. id.
327. See generally Dave Owen & Colin Apse, Trading Dams, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1043, 1080–
1102 (2015) (discussing a variety of potential environmental transfers involving dams, including treatment
of requisite legal framework, possible regulatory leverage, and information needs).
328. Id.
329. See generally UTTON CTR., supra note 161 (Excel column “OTHER RECLAMATION
PROGRAMS: URG Water Ops Model”); GAIL STOCKTON, ET AL., UPPER RIO GRANDE BASIN 7–8
(2004); URG WATER OPERATIONS REVIEW, supra note 230, Vol. I, at 2-2 (Key Tools: URGWOM
Planning Version”).
330. URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 4.
331. UNIV. OF COLO.–BOULDER, CENTER FOR ADVANCED DECISION SUPPORT FOR WATER AND
ENVT’L. SYSTEMS, River Ware, https://www.colorado.edu/cadswes/creative-works/riverware.
332. Id.
333. See URGWOM Model v–4.1.2 User Manual, supra note 41, at 3–5, § 1, pp. 3–5 (“Introduction’),
§ 3, pp. 33–43 (“Inputs and Model Setup”), including §§ 3.1–3.1 (Accounting, Forecast, and Water Ops
Models, respectively); Boroughs (2010), supra note 263, at 1–2, 33–43 (outlining sections for Accounting,
Forecast, and Water Ops Models, respectively); URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 2–3.
334. See URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 5.
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rules, as needed.335 The forecast model builds on the model’s simulation capabilities,
using spring runoff forecasts and historic hydrographs to predict daily flows at the
different control points contained in the water operations model.336 Finally, the
planning model involves a simplified rule structure to carry out longer term
forecasting runs, which are computationally more intensive.337
Reclamation and the Corps, along with the New Mexico Interstate Stream
Commission, used URGWOM in the landmark 2007 study of water operations of the
Upper Rio Grande Basin, from the river’s headwater in Colorado through New
Mexico.338 This Upper Rio Grande Water Operations Review339 and the associated
Environmental Impact Statement addressed the agencies’ development of an
integrated plan for water operations at Reclamation and the Corps’ existing facilities
upstream of Ft. Quitman, Texas.340 The backdrop of this interagency effort was the
exigency of meeting new habitat and species needs under the ESA while also meeting
existing demands under conditions of protracted drought.341 Given the Rio Grande’s
“highly variable flow regime,” the newly-developed URGWOM permitted the study
to “evaluate the operations of multiple water management facilities as a system,
enabling technically valid comparison of different scenarios.”342 Thus, the Review’s
goal was to use URGWOM to “evaluate a full range of water operations in an
integrated systems approach and to examine whether the full range of discretionary
actions were being implemented for better ecosystem management.”343
In investigating water operations and associated discretionary actions, the
Review looked in detail at five main areas: 1) reservoir operations; 2) opportunities
for operational optimization of the system as a whole; 3) planning for future water
operation; 4) capabilities for improved decision-making; and 5) compliance with

335. See id., at 7–23, 25–29 (outlining sections for “Synopses of Policy Control” and “Priorities for
Rule Execution”); see also App. A–I, B-1–B-153 (presenting “Flowchart for Overall Policy” and
individual policy rules, respectively); cf. URGWOM Model v–4.1.2 User Manual, supra note 41, at 6–32
(outlining “Modeling Assumptions” with subsections for, respectively: water “demands” (e.g., MRGCD
and ABCQUA), “reservoir storage and releases” (e.g., San Juan–Chama Project water and, inter alia,
loans with Project water contractors), and “water agreements,” including Reclamation leases,
Relinquishment Credits, Emergency Drought Water, and “Cochiti deviations,” among others), at § 2
(detailing “Modeling Assumptions”).
336. See URGWOM Model v–4.1.2 User Manual, supra note 41, at 34–38, 39–43 (providing forecast
and water ops. models, respectively).
337. See STOCKTON, supra note 329, at 7; see generally URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 1–2
(explaining that URGWOM creates Annual Operating Plans using rule-based simulations to make
forecasts through the end of the year); URGWOM Summary, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS,
https://www.spa.usace.army.mil/Missions/Civil-Works/URGWOM/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2021)
(providing a useful overview and linking to detailed URGWOM information including, inter alia, model
documentation and data, technical review, committee notes, and model output for different rule-based
simulations (e.g., monthly forecast runs and current year “Annual Operating Plan” model runs)).
338. URG WATER OPERATIONS REVIEW, supra note 230, Vol. I, at I-1–I-2,
II-1–II-2.
339. Id.
340. Id. at I-1.
341. Id.
342. Id. (emphasis added).
343. Id. at I-1.
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extant authorities.344 Within these focus areas, the Review explicitly incorporated the
need to operate the system within existing legal authorities, namely extant water
allocation schemes and prior appropriation.345 Compliance with these authorities
permits Reclamation, the Corps, and the state of New Mexico to “store and deliver
water for agricultural, domestic, municipal, industrial, and environmental uses,”
meet Rio Grande Compact delivery obligations to Texas, provide flood control, and
meet obligations under legal authority, treaty, and contract.346
The Review also identified low-water flows and endangered species needs,
as well as water conveyance efficiency and sediment and flood control capabilities
as the major water operations issues in this inherently complex space.347
URGWOM’s planning model permitted the Corps and Reclamation, among other
water managers such as New Mexico’s Interstate Stream Commission, to navigate
this inherent complexity, including overlapping and variable jurisdictional,
hydrologic, and climatologic demands.348
Another type of institutional arrangement for water management flexibility
that URGWOM has modeled are deviations from “normal operations” at Cochiti
reservoir,349 which facility is primarily operated for flood and sediment control
purposes.350 The objective of such operations is to provide spawning and recruitment
flows for the ESA-protected silvery minnow. When runoff conditions would not
otherwise permit such flows, water is temporarily stored and released to provide a
spring pulse flow that mimics the natural pulse of snowmelt runoff.351 The 1960
Flood Control Act requires that such deviations from the Act’s Reservoir Regulation
Plan be authorized by the Rio Grande Compact Commission.352 URGWOM permits
an evaluation of such deviations, which differ from typical reservoirs.353
URGWOM incorporates approximately 180 discrete law-based policy rules
into its water operations simulations, and thus provides for a modeling of a range of
system conditions, physical and legal.354 It supports water managers’ operations need
to meet various water demands under multiple constraints, including those contained

344. Id. at I-1–I-2.
345. See id. at 1–3 (providing the Record of Decision [ROD]).
346. Id.
347. Id. at I-6.
348. See URG WATER OPERATIONS REVIEW, supra note 230 (explaining that the Interstate Stream
Comm’n [ISC] was a cooperating institution for, with interests in, this Water Operations Review for which
URGWOM served as a lodestar). The area includes state, federal, and tribal jurisdictions where
considerations range from managing U.S. government’s federal trust responsibilities to hydrology,
riparian ecology, and river geomorphology. See id. at I-2, I-5, II-1 (explaining URGWOM’s long-term
planning module was the outcome of a process that water managers pursued to develop a tool that would
“facilitate the sharing of daily water operations data” and clearly memorialize “existing procedures by
which the river has come to be managed.”).
349. See generally M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45, at 219; Gillon (2007), supra note 57, at 630
n. 102, 635 (explaining constraints to such a deviation).
350. See Kelly (2007a), supra note 183, at 547.
351. Id.; cf. URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 28, app. B-56–B-59.
352. Kelly (2007a), supra note 183, at 547.
353. URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 28.
354. Id. at 4–5.
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in the legal authority.355 This process reduces, in part, to an accounting exercise,
where water demands for people, agriculture, and the environment are met with both
native Rio Grande Basin water and non-native, imported San Juan-Chama Project
water. Water operations in URGWOM use policy rules to track water in different
accounts, starting with the overarching issues of whether a particular demand is to
be met with native and/or non-native water.356 Of course, there are many more colors
of water when different types of water rights, such as ownership rights, are
considered.357
Therefore, policy rules are a fairly high-resolution attempt at modeling,
both in substance and in terms of hierarchy, the legal authorities that control the
allocation and use of water in the basin, as well as the associated (or derivative)
regulatory and operational mandates. Appendix C compiles and presents an
annotated summary of URGWOM’s ruleset, excerpts important rules, and attempts
to capture their hierarchical status. The remainder of this section presents a further
summarization of the most relevant policy rules, in a synthesis whose structure
derives from the overarching legal and management hierarchy.358
Heron Reservoir, furthest upstream on the Rio Chama, stores only imported
San Juan-Chama water, so URGWOM is programed to bypass native Rio Grande
flows.359 Downstream, native flows are captured at El Vado.360 Storage occurs there
to the extent required, first, to ensure supply of Prior and Paramount water to the Six
Middle Rio Grande Pueblos should the mainstem Rio Grande provide insufficient
flows to meet this need and, second, for the irrigation needs of the MRGCD.361
Importantly, El Vado storage is controlled by the Rio Grande Compact.362 As a post1929 reservoir, El Vado storage of native Rio Grande water for the MRGCD is
prohibited when Compact Article VII is in force.363 Further downstream, native Rio
Grande flows are bypassed through the reservoirs of the Middle Rio Grande Project,
Abiquiu and Cochiti, unless the exigencies of flood control dictate their temporary
storage.364 In certain circumstances, flood waters may be detained until after the
irrigation seasons.365
URGWOM also offers the ability to track reservoir releases of both native
Rio Grande Basin and imported San Juan-Chama Project water for different water
uses.366 The lion’s share of these water uses comprise MRGCD irrigation diversions
and ABCWUA’s Drinking Water Project.367 URGWOM also tracks, for example,
355. Cf. infra notes 435–45 and accompanying text.
356. See URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 5, 7.
357. See, e.g., App. A(2)(ii)(b)(6)(b) and accompanying text (detailing seven types of water rights
with the boundaries of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District).
358. URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 6–8.
359. Id. at 10; cf. id. at B-40., at 9; cf. id. at app. B-40.
360. Id. at 15, 25; cf. id. at app. B-98–B-102.
361. Id. at 15–16, 24–25; cf. id. at app. A-1, B-7, B-9, B-41–B-49.
362. Id. at 12–15.
363. Id. at 14; cf. id. at app. A-1, B-13–B-19.
364. See id. at 11, 15–16, 26–27; cf. id. at app. A-1, B-51–B-70.
365. See id. at 11.
366. Id. at 30.
367. Id. at 8.
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so-called “letter water deliveries,” by which federal water project contractors—
MRGCD and ABCWUA—leave water in the river to pay back groundwater
depletions which have impacted surface flows.368 URGWOM further tracks water in
borrow/payback schemes by which one contract borrows water from another
contractor and agrees to subsequent repayment.369
The MRGCD diverts water at four points between Cochiti and Elephant
Butte, namely the Cochiti, Angostura, Isleta, and San Acacia diversions.370
URGWOM treats these diversions as exogenous, that is, this data is inputted into the
model based on crop irrigation requirements. To accurately reflect the physical
system, URGWOM also accounts for irrigation return flows to the river.371
As modeled, diversions by ABCWUA’s Drinking Water Project, in turn,
are nominally supplied by the ABCWUA’s San Juan-Chama Project allocation. The
Drinking Water Project diversions depend on current river flows and before the
ABCWUA diverts its full allocation, minimum rivers flows must be obtained.372 As
permitted, these diversions require Project water to be carried by an equal amount of
native Rio Grande water.373 Therefore, ABCWUA’s Drinking Water Project
physically diverts twice its allocation by volume, but 50 percent of the diversion
returns to the river as return flow.374 When river flows are too low for the ABCWUA
to divert water, the Drinking Water Project’s inflatable diversion dam deflates,
allowing the remaining flows to pass unimpeded.375
URGWOM also accounts for in-stream, environmental flows as water uses.
For example, from 2003 until late 2016, the then-operative Biological Opinion
mandated flow targets at certain locations in the Middle Rio Grande Valley as an
attempt to vouchsafe endangered species and related habitat needs.376 These targets
were seasonal but also differed based on relative annual flows. Under the 2003
Biological Opinion, each year was designated as “wet,” “dry,” or “average” and flow
targets decreased with natural runoff.377 URGWOM would compute water releases
necessary to meet these flow targets.378 Sometimes, compliance with these flow
targets would necessitate release of supplemental water supplies, such as San JuanChama water leased by Reclamation379 or native Rio Grande Basin water stored

368. Id. at 10.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 15; cf. id. at app. A-1, B-9, B-63–B-70.
371. URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 7.
372. Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority, WATER 2120: SECURING OUR
WATER FUTURE 3.3, 3.3.1.2 (2016).
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. 2003 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 224, at 92–95.
377. Id. at 92.
378. Cf. URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 18; cf., id. at app. A-1, B-8–B-9, B-63–B-76.
379. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, REPORT TO THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION 44
(March 2017).
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pursuant to the EDWA, as described below.380 URGWOM can track these releases
and storage balances.381
Finally, URGWOM considers so-called “letter water deliveries” pursuant
calculations made by the New Mexico Officer of the State Engineer (“OSE”).382
These communications, addressed to Reclamation, indicate the extent to which San
Juan-Chama contractors—mainly ABCWUA—are obligated to leave Project water
in the river to repay the river for water withdraw from this system through
groundwater pumping. This determination is in large part on OSE’s modeling of the
interconnection groundwater–surface waters system.383 As a matter of policy, the
flows are distributed between the irrigation season to avoid curtailment of MRGCD
diversions, and the off-season to facilitate Compact deliveries to Elephant Butte.384
In this scheme, exchange of San Juan–Chama water for groundwater is treated as a
(ground)water debt subject to subsequent payback vis-à-vis San Juan–Chama Project
water deliveries to the river. URGWOM handles these water accounts as well as the
OSE-calculated delivery schedules, which are fed into the model.385
***
URGWOM, thus enumerates a suite of enabling constraints that provides
some measure of stability within an otherwise complex, entangled system of rules,
institutions, law, and policy that constitutes the Law of the River. In this way,
URGWOM serves as an algorithmic tool designed to support decision-making in the
realm of water management and environment law and policy. But it’s representation
of the system is not the system itself; the map is not the territory. Such algorithmic
technical decision-support tools as URGWOM appear on their face to be “policy
neutral but [actually] embody bias and hidden values that affect democracy,” as
Sonya Ziaja has recently asserted.386 As Ziaja’s proposed evaluation framework
suggests, a critical inquiry into URGWOM’s modeling structure and process must
reflect, on the one hand “how, and whether, existing law and policy is incorporated,”
and on the other “how, and whether, stakeholders and end-users collaborated in the
models development.”387
Thus, the URGWOM model appears to provide a reasonable, fairly highresolution, first-order approximation of the legal regime. Indeed, it not only models
both “wet” water and paper water, but its policy rules also model complex legal–
physical reservoir operations as well as a menu of water management. Many items
on this menu are water exchanges of one sort or another. In the domain of exchanges,
agents such as MRGCD and Reclamation essentially “encourage some users to use
less water” or to vary the timing, magnitude, or location of water storage and
380. Id.
381. See, e.g., URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 6–7.
382. Id. at B-33–B-38.
383. Id. at 7.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Sonya Ziaja, How Algorithmic Assisted Decision Making is Influencing Environmental Law and
Climate Adaptation, 38 Ecology L.Q. ___ (forthcoming, 2021) (working paper on filed with author).
387. Id.
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delivery, in the case of reservoir operations, which then “allow[s] other user to”
either “use that water” or “leave the unused water” in the system. In so doing, various
“colors” of water—groundwater and surface—treated as fungible within a set of
“institutional rules.”388
Still, URGWOM needs to be “ground-truth’ed” to assess its performance
under the latter criteria, which boils down to meaningful public participation. Where
does this leave the Middle Rio Grande as an integrated social–ecological system
facing existential threats with both intensive and extensive implications in the
domain of rights, dignity, wellbeing, and survival,389 both physical and cultural?
While the foregoing two-pronged URGWOM evaluation must wait, given the
constraints of the present article, a brief investigation into contemporary water lawand-policy-in action, under specific resilience criterion will serve as a useful point
of departure.
2.

Resilient Water Law and Policy

Diverse water managers and stakeholders share the operative goal that even
under the constraints of drought and generally increased use and storage demand,
water must be delivered to people and ecosystems.390 Sustainability scholars have
argued that this challenge demands a resilient response, one that operates “beyond
sustainability” and must acknowledge the operative demands and realities of the
“novel system.”391 For its part, the Rio Chama Flow Project has prioritized
interdisciplinary lobbying, planning, and the scientific study of managed flood pulses
in the Wild and Scenic reach of the otherwise highly engineered Rio Chama between
the El Vado and Abiquiu reservoirs.392 Even Congress has recognized the importance
of such demands, having added the promotion of “flow dependent ecological
resiliency” to the Corps’ mandate.393
The December 2016 Biological Opinion appears to be an attempt at such a
resilient response. This latest iteration of the Middle Rio Grande Biological Opinion
is a core component of the Law of the River. In terms of legal hierarchies, the ESA
forms the cornerstone of the modern Law of the River for the Rio Grande, both in
theory and practice. Federal law such as the ESA may preempt contrary state law,
according to the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.394 As well, Congress
provided in 2004 that the Middle Rio Grande water operations 2003 Biological
Opinion would be the Law of the River through 2013.395 In this way, Congress came

388. Robert Glennon, Powell’s Legacy—The Bureau of Reclamation and the Contemporary West:
Water Exchanges, in VISION & PLACE 76, 88 (Jason Robinson, et al., eds. 2020).
389. See, e.g., Kelly (2007b), supra note 136, at 673.
390. See generally UTTON CENTER, WATER RESILIENCE IN A TIME OF UNCERTAINTY (2015).
391. M.H. Benson (2019), supra note 13.
392. See, e.g., RCFP Proposal, supra at 43.
393. Science and Engineering to Comprehensively Understand and Responsibly Enhance (SECURE)
Water Act (2009) at Sec. 4(g), approved in Omnibus Public Lands Act of 2009, P.L. 111–11 (Mar. 30,
2009).
394. See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Does the Endangered Species Act Preempt State Water Law?, 62
UNIV. OF KANSAS L. REV. 851 (2014).
395. Consolidated Appropriations Ct of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-447, § 205, 118 Stat. 2809 at 2949
(2004).
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to define Middle Rio Grande ESA compliance as compliance with the Biological
Opinion.396 Specifically this means compliance with the Reasonable and Prudent
Alternatives and incidental take limits it sets forth, in concert with certain
collaborative actions.397 This rider was itself a more permanent codification of the
previous year’s “Minnow Rider,” attached to the Energy and Water Development
Act of 2004,398 which water attorney Lara Katz characterized as “purporting to divest
[Reclamation] of its newly acknowledged discretion.”399 This Act was recognized
just the year before in a 10th Circuit ruling blessing the agency’s discretionary to
curtail water delivery during severe drought for ESA compliance.400
The current Biological Opinion has emerged, through characteristic
wrangling, from a series of earlier Biological Opinions issued, challenged, and
operationalize throughout the early 2000s. A federal District Court conditionally
upheld the 2001 Biological Opinion on a finding, inter alia, that it contained
Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives which the Service has formulated based on the
“best available science,” despite various procedural flaws.401 Serious drought would
effectively break the Biological Opinion within a year’s time.402
Around the same time the 2001 Biological Opinion was issued, New
Mexico and the U.S., among other parties, signed the Conservation Water
Agreement.403 With the Compact Commission’s approval, the Agreement provided
for the storage of Rio Grande Compact “relinquishment credit water” in a temporary
“Conservation Pool’ at Abiquiu, up to a total of 100,000 acre-feet of wet water.404
The following year, due to the worsening drought, Reclamation re-commenced
consultation with the Service and a new Biological Opinion was issued in September
2002.405 This Opinion would be invalidated by the court as “arbitrary and
capricious,” since Reclamation “did not adequately consult on water sources” for the
endangered minnow and the Biological Opinion “improperly stated there was no
[Reasonable and Prudent Alternative].” The court would then go on to order
injunctive relief through unilaterally imposed flow targets, among other measures.406

396. Id.
397. Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-137, § 208(b), 117
Stat. 1827, 1849 (2003).
398. Pub. L. No. 108-137, § 208(a)–(b), 117 Stat. 1830 (N.b. – Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-137, § 208, 117 Stat. 1827, 1849–50 (2003) (providing,
overall, that no federal funds would be applied to the San Juan-Chama Project for the benefit of the Silvery
Minnow unless such water purchased from a willing seller pursuant to relevant Office of the State
Engineer [OSE] permitting, and deeming that compliance with the 2003 BiOp would comprise
compliance with Endangered Species Act requirements for a ten-year period).
399. Lara Katz, History of the Minnow Litigation and Its Implications for the Future of Reservoir
Operations on the Rio Grande, 47 NAT. RES. J. 675, 685, n. 62 and accompanying text (2007).
400. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003).
401. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 469 F. Supp. 2d 973, 1002–1003 (D.N.M. 2002).
402. Katz, supra note 399, at 680–81.
403. Id. at 681.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 681 nn. 36–39 and accompanying text (citing Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F.
Supp. 2d 1222, 1235, 1237–38 (D.N.M. 2002)).
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In this contentious environment, Reclamation began to take various water
management actions in response to ESA requirements and the uncertain legal and
hydrological context. For example, it initiated a program of leasing imported San
Juan-Chama water, under the Supplemental Water Program, begun in 1996 when
drought hit the basin for the first time in decades.407 Additionally, Reclamation
participated in the newly created, multi-stakeholder Middle Rio Grande Endangered
Species Collaborative Program, established in 2000.408 Finally, it also drew up, along
with other water users and managers, the Conservation Water Agreement of 2001.
All this to keep water in the river, or generate storage capacity in upstream reservoirs,
where evaporation would be less.
In a similar, operational vein, the March 16, 2003 Biological Opinion
dictated differentiated flow targets on a wet year/dry year basis;409 required that
decreases in flow rates be “ramped down;” and provided for silvery minnow salvage
operation when the river became disconnected.410 These were some of the provisions
of the Biological Opinion Congress would subsequently denote as the Law of the
River.
Following the 2003 Biological Opinion, various voluntary, collaborative
efforts have been conducted with the aim of achieving ESA compliance while
meeting municipalities’ water needs, all in the context of ongoing drought. For
example, in April of 2003, MRGCD and Santa Fe allocated 217,500 acre-feet of
relinquishment credit water under the EDWA.411 In 2005, the City of Albuquerque
settled with WildEarth Guardians, who protested the City’s OSE permit application
for their San Juan-Chama Project contract water, yielding 30,000 acre-feet of
Abiquiu Reservoir storage space for an Environmental Pool of water.412
Significantly, Reclamation continues to operate its Supplemental Water Program,
leasing primarily San Juan–Chama Project water from contractors like ABCWUA,
for the benefit of the silvery minnow. This Program now comprises a core
“Conservation Measure” under the current Biological Opinion.413
Turning to December 2016, the Service released its fourth Biological
Opinion on water operations in the Middle Rio Grande Valley affecting the

407. Id. at 679 n. 20 and accompanying text.
408. Id. at 689 n. 79 and accompanying text.
409. Dry year flow targets under the 2003 Biological Opinion, applicable to the Rio Grande from the
outlet of Cochiti Dam and Reservoir through San Marcial, comprise a “continuous flow” requirement in
the winter and spawning season, from November 16 through June 15, and a minimum 100 cubic feet per
second (“cfs”) during the post-spawning and summer months. See, e.g., BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, RIO
GRANDE PROJECT ANNUAL OPERATING PLAN: WATER OPERATIONS MODELING 26 (2016),
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/albuq/rm/RGP/pdfs/2016-AOP.pdf.
410. 2003 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 224.
411. Emergency Drought Water Agreement (Apr. 22, 2003) (on file with author). Similar agreements
were carried out as amendments to this original 2003 agreement in 2008 and 2016. Amendment No. 1 to
the Emergency Drought Water Agreement of 2003 (Mar. 31, 2008); Emergency Drought Water
Agreement of 2016 (Apr. 22, 2016).
412. Settlement Agreement Between Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys Plaintiffs, the City of
Albuquerque, and the Albuquerque-Bernalillo County Water Utility Authority (Feb. 23, 2005) (on file
with author).
413. 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 56.
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endangered minnow.414 Since the first silvery minnow Biological Opinion issued in
2001, the vulnerable fish’s fate has evolved along a complex and litigious path. The
Biological Opinion’s development was—and its implementation continues to be—
fundamentally informed by longstanding cooperative water management effort
dating back to the origins of the silvery minnow litigation more than 20 years ago.
Additionally, flexibility-generating mechanisms like Reclamation’s flagship
Supplemental Water Program, the landmark Conservation Water Agreement of
2001, and three iterations of the EDWA—2003, 2008, and 2016—continue to
provide critical operational flexibility amidst the tight margins of water scarcity.415
This latest Biological Opinion attempts to balance increasingly complex
operating criteria with competing water demands,416 such as environmental flows for
endangered species, and water for Pueblos, municipalities, and irrigated
agriculture.417 In service of this goal, the 2016 Biological Opinion explicitly
conditions its no-jeopardy finding on voluntary “Conservation Measures.”418 Most
of these require a high degree of multi-stakeholder collaboration, which necessarily
unfold within a contested and litigated space. Accordingly, the Conservation
Measures require not just stakeholder collaboration, but also federal water managers’
de facto, if not de jure, discretion, within a jurisdictionally, ideologically, and
biologically complex environment.419
Perhaps the most important Conservation Measure included in the 2016
Biological Opinion, and certainly the flow operation of oldest vintage—dating from
the mid-1990s—is the Supplemental Water Program.420 In this scheme, Reclamation
leases surplus San Juan-Chama Project water, which it stores at Abiquiu in “up to”
20,000 acre-feet of space leased from the ABCWUA.421 This water is subsequently
released for the silvery minnow.422 Reclamation then exchanges this San Juan414. Press Release, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, et al., Efforts to Protect Endangered Species in the
Middle Rio Grande Continue with Renewed Commitments from Key Water Management Agencies (Dec.
5,
2016),
https://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/NewMexico/documents/BO/Joint_BiOp_Press_Release_Version6a.p
df.
415. Cf. Amy McCoy et al., Water & Climate Resilience: Ten Strategies for Climate resilience in the
Colorado River Basin, THE WATER REPORT NO. 205, 1 (Mar. 15, 2021) (“within the last decade have new
components of the ‘Law of the River’ . . . contemplated increased conservation as a central management
tool”) (internal citation omitted).
416. 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 56.
417. See Faler, supra note 211 (citing, inter alia, 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION); cf. 2016 BIOLOGICAL
OPINION, supra note 56, Tbl. 1, at 149–159 (see, e.g., Conservation Measures corresponding to various
Federal and non-federal entities); 1981 P&P Agreement, supra note 193.
418. Id. at 18.
419. Cf. App. A(4), supra note 224, at nn. 277, 282; see 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 56,
Tbl. 1, at 149–159; see also 2003 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 224.
420. 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 56, at 10–11, 18–19, 21, Tbl. 1.
421. Cf. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, 2011–16 SUPPLEMENT TO THE RIO GRANDE SUPPLEMENTAL
WATER PROGRAMMATIC FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT
IMPACT, AAO-11-022, at 8 (signed Feb. 17 & 22, 2011) (“up to”) [hereinafter Supp. Water Progr. FONSI
(2011)].
422. Gillon (2007), supra note 57, at 632 n. 119 and accompanying text (citing Agreement between
the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation and the Albuquerque Bernalillo County Water
Utility Authority to Lease Abiquiu Reservoir Storage Space (on file with author).
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Chama Project water for native Rio Grande water. Accordingly, MRGCD only
diverts San Juan-Chama water and so an equal amount of native water flows
unimpeded, for “beneficial instream flow.”423 This accounting scheme presents no
major legal issues since San Juan-Chama water is not required under the Rio Grande
Compact to be delivered to Texas, and thus this Project water must be consumed
within the Middle Rio Grande.424
As stated in a Supplemental Water Program report to the Rio Grande
Compact Commission, it “provides additional water for endangered species
needs”425 through five Program components:
1) surplus San Juan-Chama Project water leases;
2) assent to contractors’ waiver of Heron carryover storage requests;
3) Low Flow Conveyance Channel water management;
4) temporary off-channel storage at “refuges”; and
5) groundwater pumping.426
Treatment of Low Flow Conveyance Channel’s, off-channel storage, and
groundwater pumping are beyond the scope of this report. Operationally, leased San
Juan-Chama water is “released for diversion and use by the MRGCD.”427
Furthermore, this Program transaction allows for “an equivalent amount of native
Rio Grande water (minus conveyance losses) to remain undiverted,” and thus
dedicated to the river ecosystem itself. 428
According to Reclamation, the Supplemental Water Program is the San
Juan-Chama Project’s “primary conservation measure” for ESA Section 7
compliance.429 The goal of this measure is to avoid jeopardy to listed species or
adverse modification to their habitat. Reclamation contended that through this
Program, the agency was able to maintain compliance with the 2003 Biological
Opinions, Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives and Reasonable and Prudent
Measures, including flow targets.430 However, thirteen years after this claim,
Reclamation reports “reduced opportunities” for leasing of San Juan-Chama Project

423. Id. at 633 n. 120–23 and accompanying text.
424. Rio Grande Compact, Art. X (1938).
425. Engineer Advisers Report, at 10–11, in RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT
(2001) (citing 2001 Final Rio Grande Supplemental Water Program Programmatic Environmental
Assessment) (cited in UTTON CTR., Policy and Operations, supra note 161, at “RGCC.Ann.RptEng’rAdv” tab) [hereinafter RGCC EA 2001].
426. Id. at 10–11; accord Supp. Water Progr. FONSI (2011), supra note 421, at 1–3, 5–10 (inserting
word Purpose and Need statement and Alternatives Description–Proposed Action, respectively).
427. Engineer Advisers Report, at 26, in RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT
(2002) (cited in UTTON CTR., Policy and Operations, supra note 161, at “RGCC.Ann.Rpt-Eng’rAdv” tab)
[hereinafter RGCC EA 2002]; accord Supp. Water Progr. FONSI (2011), supra note 421, at 5.
428. RGCC EA 2002, supra note 427. This exchange is governed by the July 3, 2001 Rio Grande
Water Management Agreement between the United States and MRGCD.
429. Water Marketing Activities within the Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. BUR. OF REC., 24 (Dec. 2016),
https://www.usbr.gov/watersmart/docs/2016/2016watermarketingreport.pdf.
430. Supp. Water Progr. FONSI (2011), supra note 421, at 5 (avoiding jeopardy), 47 (Response to
Comment) (“The Supplemental Water Program has allowed for maintaining compliance with the 2001
and 2003 Biological Opinions.”).
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water, which the agency characterized as a mainstay of the Supplemental Water
Program.431
The reduced availability of San Juan-Chama water for leasing, largely a
function of the ABCWUA’s Drinking Water Project of 2008,432 together with
extended drought, leaves the Supplemental Water Program vulnerable. These
exigencies demand innovative water management of available supplies. Indeed, the
current Biological Opinion has moved away from the strict wet year/dry year-pegged
seasonal flow targets of the previous Biological Opinion to more of an adaptive
management model.433 Based on this connection and in light of lessons afforded by
polycentric governance principles can afford, it would figure that non-federal
agencies, such as the MRGCD, will need to bear a greater burden of providing
environmental flows going forward than were previously achieved through the
Supplemental Water Program alone.
As if to underscore the polycentricity of water governance in the Middle
Rio Garden, already in the early 2000s, on the heels of what would what become
known as a megadrought, and soon after the 2003 Biological Opinion was issued,434
New Mexico and the U.S. entered into the EDWA.435 This negotiated agreement was
a successor to the landmark Conservation Water Agreement two years prior. To
enable operations pursuant the 2003 EDWA, Texas would, at some point, need to
accept a “relinquishment” of 122,500 acre-feet of “credit” water under the terms of
the Rio Grande Compact, which it did in 2003.436 The agreement itself allocated a
total of 217,500 acre-feet of relinquishment credit water between the MRGCD
(140,000 acre-feet), Reclamation (70,000 acre-feet)—for endangered species
purposes—and the City of Santa Fe (75,000 acre-feet).437 Under the EDWA, release
of the MRGCD’s and Reclamation’s allocations would be annually limited to 46,667
and 20,000 acre-feet, respectively (except in 2003, when Reclamation’s cap was
30,000 acre-feet).438 As with the Conservation Water Agreement of 2001, New
Mexico also agreed in the EDWA that MRGCD, Reclamation, and Santa Fe had
carryover rights for “any unused portion of a particular year’s allocation.”439 The

431. Id.; c.f. Flanigan & Haas, supra note 263, 371–376 (previewing or foreshadowing this
eventuality, which Reclamation explicitly recognized in their 2016 water marketing report).
432. See Flanigan & Haas, supra note 263; App. B, at tbl. 8 (detailing relevant Supp. Water Progr.
operations from 2002 through 2018, including amounts leased, from willing San Juan-Chama Project
contractor, and release to the river for the benefit of the silver minnow, by Reclamation—by year).
433. 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 56.
434. 2003 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 224.
435. EMERGENCY DROUGHT WATER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, U.S. DEPT.
OF INTERIOR AND THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CONTRACT NO. 03-WC-40-886 (April 22, 2003)
[hereinafter 2003 EDWA].
436. Engineer Advisers Report, at 22, 34, in RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT
(2003) (cited in UTTON CTR., Policy and Operations, supra note 161, at “RGCC.Ann.Rpt-Eng’rAdv” tab)
[hereinafter RGCC EA 2003] (citing 2003 EDWA, supra note 435).
437. RGCC EA 2003, supra note 436, at 26.
438. Id.
439. Engineer Advisers Report, at 26, in RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT
(2004) (cited in UTTON CTR., Policy and Operations, supra note 161, at “RGCC.Ann.Rpt-Eng’rAdv” tab)
[hereinafter RGCC EA 2004].
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State furnished the allocations, under the terms of the 2003 Agreement, to MRGCD,
Reclamation, and the City of Santa Fe.440
In 2008, the EDWA was amended for the first time.441 This 2008 agreement
was actually an amendment to the Conservation Water Agreement of 2001, which
arose out of negotiations surrounding the 2001 Biological Opinion.442 Pursuant to
this iteration of the EDWA, New Mexico relinquished 125,000 acre-feet of Rio
Grande Compact credit water to Texas at Elephant Butte.443 Texas’s assent to this
relinquishment had the effect of permitting New Mexico to physically store the same
amount of water upstream at El Vado as a hedge against drought. The EDWA
allocated this special tranche of stored water between Reclamation, MRGCD, and
certain municipalities.444 The URGWOM tracks these different accounts. As an
engineer and URGWOM expert noted, URGWOM “served as an excellent tool for
agencies and stakeholders to analyze the impact of such agreement on various
indicators in the basin.”445 Under the 2008 EDWA,446 which was the first institutional
arrangement set up under URGWOM, New Mexico was able to store native water at
El Vado reservoir when it would have otherwise been precluded by operation of
Compact Article VII.447
Another three-year EDWA was signed in 2016.448 This Agreement, which
corresponded to and would comprise a key Conservation Measure in the then-soonto-be-released Biological Opinion,449 allocated 110,000 acre-feet of relinquishment
credit water to satisfy both ESA needs as well as MRGCD irrigation demands.450
Under the new 2016 EDWA, Emergency Drought Water451 was allocated outright to
440. Engineer Advisers Report, at 11, in RIO GRANDE COMPACT COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT
(2008) (citing Feb. 5, 2008 Relinquishment Agreement) (cited in UTTON CTR., Policy and Operations,
supra note 161, at “RGCC.Ann.Rpt-Eng’rAdv” tab) [hereinafter RGCC EA 2008].
441. Emergency Drought Water Agreement, Amendment No. 1 (Mar. 31, 2008) [hereinafter 2008
EDWA].
442. Id. at 1 n. 389; cf. Gillon (2007), supra note 57, at 633, 635.
443. See KEVIN REIN ET AL., CALENDAR YEAR 2017 REPORT TO THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT
COMMISSION 16 (2018).
444. 2008 EDWA, supra note 441; URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 14, app. B-17.
445. URGWOM Ruleset, supra note 21, at 6.
446. See generally Gillon (2007), supra note 57, at 633–35, nn. 123–37 and accompanying text
(analyzing the Conservation Water Agreement, which is predecessor to Emergency Drought Water
Agreement).
447. See 2008 EDWA, supra note 441.
448. EMERGENCY DROUGHT WATER AGREEMENT OF 2016, BETWEEN NEW MEXICO, MIDDLE RIO
GRANDE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, AND DEPT. OF INTERIOR
SOLICITORS’ OFFICE 3 (Apr. 22, 2016) [hereinafter 2016 EDWA].
449. Id. at 1, § 2 (citing 2015 JOINT BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, which paved the way for the Dec. 2016
BIOLOGICAL OPINION), 2, § 2(f) (conditioning MRGCD’s allocation on District making its “best efforts”
at meeting flow requirement of 2003 Biological Opinion or those of “any subsequent Biological Opinion”)
and, while it has “stored native Rio Grande water available,” supporting Silvery Minnow Recovery
Implementation Program).
450. Id. at 1, §§ 1, 2 (citing November 2012, February 2013, and March 2015 letters from New Mexico
Rio Grande Compact Commissioner which relinquished credit water to Texas, pursuant to the Rio Grande
Compact article).
451. Id. at 1, § 2 (defining Emergency Drought Water as “up to 110,.000 acre-feet of relinquishment
credit water” that MRGCD and the United States agree to “seek to capture, store, and release,” subject to
require “approvals and regulatory requirements”).
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the MRGCD (78,000 acre-feet), leased to Reclamation (19,000 acre-feet) at a cost of
$1.9 million.452 13,000 acre-feet was set to be used “by the [MRGCD] or the United
States, consistent with [New Mexico’s] commitments in the 2015 Biological
Assessment [‘BA’]” and “at the direction of” New Mexico’s Interstate Stream
Commission.453 Under the 2016 EDWA, Reclamation may only store or release up
to 10,000 acre-feet in any given year,454 and MRGCD’ storage and releases are
limited to 45,000 acre-feet annually.455 Notably, MRGCD is required to manage
Reclamation’s 14,000 acre-feet allocation under the 2016 EDWA “for the sole
purpose of ESA compliance.”456
In making these allocations for endangered species’ needs and irrigated
agriculture, the 2016 EDWA recognized operative “hydrologic realities and
limitations on the water supply in the [M]iddle Rio Grande [B]asin.”457 It therefore
aimed to “collaboratively provide for the coordinated storage, release and
management of water.” Accordingly, emergency drought water is required to be
“beneficially used, consistent with New Mexico law” in accordance with the relevant
Biological Opinion “and/or as part of the planned Middle Rio Endangered Species
Collaborative Programs Recovery Implementation Program[.]”458
Water operations pursuant to the 2016 EDWA are thus controlled by the
parameters of the Biological Opinion and the Recovery Implementation Program,
both ESA institutes, within the broad confines of the Rio Grande Compact and New
Mexico water law. In terms of the December 2016 Biological Opinion, the parties’
agreed that this allocation of relinquishment credit water “will be considered a
combined contribution to the 2015 [Joint] offsetting and conservation measures.”459
The EDWA of 2003, which would be durable through amendments to the
Agreements in 2008 and 2016, had their roots in the Conservation Water Agreement
of 2001. This was a truly innovative effort to shore up water for the endangered
silvery minnow and its Rio Grande habitat. By way of water operations flexibility,
as with the EDWA’s subsequent reincarnations, Reclamation and other parties
entered into an innovative agreement in 2001 to store relinquishment credit water in
reservoirs upstream of Elephant Butte, when not otherwise permitted under the terms
of the Rio Grande Compact.460 First proposed by the State of New Mexico as a

452. This amount equates to $100 per acre-foot of water. Id. at 1, § 2(c).
453. Id.
454. Id. at 1, § 2(b).
455. Id. at 2, §2(d).
456. Id. at 2, §2(e).
457. Id. at 1, § 2(a).
458. Id.
459. 2016 EDWA, supra note 448, at 1, ¶ 2(c); see 2015 JOINT BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note
74.
460. See Santa Ana Pueblo, Office of the Gov., Lt. Gov, and Sec’y, Resolution of the Tribal Council,
Storage of Rio Grande Compact Accumulated Credit Water in Jemez Canyon Reservoir, No. 01-R-06
(signed Mar. 27, 2001); Memorandum of Agreement [MOA] Among the Pueblo of Santa Ana, the [N.M]
Interstate Stream Comm’n [ISC], and the [U.S.] Army Corps of Engineers [COA] (signed on various
dates, April 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2001 CWA MOA].
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settlement offer during the early stages of the minnow litigation in March 2001,461
the Conservation Water Agreement462 aimed to facilitate compliance with the 2001
Biological Opinion’s Reasonable and Prudent Alternatives.463 Under the
Conservation Water Agreement, New Mexico would take advantage of the
Compact’s credit status to store native Rio Grande relinquishment credit water in
upstream reservoirs for subsequent release for instream use.464 This arrangement was
subject to various conditions precedent, that is, acts or events required before a duty
to perform arises,465 specifically, regulatory approvals.466 As a deviation from normal
operations, the agreement required the Rio Grande Compact Commission’s “advice
and consent,” which was obtained via resolution in advance.467 It also required
approval from the Corps, as a non-emergency deviation, as well as NEPA
compliance by the Corps for that same action.468 Finally, the Conservation Water
Agreement was subject to the terms of a permit issued by the OSE.469 The permit
required Conservation Water Agreement water be released “for beneficial uses
occurring in the Rio Grande”470 for purposes of complying with the ESA or
managing the Compact delivery obligations.471
Under the Agreement, Conservation Water was defined as:
. . . water stored and made available consistent with state law by
New Mexico as a conservation pool above Elephant Butte
Reservoir[, i.e.,] native Rio Grande water that, if not stored, would
otherwise have flowed downstream to Elephant Butte Reservoir
and contributed to New Mexico’s compact deliveries.472
Total storage under the Conservation Water Agreement was limited to 100,000 acrefeet in Abiquiu and Jemez Canyon reservoirs, which would then be released—up to
30,000 acre-feet per year—between 2001 and 2003. Water stored, but not used, in
any given year would not be lost but carried over.473
The Agreement authorized storage of water in excess of downstream
demand and was feasible due to three discrete conditions: 1) at the time New Mexico
had a credit status under the Compact; 2) hydrologic conditions did not preclude
461. Gillon (2007), supra note 57 and accompanying text (citing Letter from Stephen Farris, N.M.
Asst. Att’y Gen. et al., to Andrew Smith, U.S. Dep’t of Justice et al. (Mar. 5, 2001) http://
www.ose.state.nm.us/doing-business/mrgsettle/3-5-01-Settlement-Proposal.pdf.
462. See Gillon (2007), supra note 57, at 633–36 (summarizing and analyzing agreement, including
rationale, contractual provisions, legal authority, operational aspects, and “lessons learned”).
463. Id. at 633.
464. 2001 CWA MOA, supra note 460, at ¶¶ 1–17.
465. Conditions Precedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
466. See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 1–3, 10, 15.
467. Id. at 634.
468. Id.
469. See CONSERVATION WATER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO, U.S. DEPT. OF
INTERIOR, AND THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS § 5.D, at 4 (June 29, 2001) [hereinafter
CONSERVATION WATER AGREEMENT]; Permit No. SP-4822 (Apr. 28, 2003).
470. Gillon (2007), supra note 57, at 635, n. 134.
471. Id. at 635 n. 137 (citing Permit No. SP-4822).
472. Id. at 634 n. 130 (citing CONSERVATION WATER AGREEMENT, supra note 469, § 3, at 2).
473. Id. at 634 n. 128 (citing CONSERVATION WATER AGREEMENT, supra note 469, § 4, at 3).
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upstream storage under Compact Art. VII since there was more than 400,000 acrefeet in storage at Elephant Butte; and 3) storage space was available at the Abiquiu
and Jemez Canyon reservoirs.474
This confluence of enabling conditions shows what is typically required to
operationalize even modest reservoir flexibility, at Abiquiu or otherwise. In the case
of the now-operationalized Environmental Pool at Abiquiu— whose storage rights
have now been exercised to store environmental water for instream flow operations
since Audubon’s first use of the water space in 2016475—the Conservation Water
Agreement, which provided the framework for this innovative water storage space
could, as a result, be subsequently release for environmental purposes.476 The
landmark agreement itself was catalyzed by the fraught Rio Grande silvery minnow
litigation, a suit the environmental plaintiffs brought under ESA. As Gillon
highlighted, now roughly a decade and a half ago, “[m]any of the documents used to
implement the Conservation Water Agreement . . . serve as templates for [such]
agreements . . . [and] draw attention to the conditions for storing and releasing water
in [the] Environmental Pool.”477
Such operational collaboration and discretion, as codified in the present
Biological Opinion, increasingly characterizes the polycentric governance system
that is emerging on the Middle Rio Grande, that is “a series of partly overlapping
institutions . . . working within a cooperative structure defined by agreements and
basic rules.”478 This summary description of the concept, extensively developed by
institutional economist and political theorist Elinor Ostrom, draws on the work of
Hungarian polymath Michael Polanyi.479 More recently, polycentric governance has
been described as “a social system of many decision centers having limited and
autonomous prerogatives and operating under an overarching set of rule.”480 Students
of the philosopher–architect Christopher Alexander have summarized this set of
rules as “formal laws, contractual agreement, and informal or even tacit agreements”
between entities comprising this system.481 Perhaps most relevant to the present
work, polycentric governance appears to be constitutive of the transformation and
resilience that diversity produces.
In formulating and operationalizing its core Conservation Measures, the
current Biological Opinion constructs discretion as a primary mechanism for
achieving environmental flows. ESA compliance is thus a function of long-term
collaboration and trust-building between federal agencies such as the Service and

474. Id. at 635.
475. National Audubon Society, Audubon Announces Historic Water Release to the Middle Rio
Grande, (Sept. 7, 2016) https://www.audubon.org/news/audubon-announces-historic-water-releasemiddle-rio-grande.
476. Id. at 636.
477. Id.
478. Michael W. Mehaffy, Yulia Kryazheva, Andrew Rudd, Nikos A. Salingaros, A NEW PATTERN
LANGUAGE FOR GROWING REGIONS: PLACES, NETWORKS, PROCESSES 281 (SUSTASIS PRESS, 2020).
479. Id.
480. Id. (internal citation omitted).
481. Id.
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Reclamation, together with nonfederal stakeholders like MRGCD and New
Mexico’s Interstate Stream Commission.482
This view of discretion lies in contrast to the view of some environmental
advocacy groups that agency discretion is, per se, detrimental to the environment
because government agencies have not wielded their discretionary authority
properly.483 This rationale, however, can ignore the fact that the Rio Grande is a
novel system, which cannot easily be restored by fiat but must be managed
cooperatively—already the emerging pattern. In this environment, managing Rio
Grande reservoir operations for flexibility is a key variable; such operations are
themselves governed by various legal authorities, including Congressional
authorizations.484 This flexibility requires discretion on the part of both federal water
managers and river stakeholders.485 Thus, the Biological Opinion’s discretionary
space comprises coupled legal–physical dimensions, manifesting in practical and
political and as well as scientific and administrative registers—all in a
transboundary, social–ecological context.
The Biological Opinion also serves as a microcosm for larger surrounding
questions of, and approaches to, sustainability and water management in the arid
West. For example, what is the proper place for collaboration as opposed to litigation
in water politics? Some environmental groups have emphasized the perils of such
discretion and the benefits of adversarial legal action.486 In contrast, stakeholder
482. Cf. App. A(4); 2016 BIOLOGICAL OPINION, supra note 56, at 13 (regarding draft Hydrologic
Objectives for seasonal water needs for silvery minnow support), 18–24, 109–110 (“Conservation
Measures” and implementing regulations/programs/partners, corresponding to ESA-required “reasonable
and prudent measures,” and subject to the BiOp’s enumerated “terms and conditions”); cf id. 116–18
(concomitant Federal and state agencies’ discretionary “conservation recommendations”) (emphasis
added).
483. Cf. App. A(4)(iii) (regarding mid–2010’s WEG v. Corps litigation); see WildEarth Guardians v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 314 F.Supp.3d 1178, 1184–85 (D.N.M. June 6, 2018, amd’d
Aug. 14, 2018); WildEarth Guardians v. United States EPA, 759 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2014) (defining
what counts as an “action” that triggers § 7(a)(2)).
484. See, e.g., Kelly (2007b), supra note 136, at 656, 663–71, 671 (highlighting the work of
MRGESCP’s Water Acquisition and Management, or WAM, subcommittee, many of whose member “felt
it was important,” in “researching, developing, evaluating, and implementing water management
alternatives; examining ideas for efficient water use; and finding strategies to offset depletions caused by
program activities,” to “address reservoir storage and operations (especially focusing on gaining longterm flexibility in reservoir storage) because they are important components of water management and
supply.”), 665 (noting WAM members ultimately agreed that “long-term,” as opposed to short-term,
“storage flexibility should be one component” of the Committee’s work on a “Preliminary Analysis,”
beginning in 2004, and concomitant attempt to develop consensus regarding scenarios to be modeled,
which would ultimately be fairly limited scope, ultimately “not resulting in [actual] model runs” of
alternative water operations scenarios.).
485. See, e.g., id. at 664 n. 29 (reporting that URGWOM’s ruleset “consists of [the URGWOM]
technical team’s interpretation of operational policy, regulatory, preferences, and other decision-making
logic.”), 666 (WAM alternatives analysis, during the mid-aughts, “[d]iscussion of Cochiti Lake surfaced
immediately, but it was brief and the proposals were quickly dropped because the Pueblo de Cochiti was
not ready to discuss various operations of the lake.”), 670 (noting that Reclamation has “negotiated
temporary waivers [of San Juan–Chama Project water] with contractors to allow carryover [of such water]
until April 30 in order to provide release rates on the Rio Chama to enhance the fishery between El Vado
and Abiquiu Reservoirs during the winter and provide flexibility in managing river flows”), 671 (noting
that, one point, “discussion of . . . [Cochiti and Abiquiu] was taken off the table”).
486. See id.; c.f., Fishman, supra note 93, at 63–65 or 101–103.
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groups and water management, law, and policy practitioners comprising the Rio
Chama Flow Project emphasize the practical and environmental benefits of
collaborative approaches.487 In this context, real, if only incremental changes allow
for adaptive management of a novel system.
IV. ADAPTING: A PARTIAL INTEGRATION, INSTITUTIONAL
DIVERSITY
Finding a balance between flexible management and operating certainty is
a perpetual challenge in water management. In governmental institutions there is
always a tension between maintaining functional stability and adapting to changing
circumstances. Those who are regulated or served by government want and need of
a stable operating environment. However, dynamic circumstances require
government to respond to immediate needs in our ever-changing world.
Water management is an incredibly dynamic operating environment,
especially in the American Southwest. Water managers face dramatically changing
conditions from one water year to the next. They do so within what is perceived as a
tightly constrained legal and regulatory environment. Nonetheless, over time New
Mexico water managers have shown great imagination in developing new tools
within existing legal authorities.
The development of new water management tools does not occur overnight.
At times it seems that New Mexico’s water managers can respond remarkably
quickly to new challenges. However, in the background of these apparently rapid
responses there have always been pre-existing collections of information, positive
working relationships, and conversations about new ideas that range from the
embryonic to the fully developed. Thus, new water management regimes are often
the result of decades of discussion and contemplation.
Rules are made by people and can be changed by people. New laws are
passed, new regulations are crafted, and new agreements are forged all the time.
While it may seem impossible to challenge the status quo due to fears of disrupting
society and the economy, the truth is that all rules can be changed. Ideally, water
management regimes are constantly being improved through well-thought-out
responses to changing circumstances.
A. Current Flex Point for Rio Chama Reservoirs
Given the focus of the Rio Chama Flow Project on operations at the Heron,
El Vado, and Abiquiu Reservoirs, these three critical water-works form an important
piece of water management in the Middle Rio Grande. All three of these reservoirs
are operated in compliance with the Compact, but deviations from their standard
operations can be granted by the Rio Grande Compact Commission.488
With Heron as an initial waypoint, importation of San Juan-Chama water
into the Rio Grande Basin provides much needed flexibility given that it is authorized
to be used for a multitude of purposes. Most notably, San Juan-Chama water can be

487. The Utton Center is one such participating institution. Cf. RCFP Proposal, supra note 43, at 1;
2014 RGR WaterSMART Proposal, supra note 198, at 2, 8–13.
488. Gillon (2007), supra note 57; M.H. Benson (2014), supra note 45; App. B(2)(ii)(a)–(c).
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used for wildlife purposes such as endangered fish.489 San Juan-Chama water also
adds flexibility to basin-wide storage scenarios as it can now be stored in any
reservoir.490
For the first twenty years of San Juan-Chama Project operations, it was
believed that San Juan-Chama contractors must evacuate their annual allotment of
water from Heron Reservoir by December 31 each year.491 This was based on an
interpretation of a provision in the Colorado River Project Storage Act.492 In 1983
the San Juan-Chama Project Engineer proposed that carryover of water be allowed
until March 31 of the following year.493 This was suggested to alleviate the negative
effects of reduced flows in January on the trout population in the Rio Chama.
Carryover waivers were at first thought to be illegal but quickly found to be
allowed.494 A field solicitor issued a legal memorandum on September 7, 1983,
which held that carryover of San Juan-Chama water from year-to-year in Heron was
not allowed.495 After discussions with Reclamation’s Southwest Regional Director
the same field solicitor issued a revised legal memorandum less than a month later,
this time confirming that reading the law to allow for carryover storage was a more
proper interpretation.496 In that same legal memorandum, the solicitor blessed a
carryover waiver for the City of Albuquerque, despite acknowledging that
Albuquerque’s San Juan-Chama contract had a no-carryover clause in it.497
Furthermore, the solicitor expressed the opinion that other carryover waivers could
be granted on a case-by-case basis when there are benefits to the U.S. through more
effective Project operations.498
El Vado, for its part, differs from the other reservoirs in this article in a
significant way. Namely, it was not built by the federal government and does not
have explicit federal restrictions on how it may be used, other than those set forth in
the Rio Grande Compact.499 It is used to store both native and San Juan-Chama water,
as well as supplemental water for endangered species, and senior Pueblo irrigation
water rights.500 El Vado is often used as a re-regulating reservoir to simplify water

489. Act of June 13, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-483, 76 Stat. 96–102 (1962).
490. Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-140, §5(a), 95 Stat. 1717 (1981).
491. See, e.g., Email exchange between Rich Barrios and Karl Martin, inter alia, Sept. 15, 1998,
Regarding “Nov. 3, 1983 long lost solicitor’s opinion for waiving the carryover provision in heron” (on
file with author); cf. EMMET RICE, RECLAMATION FIELD SOLICITOR OPINION (Sept. 7, 1983) (on file with
author) [hereinafter RICE (Sept.)]; EMMET RICE, RECLAMATION FIELD SOLICITOR Opinion (Nov. 3, 1983)
(on file with author) [hereinafter RICE (Nov.)].
492. Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 (“CRSPA”), App. A(2)(ii)(b) at nn. 74–85 (at issue
was Sec. 8(d) of Pub. L. 87-483, 76 Stat. 98 (1956, 1962)).
493. See MEMORANDUM FROM REGIONAL DIRECTOR, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, SOUTHWEST REGION, TO REGIONAL DIRECTOR (Sept. 15, 1983) (on file with author); cf.
Barrios & Martin, supra note 205.
494. Cf. Barrios & Martin, supra note 205.
495. RICE (Sept.), supra note 491.
496. RICE (Nov.), supra note 491.
497. Id.
498. Emmet Rice, Reclamation Field Solicitor Opinions (Sept. 7, 1983 & Nov. 3, 1983).
499. See App. A(3)(ii)(a) (Irrigation Water: MRGCD Permits Nos. 1690 and 0620).
500. See App. A(3)(ii)(b) (“For their part, the six Middle Rio Grande Pueblos have two varieties of
water rights on the main-stem Rio Grande. Their “Prior and Paramount” water rights comprise surface

Summer 2021

WATER LAW, COMPLEXITY, AND JURISPRUDENCE

323

operations between Heron and Abiquiu Reservoirs. In 2015 and 2016 the Rio Grande
Compact Commission authorized new flexibility at El Vado when it approved a
deviation in operations to allow for water to be stored and released for the benefit of
the Rio Grande silvery minnow despite ongoing storage restrictions.501
El Vado provides various examples of flexible water management. It may
be the storage of Pueblo water rights that presents the greatest potential for
implementing future management flexibility at El Vado. Currently only the Pueblos’
Prior and Paramount water rights are stored in El Vado.502 The amounts and
procedures for storage and release of Pueblo water are dictated by a 1981 agreement
between the Secretary of the Interior and the MRGCD.503 This agreement could be
renegotiated in the future. Moreover, when the Pueblos decide to assert their water
right claims, storage at El Vado could be a major component of water right settlement
discussions. For example, it may be found prudent for the Pueblos’ Prior and
Paramount irrigation water rights to carry over from year-to-year in El Vado.
At Abiquiu, in turn, the Corps can deviate from normal operations with
permission from the Rio Grande Compact Commission.504 The Corps analyzes
planned deviations based on the case-by-case merits of the situation.505 Impacts to
flood potential, reservoir conditions, and expected benefits and consequences are all
considered. For example, in 2001 the Corps allowed for a deviation by approving the
storage of the Compact credit water in Abiquiu for the benefit of endangered
species.506 In 2014, the City of Albuquerque acquired land above the current fill limit
elevation of 6,220 feet, with the hopes of increasing its storage in Abiquiu.507 In
2018, Congress authorized the Corps to create peak flows on the Rio Grande through
temporary deviations of operations and both Cochiti and Jemez Reservoirs for a

flows necessary to irrigate 8,847 acres of Pueblo land which were being irrigated before the formation of
MRGCD. These Prior and Paramount rights are based on aboriginal sovereignty. In contrast, the roughly
11,000 acres of Pueblo land that have been reclaimed since the MRGCD was formed have shared priority
with all the other newly-reclaimed lands within the MRGCD.”); App. B, at tbls. 2, 3, & 6.
501. See App. B, at tbls. 1 & 2.
502. See App. A(3)(ii)(b); App. B, at tbls 1, 2, 3, 6, & 8.
503. 1981 P&P Agreement, supra note 193.
504. See App. A(2)(ii) (“[T]he Rio Grande Compact Commission would be the last word regarding
‘deviations’ from normal operations, i.e., those delineated in the Act’s “Reservoir Regulation Plan.” The
1960 Act provided that MRG reservoirs would be operated in compliance with the Rio Grande Compact
but that departures from the regulation plan could only occur with the advice and consent of the Compact
Commission—or in the case of an emergency.”); see also 74 Stat. at 493 (“[A]ll reservoirs of the Middle
Rio Grande Project will be operated at all times in the manner described above in conformity with the Rio
Grande compact, and no departure from the foregoing operations schedule will be made except with the
advice and consent of the Rio Grande Compact Commission.”).
505. See, e.g., 2001 CWA MOA, supra note 460.
506. Id.
507. See App. B, at tbls. 1, 2, & 8.
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period of five years, once the deviations are resumed.508 The Corps is required to
consult with Cochiti and Santa Ana Pueblos on these deviations.509
B. Future Flex Points
It is difficult to predict what will motivate water managers to find and
exercise flexibility in their future work. However, there are a number of unresolved
issues along the Rio Chama, in the Middle Rio Grande, and beyond that seem ripe
for creative thinking. First and foremost is the ongoing U.S. Supreme Court litigation
regarding groundwater use within the Rio Grande Project.510 That litigation was
catalyzed by the adoption of a new operating agreement for the Rio Grande
Project.511 That attempt at creating a new flexible management regime for water
deliveries from Elephant Butte Reservoir to Texas stretched beyond New Mexico’s
threshold for flexibly interpreting the Rio Grande Compact. Settlement negotiations
for this litigation present an intriguing forum for discussion of creative
interpretations of the Compact.512
The resolution of Pueblo water right claims is another opportunity for
creative water management thinking. The resolution of Pueblo water right claims in
northern and central New Mexico has included commitments to create regional water
supply systems and implement conjunctive management of ground and surface
waters.513 Future Pueblo water rights claims in the Middle Rio Grande may include
claims for ecological water, like spring pulse flows and maintained base flows.
Pueblo water right claim settlement negotiations may present the opportunity to
reconsider how the Rio Chama and Rio Grande reservoirs are used and operated.514
The ongoing corrective action study of El Vado Dam presents an
opportunity to think creatively about not only how the dam’s current operations can
be protected but also how it can be improved to better serve its users.515 For example,
perhaps the repairs to the dam could include upgrades that would allow operators to

508. Water Resources Development Act of 2018, 74 Stat. § 1174 (Middle Grande Peak Flow
Restoration); cf. JAMES DALTON, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL WORKS, MEMORANDUM ON REVISED
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE FOR SECTION 1174 [of 2018 WRDA], May 6, 2019,
https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/api/collection/p16021coll5/id/35434/download; AWIA (2018),
supra note 244 (containing current Congressional authorization of Cochiti Deviation).
509. Id.; see generally AWIA (2018), supra note 244 (containing current Congressional authorization
of Cochiti Deviations); cf. App. at § B (citing the Letter from Antoinette Grant, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, to Estevan Lopez and Brent Rhees (Nov. 12, 2013) (regarding expiration of the Cochiti
Deviation) (on file with author); see also D’Antonio, supra note 211, at 17 (noting the Corps’ that such
deviations were “unreliable tool[s]” for Silvery Minnow spawning).
510. Texas
v.
New
Mexico
and
Colorado,
Orig.
No.
141,
SCOTUSBLOG,
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/texas-v-new-mexico-and-colorado/.
511. See id. passim; ELEPHANT BUTTE IRRIGATION DISTRICT [EBID], EL PASO COUNTRY WATER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT NO. 1 [EPCID–1], AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA [US], OPERATING
AGREEMENT FOR THE RIO GRANDE PROJECT (Mar. 10, 2008); see also EBID, EPCID–1, and U.S., RIO
GRANDE PROJECT OPERATIONS MANUAL (rev’n May 2012).
512. Cf. Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado, supra note 510.
513. See UTTON CENTER, supra note 267.
514. Cf. Audubon Soc’y, Historic Partnership, supra note 123.
515. Personal Communication, Steve Harris, Exec. Dir. Rio Grande Restoration (Sept. 2020) (notes
on file with author).
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better control the sediment that is transported downstream. It may be that the need to
store water elsewhere during the repair of El Vado will require water managers to be
more flexible in their interpretation of existing reservoir authorities.
***
C. Metaphysics, Analytics, and Legal Common Sense: What is the Law of the
River?
This article has shown how negotiated arrangements leading to in-stream
flow innovations, such as the Conservation Water Agreement516 and its progeny;
algorithm-assisted decision-making tools, like URGWOM; and complementary
frames such as political ecology517 are integral to the Law of the River, and thus
constitutive of water law, policy, and management in the Middle Rio Grande. How
might their adaptive capacity and effectiveness be gaged?
To answer this question, this article has drawn heavily on, and thus sought
to extend contemporary complexity theory in the domain of law.518 As a
philosophical matter, the article has been guided by a jurisprudence heavily
influenced by Vine Deloria, Jr. A rigorous pluralistic perspective as Deloria’s, one
grounded in place and experience, hold heuristic value in practical as well as law and
policy terms. As Deloria life and works show, synthesizing diverse ways of knowing
and being that are independent of and transcend parochial views, as was his focus in
Metaphysics, is a powerful tool to bring “our transforming institutions” and
“expanding legal universe”—our institutional ontology—in line with the exigencies
of modern existence.519
Through empirical legal research, the resultant conceptual model of what
has been called the Law of the River emerges as an unsettled and entangled
assemblage. The model and empirical results nonetheless respond to Reclamation’s
desire for unpacking the dimensionalities of this mode of governance—legal
authority which, as this article has shown, is inseparable from the systems’ physical,
cultural, and political components and their myriad interdependencies. This model,
roughly sketched here, serves as scaffolding, and could be extended in support of a
larger project of catalyzing legal information extraction, synthesis, and
simplification.520
In broad strokes, a follow-on applied research agenda going might consider
further development of integral legal analytics, a mapping project to incorporate
such elements as natural language processing, network analysis, and graph theory. It
would likely offer insights well beyond the law. In abstract terms, this project would
516. See, e.g., McCoy, supra note 415.
517. i.e., political ecology and jurisprudence as social policy—cf. historic and contemporary
manifestation of settler colonialism attendant to political economies and material cultures in water, natural
resources, and the environmental and natural resources.
518. MURRAY ET AL., COMPLEXITY THEORY AND LAW: MAPPING AN EMERGENT JURISPRUDENCE
(2019).
519. DELORIA, supra note 12; accord DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 320; JOHN PROTEVI, EDGES OF
THE STATE (2019).
520. See generally ASHLEY, supra note 20 (like the application of Gillon’s (2007) framework in the
2016 (and subsequent) Audubon flows).
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be extension of Ashley’s computational legal analytics in concert with Ruhl &
Katz’s conceptual model of legal mapping. And, in the case of river basin
governance in the American West, could also synthesize Amos and Jaeger’s
hydrologic–economic–legal modeling of the Willamette River, for example, with
Deloria’s grounded and pragmatic yet expansive jurisprudence. In virtue of such a
proposal, as Deloria suggested, actionable Critical Zone-related insights might
emerge whereby:
[a] new understanding and way of life for individuals[,] . . . [in
which] [o]ur understanding of societies, of technology, of
institutions, and of the place of nature within our legal system
points to a radically new conception of individual life and seems
to indicate that all transformation of larger social organization and
concepts will eventually focus on ourselves as individuals . . .
[through a] [re]examinat[ion] of our traditional understanding of
the individual.521
Moving thus, as Deloria tracked in his Metaphysics, from a “charismatic model” of
human affairs, through a “traumatic planetary past,” to a “transformation of modern
science,” and on to a “metaphysics of modern existence,” we might come to be
informed by “the original . . . perception of realities” which have been, through the
ages, “transformed” into philosophes that, though they “purport to give a logical and
analytical explanation of ultimate reality,” nonetheless Deloria showed have
“eliminated the human emotions and intuitive insights of the original experience.”522
By “substitute[ing] a systematic rendering of human knowledge concerning the
natural world,” our modern paradigm has generated a maladaptive response, overall,
to our accumulating planetary catastrophes. What important knowledge might be
gleaned from a Deloria-inspired jurisprudence of the so-called law of the river?
Going forward, properly analyzing this intertwined physical and legal
system will certainly require some automation, a necessary though far from sufficient
step, given the characteristic, systemic complexity of the Middle Rio Grande. To
keep these matters manageable, Christopher Alexander’s theory of building,
originally inspired by legal scholar James Ragsdale, Jr.’s phenomenological
jurisprudence of land, governance, and being is instructive.523 Alexander’s theory
rests on simple “pattern language[s]” which, unfolding on their own, are governed
in a “timeless” fashion;524 an analytical device which aids in digesting synthesis and
thus making sense of and deriving some meaning and knowledge as ethical know521. DELORIA, supra note 12, at 187–88.
522. See id. at 177, 189, 201, 215.
523. See Ragsdale, Jr., supra note 12. For a complementary perspective, see Edward L. Rubin, Putting
Rational Actors in their Places: Economics and Phenomenology, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1705–07,
1726–27 (1998) (characterizing the explanatory strength of Husserl’s phenomenology in empirical terms,
in contrast to purported strength of economics’ rational actor theory, sometimes incorporated into legal
analysis, in idoneous—i.e., institutional–economics—domains), 1719 (“All human thought, being
individual thought, is necessarily limited by cognitive and informational constraints, and must therefore
proceed by means of approximation or heuristics.”) (internal citation omitted), 1719 n. 38 (noting different
approaches to phenomenology-adjacent heuristics in contexts such as institutional economics which, this
author would add, is itself a field adjacent to jurisprudence as a close reading of this work would reveal).
524. See CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, THE TIMELESS WAY OF BUILDING (1979).
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how, even wisdom, of the Law of the River as a complex system. This is all the more
important given climate change and drought as existential threat and climate justice
as a normative, even operational, response.
Useful tools such as URGWOM may be necessary for water managers and
stakeholder to “unpack” the Law of the River. But insights gleaned from such
heterodox modes of thinking as Deloria’s, which underlie the thrust of this work,
may ultimately prove more valuable. As the Law of the River faces an existential
crisis, its transformation in the direction of “expanding the legal universe,” as Deloria
put it, is of foremost importance. There are indications that such transformation may
be underway, as highlighted recently by the interdisciplinary work on Colorado
River drought contingency work carried out by a team of consultants, Martin and
McCoy and Culp & Kelly. The founding partners of the former firm are an ecologist
and an environmental economist who, with support now from a computational
biologist, employ a self-described “practice of inquiry.” The latter is a boutique law
firm specializing in water, environmental, and natural resources law and policy, is
perhaps the only firm in the West to have an in-house hydrogeologist.525 The
combined efforts, explained in these orthodox terms, is a token of the sorts of modes
of inquiry this article has drawn on, from the philosophy of law and jurisprudence to
social policy. All such inquiries—scholarly by nature here, or as a matter of
effectively navigating the complex regulatory and transactional landscape of water
in the West, as with the Rio Chama Flow Project or Martin & McCoy, Culp & Kelly,
and their clients—are quite adjacent to political ecology, recalling historian and
conservationist William deBuys’ shorthand for describing the Middle Rio Grande’s
biggest water governance challenges.526
In pursuing such a political–ecological inquiry under the guise of legal
analysis, this article has described and attempted to explain the origin, persistence,
and success or failure of certain ideas of water law in the context of the Middle Rio
Grande Basin. As Deloria puts it, the purpose of engaging a critique of “culture and
civilization,” as this article has attempted, is “perceiving [of] situations in [] total
experience” to aid ourselves to “make sense of our lives” and thus “become better
people.”527 In retrospect, the Law of the River jurisprudence explored here had its
point of departure in an exploration of how and what it means to live in a place
together, the age-old political question. But this legal philosophy is not merely an
intellectual exercise and even less a purely legal one. Forty years ago, Deloria was
already observing that “science [had been] . . . rapidly approaching the area of
metaphysics.”528 As the visionary Deloria was well aware, philosophers and
physicists—and even philosopher–physicists—alike had accepted this proposition
long before he made it.529

525. Cf. McCoy, supra note 415.
526. Cf. LATOUR & WIEBEL, supra note 1, at 1 (epigraph); accord DEBUYS, supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
527. DELORIA, supra note 12, at 150, 187–88.
528. Id. at 64.
529. Cf. KAREN BARAD, MEETING THE UNIVERSE HALFWAY: QUANTUM PHYSICS AND THE
ENTANGLEMENT OF MATTER AND MEANING 97–132 (2007) (reviewing, extending, and revising legendary
20th century physicist Neils Bohr’s philosophical framework).
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Beyond the explanatory powers of prediction and feedback mechanisms of
interested water managers, the approach proposed, pursued, and applied in this
article responds to Deloria’s creative injunction to construct a framework, namely a
modern metaphysics that synthesizes the insights and values of Indigenous peoples
throughout the world with those of Western scientists, philosophers, and theorists.530
In doing so, the common aim would be to harmonize our beliefs and actions
independently of any particular tradition, in order to “arrive at a new vision for the
future which accurately and appropriately deal[s]” with reality.531 It is safe to say
that this reality now included a 500-year return period megadrought, as Rio Grande
conditions now demonstrate.
In this way, Deloria’s “desire . . . to use metaphysics as a bridge between
science and religion” could not be more relevant as this method serves “to determine
if Western culture and civilization have sufficient universality to provide a
meaningful vision of human existence on a planetary basis.”532 Within the
preliminary, contingent and defeasible disposition of the law-of-the-river-as-legalmap, a “social imaginary”533 of sorts has space nonetheless to emerge, one which
offers a trace of another possible Law of the River.534 This is a critical finding,
especially in virtue of 1) our current collective’s “[g]reat derangement” regarding the
“[u]nthinkable” events accompanying climate change,535 and 2) the ultimately
political issue which, doomed the Colorado River Compact from the start, namely
“ignoring inconvenient science.”536
Going forward, the positive project will be to see this diverse constellation
of what the law is. In turn, the data of experience must be given space to breathe.
Then practitioners and policymakers must articulate a “new legal common sense,”
in the words and jurisprudence of noted legal scholar Boaventura de Sousa Santos.537
Vine Deloria, Jr. would no doubt agree and has argued persuasively that this common
sense is a prerequisite to “expanding the legal universe,” a project he tirelessly
pursued and advocated prophetically.538 Indeed, synthesizing ways of knowing and
being independent of parochial views is enormously valuable. Critics of progressive
water policies demand empirical proof, especially considering the nominal
normativity of such theorizing. To wit, legal and policy analysis grounded in
experience is more approachable, and effective. Not only can “irrational things . . .
530. See DELORIA, supra note 12, at 163–88 (addressing, in consecutive chapter, the extant reality and
experience of “[o]ur [t]ransforming [i]nstitutions” and the normative project of “[e]xpanding the [l]egal
[u]niverse”), 273–81; see generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, THE LEGAL UNIVERSE:
OBSERVATION ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN LAW 1–14, 373–76 (2011) (expanding on Deloria’s
previously articulated “legal universe” expansion norm).
531. DELORIA, supra note 12, at 29, 287.
532. Id. at 29.
533. See CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES (2004).
534. See infra Section II.D (“Another world is possible,” as the Zapatista maxim suggests.).
535. AMITAV GHOSH, THE GREAT DERANGEMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE UNTHINKABLE
(2017).
536. ERIC KUHN AND JOHN FLECK, SCIENCE BE DAMMED: HOW IGNORING INCONVENIENT SCIENCE
DRAINED THE COLORADO RIVER (2019); see also Jefferey Hoagland, Book Note, 61 NAT. RES. J. 331
(2021).
537. DE SOUSA SANTOS, supra note 320, at cover, passim.
538. DELORIA, supra note 12, at 177–88, 273–82, 283–91 (afterword by David Wilkins).
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occur,”539 as when physical systems are abstracted into legal terms in the case of
Western water law, but also, for example, as Deloria observes: “if our legal system
reflects our view of reality, [] we believe we exist [] apart from the physical
world.”540 Plainly the consequent does not hold, as shown by this foray into the
complexity, and thus ontology, as well as the meaning of the Law of the River within
the social–ecological system comprising New Mexico’s Middle Rio Grande Basin.
The modest empirical results reported here are indexical of this state. This initial
inquiry may aid an understanding of how “everything happens” in the Critical Zone
and why its habitability “[d]epends on your chosen science,” and survival there
“depends on your politics.”541
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, all laws, policies, and other water management rules are human
and social constructs. The rules that govern us today were created by yesterday’s
leaders. It is incumbent on today’s water managers to evaluate today’s rules and
analyze, as best they can, how effective these rules will be in both the predictable
and unforeseen future. As this article acknowledges, “rule” changes are not made
overnight but rather through long-term contemplation, socialization, and
optimization of physical and political circumstances. Making water management
more flexible is a complex endeavor that requires mastery of many different
disciplines but ultimately depends on the open-mindedness of today’s water
managers.
***

539. Id. at 179.
540. Id. (citing and interpreting Salt River Water Users’ Ass’n v. Kovacovich, 3 Ariz. App. 28, 411
P.2d. 201 (1966)).
541. LATOUR & WEIBEL, supra note 1, at 1 n. 1.

